POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Economic globalization is the figurative wave that lifts all boats, i.e., small as well as large economies if it is managed well, if negative side effects are addressed, and if its gains are broadly distributed. Globalization is not inevitable, despite technological progress, because it depends on political commitment to sustain global economic liberalization. In order to better understand the political willingness to support globalization it is vital to understand the generally overlooked role that political parties play in this context. This paper conducts a case study of Germany's political parties by looking at the messages parties communicate to voters during federal election campaigns. By examining the written election programs of the five major parties from 1990 to 2013, this study is able to demonstrate a general lack of political will in Germany to support and manage globalization. This conclusion must not necessarily hold for other countries. The specifics of this study are not suited to allow for broad generalizations, but the fact that the political elite in a country that has been exceptionally well integrated into the global economy and has profited immensely from open borders and the ability to export it goods is so pessimistic about globalization and is only able to muster the ability to pay lip service to the idea of shaping and building globalization, but fails at delivering truly meaningful policy proposals, makes it difficult to be hopeful that other states feature parties that behave differently from Germany's parties.

To Elizabeth

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ABBREVIATIONS

CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany
CMP	Comparative Manifesto Project
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
DNVP	German National People's Party
ECB	European Central Bank
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UN	United Nations
WASG	Labor and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL PARTIES

When one thinks about globalization, political parties are probably not among the first things that come to mind. The same could be said the other way around, political parties usually do not conjure up thoughts about globalization. The connection between globalization and political parties is not necessarily obvious. This chapter will illustrate their connection and why it is important to the both the political process and the economic prosperity of modern democracies.

1.1 What Type of Globalization and why It Matters

Globalization is a contested concept and there is a vast body of literature that addresses this issue from diverse angles. It is important to clearly outline what this study includes and what it omits when using the term "globalization." One way to think about globalization that is among the most observable is the focus on markets (see Levitt, 1983; Obstfeld & Taylor, 2003) and economic issues such as competitiveness (see Krugman & Venables, 1995), but also the emphasis of globalization's potential for prosperity and peace as addressed by Friedman (2000). Another important focus within the globalization literature studies culture is how it is transformed though increased interconnectedness as well as how it shapes these connections (see Featherstone, 1990; Pieterse, 2009;

Tomlinson, 1999). Others, like Storper (1992) and Narula (2014), have focused on the relationship of globalization and technology, whereas Bauman (1998) and Nam and Barnett (2011) study the effects of globalization on mobility and immigration, more precisely how it empowers those that have the resources to be mobile on a global scale and those who are increasingly punished by their inability to venture outside of their very localized existence. Schaeffer (2003) and Perrons (2004) highlight the social consequences of globalization, while Sassen (1999) and Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (2000) address a broad range of issues like human trafficking, the environment, gender issues or corporate power, and how all of these issues are affected by globalization. These few examples are only a fraction of the literature that deals with globalization and the purpose for referencing these works here is merely to show that this study only addresses a small portion of this vast and complex issue.

The primary focus of this study is an economic conception of globalization, which at its core is defined as the "integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment […], short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology" (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 3). Such a definition or focus is not uncommon (see Cook & Underwood, 2012; Gilpin, 2001; McGrew, 2011), but it clearly omits cultural factors and marginalizes social effects, neither of which should be underestimated. However, this study is putting an emphasis on the economic side of globalization. In the context of this study it does become important to contrast the contemporary process defined as globalization with past integration efforts in order to see if the contemporary globalization process is truly unique and novel.

1.2 How Novel Is Globalization and Is It Ever Expanding?

Mankind has already experienced periods in which people, commodities, capital and information were exchanged worldwide. In fact, today's environment is the result of historic developments. Human communities have always been engaged in economic and social relationships with others; the idea that globalization is a new contemporary phenomenon can only be explained by historical amnesia, a process "in which we think that just because we are thinking about an idea, it has only just started" (Hall, 2004, p. 173). Many historians even see a continuous centuries long upwards trend in the expansion of global trade, which was only interrupted from 1914 until 1945 (Bhagwati, 2004; Ravenhill, 2011). Nevertheless, contemporary globalization has some distinctive features that previous eras lack. One difference is the way in which states conduct international trade today. In the past, the predominant type of exchange was the trade of raw materials. Presently, the bulk of traded goods consists of merchandise and value added goods for further production. This means that cross border trade matters much more to traders than it did in the past. Additionally, it is important to note that there has been a substantial and persistent increase in both the scale and pace with which products and services, capital, information, and humans are being moved on a global scale (Bisley, 2007). Therefore, this study uses the term globalization to refer to different times of economic integration, like integration efforts in the 21st century as well as those at the end of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is not to say that they are identical but they are similar enough to warrant a consistent terminology, just as the term *nation state* can be applied to the United States both in 1814 as well as in 2014, despite the fact that the US has changed significantly in those 200 years.

In this study the much more important difference is the cause of the current wave of globalization compared to globalization in the past. Earlier integration was based on innovations, like the telegraph, the railroad and the steam boat. All of these technological innovations reduced transaction costs dramatically, thus creating new opportunities for trade, investment and entrepreneurship. These technological advances have continually progressed and have become ever more sophisticated and efficient. Today, the costs and time needed to overcome distance have been significantly reduced, by supertankers, jumbo jets, the internet, and satellite navigation, for example, thus allowing for closer and tighter commercial networks over a greater distance, which affect more and more people. It is not just the fact that a larger part of the world is better connected than in years gone by; it is also the substantially increased rate of these connections that is significant (Bisley, 2007; Hirst & Thompson, 2002; Ravenhill, 2011; Roderik, 1997). In other words, globalization in the past was primarily based upon technological advances. Certainly, today's technological innovations still create incentives to engage in more trade, invest abroad and to increasingly integrate, but globalization in the current era is, to a large extent, fueled by governments who "have intervened to reduce obstacles to the flow of trade and investment worldwide. The story of globalization has to be written in two inks: one colored by technical change and the other by state action" (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 11).

It is precisely the state's involvement in this current era of globalization that is at the heart of this study. Globalization's driving force is the combination of technological innovation and political will. Of these two factors it is the political will that is the more ambiguous and volatile one, not technological advancement. It is unreasonable to suspect

that innovation and technological progress will cease. The rate of advancement might change but a complete standstill is very unlikely. When it comes to state support for globalization, however, the picture looks quite different. The first step when looking at the state's effect on globalization has to be to refute the common perception that states are being deprived of their power, initiative and legitimacy by an increasingly globalized world. This idea is based, in part, upon the belief that states are not able to guarantee the economic welfare of their citizens anymore. Instead, private economic actors determine issues of production and services and states are unable to resist globalization because the costs of not participating in the neoliberal economic model are simply too high (Bisley, 2007, p. 63). However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to substantiate these claims. National policy makers are as relevant as ever. States still raise enormous funds through taxation and spend these funds as they see fit. States continually establish and enforce laws and they employ legions of people. States still have a powerful tool at their disposal, the most powerful form of collective identity, nationalism. Even though people like to claim that nationalism is declining and "globalization is the order of the day, a reminder is necessary. Nationhood is still being reproduced" (Billig, 1995, p. 9). It is states who foster this reproduction, because nationalism is "the cultural and social means through which the political system of states is produced and reproduced and there is little evidence to support the argument that this important role will be meaningfully transformed" (Bisley, 2007, p. 182). In fact "[n]ationalism is a political idea which may shut down globalization more effectively than anything else" (Bisley, 2007, p. 186).

1.3 Globalization, Political Will, and Political Parties

In essence, globalization does not confront the state with existential threats; rather, it creates further complexities within which the state must operate and to define its preferences and "[h]erein lies a vulnerability that cannot be dismissed complacently" (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 11), because if a state's power is ultimately not circumscribed by globalization then states retain the potential to stop and even reverse it. This is exactly what happened after World War I when governments started to reverse the process of globalization by increasing trade barriers. This development started with the U.S. Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 and was later reinforced by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. These two pieces of legislation set off a torrent of protective measures all over the world (Bernanke, 2013). This led to a global reversal from a relatively open economic system into increasingly closed national economies. One could claim that "the United States led the way to closure" (Krasner, 1976, p. 339). This demand for increased protectionism was intended to shield national economies from the effects of the Great Depression, which was largely caused by three factors: low demand and over capacity, high interest rates and central banks who were unwilling to provide adequate liquidity, and the gold standard which restricted monetary growth and even led to deflation (see Caldwell & O'Driscoll, 2007; Eichengreen, 2004). The Great Depression confronted legislators with an economic predicament. The unmatched economic failure left them only two choices, "deflation under the gold standard, currency depreciation, or direct controls over trade and payments to maintain gold and foreign exchange reserves" (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010, p. 32). States usually ruled out deflation as too costly for the domestic economy due to necessary wage and price reduction, thus leaving only the

choice between maintaining fixed exchange rates or maintaining open trade. The gold standard was in essence a fixed exchange rate, which meant that if countries did not want to break with the gold standard, then their only other option was to impose trade restrictions. A reduction of imports means that monetary liquidity can be secured due to lower exports of gold, which is used to pay for the imported goods (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010, p. 32).

The Great Depression manifested an abrupt increase of trade protectionism. The implementation of tariffs, import quotas, and restrictions on the flow of capital contributed to a sharp reduction in world trade in the early 1930s, which lasted longer than the economic collapse itself (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010, p. 2.). The combined effect of direct and indirect trade restrictions accounts for a 20% contraction of global trade (Madsen, 2001, pp. 866-867). It was only at the end of World War II that governments started to engage in the reversal of barriers to trade and began to gradually embrace economic openness. Thus, it is important to note that globalization is not an inevitable or irreversible process. Previous phases of globalization have experienced setbacks and future phases may experience similar developments. In other words the policies and consequences of the 1930s might not be a singular experience; a repeat is quite possible (Gilpin, 2001; Kapstein, 1996; Keohane & Ney, 2001; Rodrik, 1997).

If globalization is not a self-perpetuating process, but instead one that is dependent upon political will, then it is important to examine this political will more closely. From 1986 to 2008 global trade as a share of global gross domestic product (GDP) has steadily risen, but leveled out and has remained level since 2008 (until today 2016). The flow of global capital plummeted in 2012 to a third of its 2007 all-time high

of $11 trillion. In other words, currently "[g]lobalization has clearly paused" ("Special Report: The World Economy," 2013, p. 3). The reason is that after 2 decades of increasingly free movement of goods, services, and people, governments are increasingly fencing off their economies. They are more selective about their trading partners, what kind of investment they deem desirable, and how easy they make it for companies to do business abroad. This does not mean that states eschew the general principles of free trade, but they increasingly try to tip the balance in their favor so as to shield themselves from the negative effects of globalization ("Special Report: The World Economy," 2013, p. 3). On a global scale the increased use of such beggar-thy-neighbor policies can slow down globalization significantly, potentially even halt or reverse it.

This leads to the broader question, what determines how political leaders respond to the opportunities and pressures of globalization? There are many different ways to answer this question. Some scholars would implicate macrolevel variables such as the overall structure of the international system (see Gowa, 1994; Krasner, 1976; Mattli, 1999), or the ability of international organizations to codify and enforce international rules and norms (see Keohane, 1988; March & Olson, 1998; Moravcsik, 1993; Nye, 1970). Another way to approach this issue, however, is to look at mesolevel variables at the intrastate level of analysis. As Milner (1998) points out, it is crucial not to exclude domestic variables when one is trying to understand global trade liberalization. Using this line of reasoning can be very helpful when examining the logic behind the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a significant effect on global trade by drastically increasing U.S. tariffs on a wide scale, and which subsequently caused a strong backlash from other states (Irwin, 2011). Over the years different attempts have been made to identify

the predominant reason for the passage of this particular piece of legislation. Schattscheider's early study (1935) identified lobbying and special interests that demanded protection from imports through increased tariffs as the primary culprits. Eichengreen (1989) argues that the combined efforts of both agricultural and industrial protectionists led to the overwhelming support for the 1930 Act in both chambers of Congress. Irwin and Kroszner (1996) demonstrate that a Senator's voting behavior was primarily influenced by his or hers constituency's economic interests, and Kumiko (2009) goes down a completely different road by arguing that research should focus on the executive, and in particular the president, and not on the legislature when trying to explain Smoot-Hawley.

On the other hand Pastor (1980) contends that the 1930 Act is the result of party politics: "The bill was one of the most controversial issues in the nation for nearly two years" (Pastor, 1980, p. 81) with wide national and international media coverage. However, when the House voted in favor of the bill 222 to 153, more than 93% of the delegates voted along party lines. Similarly, the Senate endorsed the Smoot-Hawley Act 44 to 42 with more than 81% of Senators toeing their own party's line. Clearly, "partisanship was hardly insignificant" (Pastor, 1980, p. 81). Callahan, McDonald, and O'Brien (1994) corroborate these findings, as they find that party affiliation and a constituency's unemployment rate are the two dominant factors determining voting patterns. By contrast, specific economic interests within a constituency seem to have no significant influence on voting behavior. Other supporters of these findings are Cupitt and Elliot (1994) who, contrary to their initial expectations, conclude that political party affiliation is the crucial factor explaining the passing of the 1930 Tariff Act.

There is certainly a good deal of controversy regarding which variable best explains the passing of the Smoot-Hawley Act and it is not the intent of this study to necessarily resolve this issue. It may very well be that political parties are not the most crucial variable for explaining this particular piece of trade legislation, but to discard party affiliation as an explanatory variable seems foolish. However, it appears that a lot of existing research on globalization does precisely that. Many globalization scholars assume that the impact of political parties' platforms and preferences have only a marginal influence on states' participation in and stands toward globalization. Shoch (1998) strongly contests this view, however, based on his own studies of political parties and stands on trade openness. In fact, he concludes that "party competition can have significant effects on the making of foreign economic policy" (Shoch, 1998, p. 131). More recently Camyar asserts that "the competitive forces of party politics have an autonomous impact on patterns of trade outcomes" (Camyar, 2012, p. 403), suggesting that political party affiliation is not only a relevant but important explanatory variable in policy outcomes.

Furthermore, Camyar states that "one of the least understood subjects in the political economy of international trade is the impact of party politics on trade outcomes" (Camyar, 2012, p. 397) and that "scholars should pay more attention to this neglected topic" (Shoch, 1998, p. 131). The study proposed here addresses this lack of understanding by looking at existing theory in the field of international political economy, to show where these theories fall short, and to provide a more accurate and robust explanation for what advances or impedes globalization.

1.4 The Need for a Broad Conception of Political Will

Another key issue to establish in this study is how to best gauge if the "political will" regarding globalization has changed. A popular approach to studying the effects of globalization on a specific issue area involves examining if and how domestic policies in this area have changed. The underlying theoretical model for this approach is that globalization exerts pressures on states and affords them new opportunities. Governments, as the highest, most visible and powerful entity within the state, try to devise strategies for their specific country that maximize the gains from globalization and minimize its negative effects. These strategies become manifest in new policies (see Figure 1.1).

For example, if an individual wants to study the effects of globalization on the welfare state, one could correlate the level of exposure to international markets over a certain time frame, with the type of policies introduced during that same time (with some lag time) that alter welfare spending. Examples of this kind of research on the effects of globalization on states include Deeg (1996), Rotte (2000), Conley (2001), Gelleny and McCoy (2001), Swank (2002), Dreher and Ursprung (2008), as well as Hines and Summers (2009). With regard to the issue of political will this approach means that if (for instance) a government introduces multiple policies that are restrictive in nature vis-à-vis globalization (e.g., higher tariffs, technical standards that importers must meet, etc.), then we may conclude that the political will for globalization is waning.

The downside of this approach is that it implies a very limited definition of political will, because it links political will exclusively to the government. As Allison (1969) and Woocher (2001) illustrate there are other ways to conceive of a political will

than a rational unitary actor model. A broader concept of what determines political will acknowledges that decisions are not based upon the preferences or will of a single actor, but upon the preferences and perceptions of many actors. Their preferences, in turn, largely reflect the interests of their respective constituencies and, in the end, outcomes do not reflect the goals of any one single actor but those of intensive bargaining and compromise.

Similarly, this research project does not assume that the political will to support globalization is solely dependent upon the government. Instead, a more useful approach is to look at the process that determines who will hold office and be in power: elections. Any government's willingness to enact, change or dismiss policies depends to some extent on the election process and its outcome, because it provides the government with a mandate to transform specific campaign promises into actual policies. However, at the same time, it morally binds the party in power to their promises while creating a fear of retribution in the next election if the government fails to live up to its promises (see Budge & Hofferbert, 1990).

The strategic interaction of parties around elections is particularly fascinating, because parties reveal a lot about their own goals and preferences during this time. Examining this cyclical process allows for a much broader understanding of whether or not political will for globalization is waxing or waning, than an exclusive focus on government policies does. By studying the preferences of electoral winners and losers alike, one can replace a partial view of political will with a much more complete one. This approach is especially meaningful since no party fights an isolated election campaign; "party competition takes place indirectly and implicitly, whereby parties

indicate shifts in their policy positions by selectively emphasizing and deemphasizing policy themes relative to one another" (Mansergh & Thomson, 2007, p. 323). This way the programs of all competitors matter, because the manifesto of the winners will reflect the programmatic agenda of all parties, creating what Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge call an "agenda effect" (Klingemann et al.,1994, p. 3). By conceiving of political will as a phenomenon that is based on a cross party agenda, it becomes imperative to study the whole party system instead of just government policies. This in turn transforms the term political will from something that we simply infer based upon government policies into a crucial key that determines policy (see Figure 1.2).

This chapter has demonstrated that globalization is not a unique phenomenon that started in the second half of the 20th Century. Further economic integration is not inevitable, and globalization has not made the nation state obsolete nor has it impaired governments in any meaningful way. The chapter also made the point that the relationship between political parties and globalization has not been broadly studied and it is not as well understood as it could be. This is precisely the reason for this research, to gain added understanding of the relationship between political parties and globalization. Instead of investigating government policies to determine political will towards globalization within a country, this research will study the views and policy proposals of all major domestic parties within the Federal Republic of Germany. The following chapter will substantiate the important connection between globalization and political parties by drawing on the theory put forth by Rogowski in 1989.



Figure 1.1 Effect of Globalization on Domestic Policy via National Governments



Figure 1.2 Effect of Globalization on Domestic Policy via Political Will

CHAPTER 2

THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON POLITICAL PARTIES

Chapter 1 illustrated the link between domestic political will and policy change. The claim is that one can infer general domestic willingness to address and shape globalization in a constructive way by what kind of policy proposals parties make when they campaign for votes. Such a focus would be incomplete without addressing the fundamental connection between globalization and political parties, a link that is not based upon narrowly defined issues, such as a response by a domestic party to an import quota imposed by another state. Instead it is about how globalization can fundamentally alter political power and change domestic alliances. Such a view takes the issue of globalization from the fringes of politics to its very heart, and consequently all parties will have to respond to globalization. It is this response that will be studied in detail in Chapters 5-9, but first it is necessary to theoretically substantiate this claim in order to give this research a sound foundation, which is what this chapter (Chapter 2) sets out to do. The best way to demonstrate that globalization has an effect on political parties is to show how it shifts political alliances. The primary source for this effort is Rogowski's (1998) research in general, but this study will pay particular attention to how he relates his findings to Germany, as Germany is the focus of this research.

2.1 Commerce and Coalitions as a Framework of Analysis

"Commerce and Coalitions" is Rogowski's (1989) seminal work, which examines how domestic political alliances are affected by international trade. His theoretical framework is based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts who benefits from protection and who does not. The basic logic is that within an economy there are factors of production that are scarce and others that are abundant. The factor that is abundant will profit from trade, which opens up export opportunities with a larger market and more potential customers. Likewise, owners of a scarce factor will be harmed by trade due to imports of that factor and the resulting lower domestic price for that factor. In a Stolper-Samuelson's simplified two-factor economy of capital and labor, this means that in an economy abundant with capital but poor in labor, protectionist measures will hurt capital and benefit labor; trade liberalization would benefit capital and harm labor (Rogowski, 1989, pp. 3-4).

Rogowski augments this model slightly by introducing land as a third factor. He then proceeds to classify each country as either economically advanced or backwards with a particular land-labor ratio. For example, he classifies Germany in his historic analysis as economically backwards with a low land to labor ratio, meaning that industrialists (capital) and the landed nobility profited from trade restrictions while the workers (labor) would profit from trade liberalization. Rogowski's novel step was to take this economic model and to link it with a political dimension. He claims that adding this political element to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem allows for three crucial assumptions. First, groups who profit from a change in trade liberalization will strongly support past efforts to promote trade openness and try to generate more free trade. Conversely, those

harmed by trade liberalization will try to stop any further trade liberalization and even try to establish obstacles to trade. Second, those who benefit from increased income due to a change in trade policies will increase their wealth and with it, gain increased political influence. Third, to the same degree as the interest and the means increase to pursue certain policy preferences, so will desire and creativity rise to devise new mechanisms that can gradually overcome the collective action problem (Rogowski, 1989, p. 5).

In order to convince the reader that altered exposure to trade shifts political alignments and how political conflict is carried out, Rogowski substantiates his claims by referring to historic evidence from classical Greece up to the present day. His analysis includes Germany from the mid-19th century, which is initially best characterized by class conflict and later by an urban-rural conflict. The following sections will look at Rogowski's historical analysis of Gemany in more detail. The benefit of reviewing this historical analysis is twofold. First, it will provide an example of how the abstract theoretical concepts apply to the actual political process within a country. This will substantiate not just Rogowski's theory, but ultimately also this work, since it builds upon that very same framework. The other valuable gain from this analysis is that it will highlight the dynamic nature of Rogowski's concepts. There has been actual change over time when it comes to which factors profit from a change in trade liberalization. By looking at Rogowski's historic overview of Germany it will become apparent that alterations in trade preferences and redistribution of political power across factors are not necessarily linked simply to the passing of time. Instead it is major historical events that are most likely to shape trade preferences across factors and alter their relative power. This study's analysis covers roughly a 25-year span, which includes enormous global and

technological changes as well as a tremendous transformation of Germany itself and its role in Europe and the world. This situates this study reasonably well in terms of capturing similar shifts in sectorial preferences and political power distributions.

2.1.1 19th Century Until World War I

Rogowski begins his analysis of Germany through the lens of his theory in the postindustrial revolution era. He classifies Germany during this period as having a scarcity of capital, while land and labor were abundant factors. Germany was a net grain exporter during this period and trade continued to grow from the 1830s up to the early 1870s, during which time Prussia's landed nobility (Junker) and Germany's workers formed an innate alliance for free trade. The opposition to their endeavors came from a protectionist industrial sector. It was only in the mid-1870s when American and Russian grain, aided by the continuous improvements of railroads and steamboats, started to undercut German grain prices on global markets. Land suitable for agriculture in Germany moved rapidly from an abundant factor of production to a scarce one (Garst, 1998, p. 25). At the same time Germany remained a technological laggard, which meant that German capital became less competitive compared to the capital held by foreigners. The result of this change was that land and capital became the scarce factors. The logical consequence was now an alliance of the Junkers and industrialists, which came to be known as the infamous "marriage of iron and rye." Just as Rogowski's theoretical framework predicts, in the mid-1870s landowners and capitalist in Germany united and rallied in support of trade barriers and imperialism. Social class then became the defining political cleavage (Rogowski, 1989, p. 31).

The period from 1870 onward has frequently been regarded as the beginning of the first period of globalization (see O'Rourke & Williamson, 1997; Robertson, 1992; Silver, 2003). Trade restrictions in Germany during this early time of globalization were harmful to labor, but overall trade flows kept steadily increasing. The factor that most profited from, and was politically strengthened by this early wave of globalization, was labor. Gerschenkron (1943) and Rosenberg (1967) both argued that it was the newly acquired wealth and not deprivation that fueled Germany's emerging powerful socialist movement. This movement consistently supported measures that fostered free trade. This undoubtedly constitutes an example of empowerment for one group of political actors at the expense of another due to the effects of globalization. It was only at the end of the 19th century that Germany was catching up to other industrial countries, increasingly having a capital abundant economy. Subsequently, the new industries, especially the producers of chemical and electric goods slowly started to break from the "marriage of iron and rye" and formed their own organizations, which promoted free trade. By 1900, Germany's realignment of relative factor endowments had isolated landowners with their quest for protectionism, while capitalists and labor started championing free trade. German society was moving towards what Rogowski calls, "an urban-rural cleavage in politics" (1989, p. 31). This new low-tariff coalition increased in power and achieved a victory in the 1912 presidential election, which was one important factor contributing to the threatened old elite of landed nobility charging into World War I with patriotic zeal to cement their status and power domestically (Rogowski, 1989, p. 40). In a nutshell, this brief episode in Germany's history shows a domestic power shift among political actors and how vehemently some tried to fight this change. It is reasonable to expect that similar

shifts can be observed among political actors at the end of the 20th/beginning of the 21st century and that, in an established democracy, these power shifts will be reflected in the way that parties compete for votes with one another.

2.1.2 The Interwar Years (1918-1939)

The Great War (WWI) had destroyed the liberal argument. The belief that economic interdependence makes war so costly that it would render serious armed conflicts unthinkable was now shattered. This was thought to be especially true in such an economically intertwined region as Europe. But this optimism was now gone. The war crippled Europe's economies and destroyed political trust among state leaders. As a consequence, governments generally tried to alleviate their domestic economic struggles by relying on beggar-thy-neighbor policies: the idea that a country tries to improve its own economic fortunes at the expense of another state by reducing imports through the raising tariffs. (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 13). During this period, Germany's relative factor endowment remained unchanged and according to Rogowski's (1989) logic, politics in Germany was still best characterized by an urban-rural struggle. However, this new period dramatically changed the positions of strength. Trade barriers favored land as the scarce factor of production in Germany.

In the early years of the Weimar Republic the political right and the agricultural sector gained significant power. For example, the German National People's Party (German: Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) was only formed in 1918, but already achieved an electoral success of more than 10% the next year at national elections. By 1924 the party had garnered more than 20% of the vote, which represented vast support

in the highly fractured party system of the Weimar Republic (Castellan cited in Rogowski 1989, 79). All of this success was achieved based upon a platform that party leaders started proclaiming at early public DNVP meetings in 1918. These centered on fervent support for a Christian conservative society without Jewish influences, designed to uphold the monarchy, agriculture, and the middle class (Hertzman, 1958).

The Nazis built upon this success and went even further, echoing especially the demands of the smallholding peasants, achieving significant regional victories in predominantly rural areas. Rogowski (1998, p. 79) refers to Lipset's (1963) research, which illustrates a momentous urban-rural difference in support for the National Socialist German Workers' Party in the July 1932 Reichstag election, even after controlling for other important socioeconomic factors. Once in power, Hitler ensured that tariffs on agricultural products increased further, special financing was made available for farmers, and their production inputs were subsidized. An agrarian ideology, which praised rural achievements and idealized the virtues of the German farmer, was certainly an important building block of the greater national socialist ideology of the superior Aryan race. This romanticized and glorified the German farmer which was one of the cornerstones that motivated Germany's conquest of Eastern Europe, motivated and legitimized by the idea to create Lebensraum (living space) for a prosperous agrarian German people (Rogowski, 1989, p. 80). This historic example is important for this study, because it creates an awareness of how changes in trade restrictions can be used to foster a particular type of rhetoric and ideology, which can have powerful consequences. One should certainly expect globalization to still have the power to shift alliances and to empower one group of actors at the expense of another. The result does not have to be as catastrophic as what

lay in the wake of 13 years of Nazi rule, but globalization will still shift power among domestic actors and it is reasonable that this will be reflected in ideas and rhetoric that parties employ as they fight over voters.

2.1.3 From World War II to the Present

Rogowski describes the post-World War II era in most of Europe as a time when ideology had been overcome, in the sense that the substantial antagonism between labor and capital had been surmounted. In West Germany, workplace codetermination and welfare policies were gradually accepted and supported by conservatives under the leadership of Kanzler Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963). Communist support became increasingly marginal and the Social Democrats solidified their new positions in the Godesberger Program. This transformed the party conclusively from a socialist workers party to a mainstream party that sought broad appeal and accepted the principles of a market economy and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Rogowski 1989, p. 99).

Capital and labor cooperated well in West Germany pushing for increased free trade. Rogowski shows that high profile labor organizations like the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschafts Bund) have continually supported the European Coal and Steel Community and its successors all the way to today's European Union (EU). These are organizations that have always had trade liberalization and economic cooperation as a central goal. Rogowski further points out that the high cost agricultural sector was steadily losing ground. Despite agricultural subsidies through the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy, the agricultural sector continued to

shrink. As of 2015, agriculture accounts for only 1% of Germany's GDP (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015). In general, the political power and consensus that a coalition of labor and capital has accomplished with regard to increased cross-border trade is well illustrated by the manner in which Germany endorsed the Euro. The creation of the monetary union was certainly a powerful factor in increasing trade among states and it is probably the best example in German politics of the prevalent consensus across all major parties[1] on unequivocal support of European integration. Voters were very skeptical about giving up one of their most cherished national symbols, the Deutschmark, which conferred a sense of identity, stability, and prosperity. The monetary union came into effect in January of 1999 with the introduction of the Euro as an accounting currency. Prior to its introduction, the issue was of great concern to many Germans and 58% of them opposed the implementation of the Euro (Heisenberg, 2006, p. 112), nevertheless none of the major parties tried to capitalize on this opposition by adopting a critical stance towards the monetary union during the 1998 election campaign for the Bundestag. In fact, there was a consensus among all the parties represented in the Bundestag to exclude the launch of the Euro from the election campaign (Poguntke, 2007, p. 109).

Certainly cooperation between Germany's two abundant factors of production, labor and capital, is not the only reason why Germany has embraced European integration, and by extension significant economic integration, with close to no political opposition. Such an understanding would neglect Germany's broader cultural and historic experience. For example, Germany's motivation for participating in, and even taking on a leading role within the EU and its predecessor organizations, has always been based upon

[1] Major parties refers here to all parties who were represented in the Bundestag during the election campaign of the 1998 Bundestag. These were the CDU, SPD, FDP, and the Greens.

the traumatic experience of National Socialism and World War II. Accountable for the war and the worst crimes against humanity, Germany's leaders viewed the European project as an instrument for "achieving an 'equality of rights' with their European neighbors […like…] the rehabilitation of Germany's international credentials" (Anderson, 2005, p. 79). Likewise, it does not appear sensible to discard Rogowski's argument about Germany's urban-rural conflict after 1945. As already demonstrated, one can see how the Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be convincingly applied to Germany in order to identify a connection between international trade and political power, from approximately 1870 onward.

There is no reason to assume that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is only useful in explaining why social class became the defining political cleavage as landowners and capitalist in Germany united and rallied in support of trade barriers and imperialism in the late 19th century. Or why in the 1930s, trade barriers favored land as the scarce factor of production and dramatically changed the positions of strength towards land as a factor of production resulting in urban-rural conflict. Likewise, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem also explains how labor and capital have increasingly profited from trade and subsequently found their political position strengthened in Germany since 1945 and as already discussed, it will be the focus of this study to closely examine how Rogowski's argument applies to Germany over the last decade of the twentieth century and the first 15 years of the 21st.

2.2 Commerce, Coalitions, and Its Discontents: Rogowski Reconsidered

Rogowski's argument has drawn wide attention in the field of political economy and his work has inspired many research projects, this particular study being one of them. One important block of literature has tried to assess the veracity of the logic and claims put forth in *Commerce and Coalitions*. There have been a few concrete criticisms over the years that have fundamentally challenged Rogowski's argument or his interpretation of history. It is important to take a closer look at these, because if Rogowski's theory cannot be substantiated, then the theoretical foundation of this research would falter. As this section will demonstrate, generally speaking, the critique of Rogowski's concepts is not intended to refute his argument but rather to augment them. This comes down to the question of what is more desirable: a theory that is parsimonious and very encompassing with wide predictive power, but that fails to explain specific deviations from the predicted correlation or a narrow approach that is better at explaining all observations, but is limited with regard to its scope. The advantage with this research is that it is only looking at one case, Germany. That makes it possible for this study to look at the critique of Rogowski's theory and to mostly implement the generally useful tweaks that are being suggested within the literature, because the intent here is not to explain a large number of heterogeneous cases, but a single case.

2.2.1 Unholy Coalitions and Sector Specific Conditions

One point of criticism has been brought forward by Brawley (1997), who makes the point that the coalition of "iron and rye" was made possible by a willingness of capital to accept the rejection of free trade due to the broader economic downturn in

Europe at the time. Brawley claims that this logic explains why the coalition formed in the first place, but it does not explain why it endured for so long. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not provide sufficient explanation of this phenomenon. Despite an economic recovery and capital becoming an abundant factor of production again, the alliance lasted much longer than it should have according to Rogowski's model.

Contrasting Rogowski's concept with the sector-specific factor model helps to address this discrepancy. One of the key features of the sector-specific factor model is the argument that trade does not affect factors of production in a uniform way. Trade affects people differently depending on whether they are employed in the export or the import sector. For example, capital that is used in the export sector will benefit from trade openness, whereas capital that is used in a sector that competes with imports will face further pressures under liberalization. The rate of return for capital in this case is not identical and capital that is used in the import sector cannot just start producing export goods, because there are costs or obstacles linked to adjustment. The factor-endowment model as presented by Rogowski does not take this into account and, instead, claims that trade affects everyone who owns the same factor similarly. The argument that the effect is similar regardless of whether the factor is used in the import or export sector is based on the idea that switching between sectors happens with ease. For example in an economy where agriculture is the scarce factor, and capital and labor are abundance, trade liberalization means that a worker who is employed in a factory that produces farming equipment for the domestic agricultural sector will simply find new employment in a factory that exports industrial products like ships or automobiles. This kind of example works well with unskilled workers and simple tasks, but as work becomes more

specialized and technical, one can see that switching industries becomes more difficult and creates more adjustment cost.

Brawley (1997) concludes that Rogowski's claims, that the factors that would benefit from open trade will pursue such policies and as a consequence see their political power increase, does not necessarily reflect reality. As Brawley further points out, a simple modification to include partial factor mobility would solve this problem. The inconsistencies that come to light when the model is applied to historical cases vanish once the concept of partial factor mobility is introduced. This is certainly an issue that needs to be taken into account when analyzing Germany's party competition for federal elections and the question should be asked: Do parties consider partial factor mobility in any form in their campaign programs?

Another line of critique addresses the oversimplification in Rogowski's argument and that his theory therefore is unable to take some important general factors into account. For example, Woodruff (2005) objects to the idea that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is a reasonable foundation on which to base general laws of trade and its relation to politics. He claims that Rogowski's argument is based on a radically simplified view of the international economy that is limited exclusively to relative prices. Instead, scholars such as Woodruff argue, a methodology is needed that considers an international economy that is shaped by repeated crossborder interactions of various domestic economies. A further question that Rogowski does not address, according to Woodruff, is what are the effects of volatility? Volatility is generated by markets that oscillate between economic busts and booms. Likewise, there is neither accounting in Rogowski's theory for the effects of sovereign debt, nor the implementation of the gold standard and its later

abandonment. In essence, “trade itself is not a connection between countries, but something that faces each of them as an exogenous force” (Woodruff, 2005, p. 217). This assessment is probably justified, but it is quite common for structural approaches to emphasize the long run and not specific snapshots. In this respect, Rogowski is in good company. While this research agrees with the idea of taking a long term perspective, the analytical chapters will pay attention to what the effects of volatility are for the way German parties compete for votes and whether it seems to alter power distributions.

2.2.2 The Oversimplification of the Three Factor Model

Midford (1993) bases his critique of Rogowski’s work on how it applies to the United States. He points out that Rogowski is not able to explain why multiple unions in the postwar United States failed to oppose free trade and why, at the same time, an increasing number of capitalists did advocate for protectionism. According to Rogowski one should have expected a coalition of landowners and capitalist to push for increased trade while labor should pursue protectionist policies. Midford claims that Rogowski’s three-factor model is “excessively parsimonious” (1993, p. 543) and that this is the reason why it fails to explain reality. For example, Midford argues, a better approach would be to discard the notion that labor is one homogenous group that is equally affected by trade liberalization or contraction across the board. Skills are not evenly distributed across labor and therefore the effects of trade are not uniform. Rogowski’s work is not able to pick up on these important nuances. As Martin (2002) points out, there is a danger to such a method, because after Occam’s razor has trimmed away everything that is believed to be an extraneous assumption one might have gone too far in

the pursuit of parsimony. In the end one might only be left with "a theory that is so oversimplified that it distorts or misrepresents the phenomenon it is trying to explain" (Martin, 2002, p. 10).

Instead, Midford (1993) suggests a multifactor model approach to explain this deviation from what is predicted by the three-factor model. Midford replaces Rogowski's tripartite model with eight factors. The reason for this approach is that factors are not completely homogenous; instead an approach that splits up each factor into subgroups could be very beneficial. For example, one could divide labor into subgroups such as low-skilled workers and highly skilled ones, public sector versus private sector employees, people who work in the service industry or those who work in manufacturing, and many more. By doing this division one can more easily see that there could be obstacles and costs involved with moving from one subgroup to another. Thus trade will not have a uniform effect upon labor, but instead each subgroup will be affected in its own distinct ways (Midford, 1993). This increases explanatory power significantly, but at the expense of predictive power. This tradeoff is reasonable for this research and close attention will be paid to how parties address each of these subgroups that Midford identified and if one can observe different effects of globalization for individual subgroups of the initial three factors that Rogowski identified.

2.2.3 The Relative Gains and Strength of Capital and Labor

Garst (1998) in his analysis of Rogowski's use of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem has distilled two specific issues that are in need of critical review. One is the fact that when capital and labor are able to increase their gains through trade the effect is not

uniform. The gains to capitalism are relatively concentrated in the hands of a few actors, whereas the gains for labor are spread widely across many workers. The implication of this is that incentives to organize and to push for further trade liberalization will be significantly higher for capitalists, due to these individuals' higher rate of return. At the same time, the concentration of gains enables those who own the means of production to mobilize support against protectionism to a far greater degree than the individual worker who, individually, possess only a modest share of the increased prosperity. Additionally, it is substantially harder (at least by comparison) to organize large groups of workers and to motivate them to take action than it is to form consensus among a relatively small faction of capitalists. In other words, even though the gains from trade may spread evenly across factors, the effects upon each individual factor are not equal. While this critique is certainly justified in general, one could argue that influential German labor unions have the ability to mitigate this effect and therefore this critique can be neglected for the purpose of this research.

Another critique that Garst (1998) voices is that Rogowski does not consider the effect that trade union strength has on the likelihood that labor and capital cooperate and how it is linked to labor mobility. Garst's claim is that a capitalist's default behavior is to pursue labor strategies that oppose organized worker efforts in order to maximize freedom to make unilateral decisions without restrictions from workers. A state of weak worker organization does breed contempt for capitalists and generates an adversarial environment even when it comes to issues upon which both sides (labor and capital) would otherwise agree, such as trade. Strong labor organizations can act as a mediator between employers and workers, something which facilitates cooperation. The problem,

Garst argues, is that this logic rests on an assumption of high labor mobility. As previously pointed out, there is no distinction in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem between the import and export sectors, because workers are assumed to switch with great ease between them. This means that workers who can simply switch between importing and exporting industries will have no need to form entrenched worker organizations that can facilitate cooperation between workers and their employers with regard to trade.

Garst (1998) corroborates this assertion by looking at late 19th-century Germany. In his reading of history, which differs from Rogowski's, labor and capital failed to collaborate against the landed nobility in the period from 1890 until 1914, despite Germany's ascension to the rank of a capital abundant economy. Class struggle continued to shape German society during this period. Employers resorted to repressing workers who lacked strong trade unions. Labor's political weakness was further emphasized by labor mobility, which negated the cooperation between labor and capital that one would expect in the wake of increasing domestic capital and a steadily growing global economy. Garst concludes "[t]he failure of these coalition possibilities to be realized helped ensure that the Reich's authoritarian political system remained unreformed right up to World War I" (1998, p. 38). The question is if this particular observation still holds true today. One can reasonably well argue that labor unions have made significant progress in Germany since the second half of the 20th century. Their influence within companies and politics has been pointedly strengthened over time. Their relative power has fluctuated over the years but the principle of codetermination is fundamental to most companies in Germany (see Wächter & Muller-Camen, 2002).

What all of this means for this study is that a question that needs to be asked is:

What kind of positions do parties take on the issue of labor unions? The reason this is relevant is that, due to their relative strength, unions can have significant effects on the overall support for globalization because they can organize support for less protectionism and help to distribute the gains more equitably.

2.2.4 When Cleavages Do Not Lead to Political Action

A different approach to criticizing Rogowski's theory is to question the link between changes in trade patterns and political action, because "[c]leavages do not automatically result in group mobilization" (Caproso, 1997, p. 586). It is not a simple thing for individuals to comprehend the complex workings of the economy and to identify the exact reason that caused a decline of one's economic situation. Difficult economic times can potentially be attributed to a number of reasons, such as more demanding environmental standards that are particularly hard for some sectors to adopt. Another cause of economic stress could be politically motivated subsidies for one sector at the expense of a competing one, for example traditional energy providers versus green energy. Likewise, technological change makes certain types of jobs within industries obsolete and might necessitate significant restructuring. As Caproso (1997) further points out, the individual who is threatened by these developments might not be able to relate his/her individual situation to a broader global economic picture. Instead "[s]capegoating and expressions of generalized political discontent, that is, anomic violence rather than purposeful political organization with clear goals and targets, may be the rule" (Caproso, 1997, p. 586). Caproso makes an important point, but the issue of voter mobilization does not have to be as big an issue as he suggests. Voters in general are not expected to be

experts on every issue and they might not fully comprehend the consequences of policies like trade restrictions. This problem can be alleviated by political parties that present problems and their solutions in a concise manner that voters can understand and pick the approach that fits most closely with their own preferences. The true problem is the issue of scapegoating, because if parties do not present constructive solutions to complex issues such as globalization then voters are left to their own devices as to who will truly represent positions that will translate into policies that align with their preferences. Therefore it will be essential for this research to examine if election programs present a constructive approach to globalization with meaningful policy suggestions so that voters can identify their positions or if parties merely use the issue for scapegoating, blaming globalization universally for various domestic social ills. If this would be the case then Rogowski's argument would certainly be weakened.

2.2.5 Implications for This Study Regarding Globalization and Political Will

These examples have highlighted that Rogowski's argument has its shortcomings, but despite the criticism, Midford still declares that at its core, Rogowski's theory remains unbroken at least for advanced economies. The implication, that changes in trade patterns cause alterations in the distribution of power within domestic politics, remains undisputed. In fact, Midford's critique was merely trying to propose "ways in which recent advances in the factor endowments approach can be used to strengthen Rogowski's model" (Midford, 1993, p. 564). Even Rogowski acknowledges at the end of his book that his approach will need adaptation, because an overtly ridged methodology is not productive. Using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in an identical fashion for the time of

the industrial revolution as well as for the 21st century, Rogowski states, can only lead to anachronistic results. For example “a more useful threefold categorization of factors for future analysis may be, not that of land, labor, and capital employed throughout [Rogowski’s] book, but one of skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital: or, almost equivalently, of labor, human capital and physical capital” (Rogowski, 1998, p. 178).

Garst’s verdict is that “[t]he main, and by no means insubstantial, contribution of *Commerce and Coalitions* (Rogowski, 1989) is to have set forth a bold and parsimonious theory of trade and cleavages amendable to testing and refinement that will stimulate work on this puzzle” (1998, p. 39). In other words, the critique of Rogowski’s theory is not about the affect trade has on domestic political alignments; this appears to be generally accepted. The question is how exactly it shapes domestic coalitions. The critique is that Rogowski was too parsimonious in his approach: that he either overlooks important variables that would help explain such specific coalitions, that the theory does not deal adequately with important variables, or that the gains/losses from changed trade patterns do not translate as neatly as Rogowski suggests into political action because of the omission of specific intervening variables. With each additional variable the ability to explain specific historic instances increases but at the same time the universal applicability of such an approach decreases sharply. This is the classic dilemma of parsimony versus accuracy in theory building, but it is not the intent here to debate which approach is superior. Instead the intent is find the best way to go about the research of this study.

This research is built on the premise that globalization causes domestic policy change which in turn can shape globalization. Political will is conceived of as an

intervening variable between globalization and policy change. The beginning of this chapter was designed to lay down the theoretical underpinnings for the claim that globalization alters domestic political will. Rogowski talks about alliance formation more in an abstract manner, but it is reasonable to infer that this also means a change in the overall debate as to what policies are being favored and which ones are being discarded. As the political landscape shifts and new alliances are formed, different policies will come to the fore and possibly even be implemented. In a modern democracy at the turn of the 21st century such shifts in power will certainly be reflected in the makeup of the diverse political parties that vie for power and try to represent their clientele. In order to fill Rogowski's sparing approach with more specifics and to make it more tangible for the specific context of Germany and to get a better understanding of how political will is formed, this study will address those elements (see Table 2.1) that Rogowski's critics have claimed are missing for a better and more complete understanding of how globalization affects domestic politics. In a nutshell, this study builds on this existing research and along with it asserts that international trade affects domestic alliances for a fact.

Chapter 3 will give more detail as to how German parties use their election programs as a tool for competing in federal elections and explain why election programs are an excellent source for analyzing the positions of political parties. It will also give an in-depth explanation as to why Germany is a particularly important country and why it is worthwhile to analyze how its domestic parties deal with the issue of globalization.

Table 2.1

Questions to Increase Validity of Rogowski's Model for Germany After 1990

1. Do parties consider partial factor mobility in any form in their campaign programs? (Brawley, 1997)

2. What are effects of volatility for the way German parties compete for votes and does it seem to alter power distributions? (Woodruff, 2005)

3. How do parties address labor subgroups based upon skill, the sector they work in (i.e., services versus manufacturing), or do they make a distinction between public and private workers? Do they propose policies that are clearly with one of these sub-groups in mind? (Midford, 1993)

4. What kind of positions do parties take on the issue of labor unions? (Garst, 1998)

5. Do parties present meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or do they merely use the issue for scapegoating? (Caproso, 1997)

CHAPTER 3

PARTY ELECTION PROGRAMS AND GLOBALIZATION

This chapter will first justify the use of party election programs in order to determine political will and then move on to look at previous research, which has studied the link between political parties and globalization. This prior research will assist in identifying relevant hypotheses for the research presented here. This chapter will conclude with a theoretically based justification for selecting Germany as the case for this study. This final part will also outline and explain the political party and time frame selection in this study.

3.1 Party Election Programs as a Measure of Political Will

First of all, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the term "party election programs." Election program is the quite literal translation of the German word "Wahlprogramm." An election program is a text, which is published a few months prior to an election and it defines a party's goals for the upcoming legislative period. The British term that reflects this concept best is that of "manifesto," which is commonly used in European political science texts that are published in English. The American term "party platform" conveys a similar idea, but it lacks some of the formal and binding

character of the manifesto. Therefore, this work will use the terms “manifesto” and “election program” in an interchangeable manner.

It is one thing to claim that national elections are a prime opportunity to study the political will in a political system on any issue; it is another to determine how to go about this analysis. This study proposes a content analysis of election programs of all major German parties, because election programs constitute a unique source for analyzing a party’s response to globalization. The reason is that political party election programs “are the most visible public expressions of a party’s policy position” (Crowson, 2007, p. 146), or as and Klingemann et al. (1994) put it “they are the clearest available statement of policy intentions expressed by the leadership of competing parties” (p. 241). Additionally, the outlined policies have been sanctioned by the whole party and election programs also “challenge the party leaders to present a streamlined version [of their party’s policy goals] to the public, signalling the general contours of the party’s governmental programme for the next legislative period” (Pappi & Seher, 2009, p. 403). These programs have a fairly binding character and are also important tools for coalition building, because they signal to other parties the core policy positions that a party will want to implement once in government.

This research project defines written party electoral manifestos as its central dependent variable, which means it does not follow the more traditional method of studying outcomes in the form of government policy. This decision is not made lightly, but as previously described it is a much better method to gauge the overall political will of political elites than an examination of government policies would be. The most likely critique of this approach will focus on the relationship between party election manifestos

and government policy. This relationship is most likely perceived as a rather tenuous one, based on the idea that parties make a plethora of promises to voters that are meant to sound appealing, but are unrealistic and are never intended to be implemented. This premise represents a serious challenge for this research project, because if there is no serious and meaningful link between election manifestos and policy, then this would question the whole study. A potential disconnect, where party programs and policy do not demonstrate any form of connection, would also be unfavorable. Fortunately, there is already a body of literature that has addressed this issue at length and demonstrated that there are strong and meaningful links between election programs on the one hand and policy change and policy outcomes on the other. Since the issue is so central to this project, a brief summary of the key points of this literature will be helpful.

Kavanagh (1981) built the theoretical foundation that describes the connection between party manifestos and policy outcomes. Here, it should suffice to highlight two of his key arguments. First, a manifesto provides a party in power with a mandate, because the program lays out a course of future action that a party will follow once its leaders are in office. The manifesto legitimizes the government's implementation of those election promises while at the same time setting limits to actions that fall outside of the espoused goals of the manifesto. The mandate thus has a dual purpose, because it not only empowers the government in its dealings with the political opposition, it also fortifies the cabinet in their dealings with professional civil servants. Policy change can be met with a significant level of resistance and inertia. A persuasive argument for change is that a particular policy represents the will of the sovereign, as expressed by citizens voting for a party and its program, and not the ideas of a particular minister or government. Kavanagh

further argues that manifestos represent a vital instrument for ensuring inner party democracy. Usually a party's rank and file members have to give their consent before an election program is published and it becomes a tool to keep the party elite in check. Secondly, there is the argument that any government will be held accountable at the next election for how well it has been able to implement its promises.

The relevance of this theoretical framework has been tested by various studies that have analyzed the fulfillment of election pledges. For example Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) present an in-depth study on the function that political parties have in the democratic policy process. They closely examine the party systems in 10 different western democracies over roughly 4 decades. One of their key findings is "a remarkably high congruence between the themes stressed in party election programs and the subsequent policies enacted by the parties that get into government" (Klingemann et al., 1994, p. 368). Royed's (1996) comparative study of the Reagan and Thatcher eras concludes for Britain that "[v]irtually all of the Conservatives' economic and social agenda as stated in the manifestos was enacted" (p. 76). The picture for the US is less clear cut, due to the institutional peculiarities as to how power is distributed between the President and Congress. Nevertheless, Royed asserts that there is a relationship between party platforms and enacted policies. Another study by Royed and Borrelli (1999) focuses specifically on whether or not U.S. parties can implement their economic policy proposals from 1976-1992. They conclude that the two major parties in the US are able to realize their campaign promises. Rallings (1987) studies the effects of election programs on government policy in Canada and the UK (United Kingdom) from 1945 until 1979. He finds that despite their diverging unitary and federal structures, parties do deliver on

their election manifestos on average more than two-thirds of the time, once they are in power.

Similar studies, which conclude that election programs matter when it comes to shaping policy, have been done for Greece (Kalogeropoulou, 1989), the Netherlands (Thomson, 2001), Ireland (Mansergh, 2005; Thomson, 2011), Sweden (Naurin, 2011), and Spain (Artés, 2012). Additionally, Thomson et al. (2012) conduct research on what they refer to as program-to-policy linkage in 10 different democracies. The time frame is country specific, with some country analyses starting very early in 1945 and going into the early 2000s. However, the majority of studies cover a core period of about 30 years starting around 1970. They identified 12,128 election pledges that were specific enough to test for potential fulfillment. The likelihood of pledge fulfillment was largely dependent on structural factors such as government make up (single party or a coalition of parties), or majority or minority government. The range goes from 85% pledge fulfillment in Britain down to Ireland and Italy, where a little less than half of all pledges are fulfilled. The authors contribute this to the fact that the UK is dominated by stable single majority party governments, whereas Italy and Ireland are commonly governed by minority coalitions that have a tendency to be short lived and serve a greater plurality of interests. On average, they observed that once parties are in power they realize about two-thirds of their campaign pledges, at least partially. As Budge and Hofferbert (1990) illustrate, the significant range of pledge fulfillment can, in large part, be explained by structural differences. Countries with multiparty systems are often ruled by coalition governments. In order to form a coalition all involved parties will have to compromise on some level, which does not allow for such a close link between manifesto pledges and

policy outcomes as it would be in a system that is dominated by single majority party governments.

In a nutshell, "[w]ith respect to the program-to-policy linkage, there is generally more congruence between the election programs of prospective government parties and subsequent government policies than conventional wisdom would expect" (Mansergh & Thomson, 2007, p. 324). Budge and Hofferbert (1990, p. 129) even find that government spending is to a larger degree determined by manifestos than it is by traditional partisan differences. All in all "[t]he overriding impression one gets from this body of research is that pledges are fulfilled to a greater degree than most citizens believe" (Thomson, 2011, p. 188). This is a crucial body of research that lends a significant amount of validity to this research project. Nevertheless, one can still rightly argue that a two-thirds congruence of the program-to-policy linkage is inferior to the direct study of policy outcomes. This may be true, but it is worth keeping in mind that this research does not try to demonstrate that explicit promises in election manifestos will lead to specific policies. Instead, it claims that examining campaign programs will reveal either a favorable or negative attitude among political leaders towards globalization, which will tell us something about their political willingness to push for more globalization, to restrain or even to reverse it.

An advantage of looking at election programs, as opposed to examining the policies which a party enacts once it is in office, is that it allows for a more holistic picture. With this method, one develops an understanding of what all of Germany's relevant political parties assert, regarding globalization. The reason that this is relevant is because not only governing parties matter, when it comes to domestic and international

outcomes. For example, Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993) show that if Christian-democratic parties face strong political competition from the left, they will pass legislation that builds a generous welfare state, even though their own party position is much less supportive of a sprawling social government. Left opposition parties can demand lavish welfare spending from the government, and thus please their supporters, while at the same time creating pressure for the government. If the opposition is able to keep welfare state issues on the agenda, then politically right leaning governments will often favor generating electoral favor over policy integrity. As Jensen and Seeberg (2015, p. 229) point out, this logic is not only true for welfare issues, but can be applied to any policy issue. It is a matter of issue ownership or reputational advantage; if the opposition has issue ownership within a specific policy field, then it will find a way to successfully pressure the government into at least adjusting policies in a manner that it otherwise would not have done. Additionally, the prevalent "domestic political debate about foreign policy can influence both international relations and domestic electoral outcomes" (Ramsay, 2004, p. 478). In international affairs, states do not just look to governments of other states for cues as to how states will behave in the future, but also to the political opposition, because the "opposition's rhetoric can be said to have institutionally induced credibility as a result of pursuing office through open political competition" (Ramsay, 2004, p. 478). Similarly, Schultz (1998, pp. 829-830) conducts research that replaces the unitary state assumption with a model that entails two strategic actors for each state, the opposition party and the governing party. According to this model, states resolve crises in international relations by interpreting messages from other governments as well as cues from the political opposition. The opposition party can strengthen the government's

position on the international stage by conveying that the government's position on a specific issue is not dependent on a particular party. Instead the state's actions will be consistent even if there is a change of the executive. Another effect which opposition parties can have is that they restrain governments to focus on policies that can muster broader support, because a government that faces stiff internal opposition on an issue will find its negotiation position and credibility with other states weakened. The introduction of public competition and a credible opposition party can enhance a state's ability to resolve international disputes (Schultz, 1998, p. 841). While Schultz focuses on international crises and threats of war between states, it is reasonable to apply the same logic to other areas of state interaction, like the promise to lower tariffs, to harmonize environmental standards, and to implement a common corporate tax rate. One can also expand the connection between international and domestic politics beyond the argument that opposition parties have signaling power, but that they also exert a constraining effect on governments in international affairs vis-à-vis the domestic political resources that they control, thus forcing a government to be more selective in its threats (Shea, Teo, & Levy, 2014, p. 750). In other words, there is additional information to be gained by going beyond government policies with regard to an international issue such as trade liberalization and globalization.

3.2 Previous Research and Its Implications

The idea to examine election programs to see how they relate to globalization is not a novel one. The intent of this study is to move away from a common approach across various studies, which is to examine the effects of political parties on globalization by

relying on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which comprises a pooled cross-section of political parties in 25 countries over a little more than 5 decades from 1945 until 1998 (see for example Burgoon, 2006; Camyar, 2012; Haupt, 2010; Milner & Judkins, 2004). The CMP is a very general approach to providing data, which is certainly a useful tool for broad cross-country analysis. In contrast this study is built on the assumption that there is additional knowledge to be gained from an in-depth investigation with the intent to study the effects of political parties on globalization. The goal is to form a more holistic picture that sheds light onto how parties address globalization. What messages are parties communicating, or what are they omitting? What kind of picture are they painting of globalization? Is globalization presented as an opportunity or as a threat? How does this picture fit with a party's overall position? In order to assure that the research carried out here is grounded in theory the following section will identify additional theoretical concepts that together with the research questions formulated in Chapter 2 is going to guide analysis in Chapters 5-9.

In order to answer these questions, one must certainly examine the direct statements that parties make in their election programs. Statements and policies that directly relate to economic globalization are those that address, for example, the issue of cross border trade, international competition as well as potential opportunities for economic growth and potential risks for domestic employment from international competition. They also contain comments about the high profile institutions that are generally associated with economic globalization such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), or World Bank. However, as Swank (2002) illustrates, governments may address issues that relate to globalization more

indirectly. For example, governments that rely heavily on tax revenue have a tendency to enact policies that are often very accommodating to mobile capital and corporate taxation. This is motivated by a desire to attract more foreign direct investment or by a fear of losing those mobile assets or foreign corporations to another state. In the long run, these policies can create a situation where the tax burden is placed, with an exponentially greater burden, on less mobile actors such as land and labor. It is valuable to examine which political parties support policies that are particularly accommodating to mobile assets and which parties, if any, oppose such policies. This way one can get a much better understanding of how parties truly position themselves with regard to globalization.

In other words, globalization is not just affected by obvious trade related factors such as tariff rates or trade agreements, but also by many more indirect factors, such as for example general transaction cost or national identity that can accelerate, slow down, or even reverse economic openness. There is a body of literature that has examined multiple of these factors that can have a significant effect on globalization. The next few paragraphs will outline these factors and explain how they affect globalization. This way one can obtain a more comprehensive picture of whether or not a party supports the concept of globalization.

3.2.1 Factors That Shape Attitudes

The research of Mayda, O'Rourke, and Sinnott (2007) reveals an interesting correlation. People who feel that governments are responsible for providing either an opportunity for people to earn a livelihood or basic necessities for the unemployed are the same people who hold strong protectionist views. An effective way to persuade these

people to accept increased openness is to demonstrate that the state's ability to take care of its citizens is not diminished by globalization. In fact, Mayda et al.'s research also shows that a government's size is negatively correlated to protectionist attitudes, which in turn are caused by an aversion to the risks of economic openness. Government size in and of itself is surely no indicator of effective, efficient and comprehensive support among people who are adversely affected by globalization. Nevertheless, increasing government size seems to, at the very least, give people a feeling of security and confidence that they will have support when it comes to weathering the potential storm that increased exposure to the global economy might bring.

It is pivotal to note that, negating the adverse effects of increased exposure to international trade through expansion of welfare spending cannot be universally assumed. As Rudra (2002) illustrates, less developed countries often struggle to maintain their welfare spending, let alone increase that spending, with growing exposure to the international economy. A key reason for the lack of correlation between the degree of exposure to international trade and the size of the welfare state is the inability of the least developed states to improve the skills of their workforce and the absence of strong political institutions. In essence, labor's political gains from an open economy remain hypothetical due to an inability to organize, advocate, and pressure the government for an increased social safety net. Rudra's (2002) research only applies to less developed countries, which do not include Germany. For Germany, with a relatively educated workforce that is able to rely on strong institutions, and rely on the ability to organize and advocate, the idea that the losers of globalization are compensated by its winners does make sense. As Cameron (1978) points out, citizens' stance towards trade is shaped by

their understanding of the effects that trade can have and how those effects align with their self-interest. Globalization does not affect the self-interest of all people equally. Increased exposure to international competition will increase hostility towards trade among those workers who are most exposed to imports within their sector. Instead of increasing government assistance in general, support can be specifically targeted at those sectors that are most acutely exposed to external competition.

Another interesting aspect that must be taken into consideration is what Rodrik (1997) refers to as the globalization dilemma. In essence, for globalization to work, a smaller and less regulatory state is necessary. However, in order to secure popular support for globalization what is needed is a state that does interfere in the market through regulation and taxation in order to compensate those people who are suffering from globalization. It is not an easy task to address this dilemma and to devise policies that can disentangle this complicated relationship.

Based upon the globalization dilemma, one can draw a number of conclusions. If political parties in developed countries want to increase support for globalization, then increasing the size and scope of government, in particular with regard to its welfare spending, becomes important. Thus, with an expanded welfare state people feel more secure and are more willing to accept the uncertainty that a globalized world entails. Another important conclusion is that opposition to open trade can be very specific to a particular sector even though the overall workforce is in general more ambivalent towards the issue. Therefore, it will be critical to look at the type of government programs that are suggested, if any, and how those programs might make people more open toward globalization. Is government support general or is it focused on industries

that face particular pressures from imports? Do Germany's political parties reflect these considerations in their campaign programs? Do parties deal with the globalization dilemma? Do they discuss how they want to decrease state interference in order to make trade more attractive while at the same time addressing the increased need to compensate those who struggle due to increased economic openness? Is it even possible for one party to address both issues in the same election campaign or is this where parties potentially strategically share responsibilities?

In most federal elections no single party is expected to win a majority; instead, coalition governments are the norm. It is common for German parties to announce at the start of an election who their preferred coalition partner will be in case of an electoral victory that is short of an overall majority. For example, a party could emphasize a position for increased government involvement in their electoral program knowing that their preferred coalition partner will emphasize the role of the market and deregulation. In this way, both parties can run campaigns that are coherent and not contradictory while at the same time achieving the desired amalgamation of decreasing resistance to globalization through an increased welfare net while at the same time strengthening the market by decreasing government regulation. This is something that an analysis of party competition in Germany should not neglect as it would be an interesting finding that would demonstrate that parties take the issue of globalization, and their own position with regard to it, very seriously.

To summarize, the additional questions one should ask when examining election programs are:

- Do parties address the globalization dilemma?

- What kind of policies do parties suggest to strengthen the welfare state? (Keeping in mind that a larger welfare state leads to greater acceptance of globalization)
- Do parties make general suggestions for improving state benefits or do they advocate for special protective measures for certain groups?

3.2.2 The Need to Discuss Transaction Cost

An important avenue in which governments can have a significant effect on trade is in the area of regulations. These are not direct measures such as tariffs, but indirect effects with never-the-less sizable impact. Rodrik (2000) illustrates this point quite convincingly by looking at the US-Canadian border. Despite continuous efforts to reduce formal obstacles to international trade and the establishment of a free trade zone the flow of goods, services, and capital across this border seems to be a good deal smaller than what one would expect if the same region would form one domestic market. This finding is especially interesting given the similar socio-economic state of both countries as well as the mostly shared language. The cultural differences between people from Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario are probably no more significant than those that one will find within the US, let's say between people from Seattle, Washington and those from Birmingham, Alabama. There are certainly multiple factors that will help to explain this missed trade, but perhaps the best explanation is that "national borders demarcate political and legal jurisdictions. Such demarcations serve to segment markets in much the same way that transport costs or border taxes do" (Rodrik, 2000, p. 179). Any form of cross border exchange is faced with additional and sometimes very sizable transaction costs that have to be factored in due to the divergent political and legal systems between

states. This means that domestic policies which increase or decrease these cross-border transaction costs can have a significant impact on cross-border trade flow. When analyzing what kind of policies German parties have advocated for over the last 25 years it is important to include policies that affect cross-border transaction costs because, as Rodrik (2000) points out, they do have a significant effect on trade.

There are different ways in which a party might position itself with regard to the harmonization of various standards, such as labor laws, environmental regulations, or even technical standards. These all can reduce transaction costs if they become more uniform, but the most substantial obstacle is the difficulty of enforcing contracts across jurisdictions. Ranjan and Lee (2007) illustrate precisely this point with their research. They show how a lack of contract enforcement is negatively related to trade flows and that dependable international institutions are a key factor for overcoming the issue of contract enforcement. This need for strong institutions is especially true for a country like Germany that primarily trades very complex and technologically advanced goods and services (North, 1990).

This makes it important also to look at the type policies, if any, that address this issue of contract enforcement as outlined in party programs. Such policies could include very broad suggestions or discuss the power of specific international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. In the case of Germany, it is essential to look at the role that parties outline for the institutions of the EU, because its various bodies have a significant bearing on, amongst other things, the issue of contract enforcement between Germany and its closest neighbors. Since transportation cost between the Federal Republic and its EU neighbors are so low, it is here that the costs for a lack of contract

enforcement and low levels of harmonization soar relative to the total transaction cost. What kind of role do parties outline for EU institutions? Do they intend to curb or extend the powers of the EU? Which policy areas come under scrutiny: human rights, environmental standards, economic issues? These are important issues that can have direct consequences on future trade levels and it will be interesting to see if one can identify patterns that address the issue of regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement in party programs, over time.

3.2.3 Globalization and Parliamentary Power

The issue of transaction cost and regulatory harmonization leads to a very important question: Does globalization adversely affect democracy? A common fear in this context is the concept of a race to the bottom (see Bisley, 2007; Vanberg, 2000). In a globalized world governments increasingly compete with each other to attract large investors and the vast flow of capital which they promise: innovation, growth, and sustainable jobs. The fear is that no government can afford to fall behind in this competition and therefore will face incentives and pressures to be more investment friendly than the other states. In a worst case scenario, this leads to a downward spiral or race to the bottom that only ends once the "bottom" is reached, a neoliberal bottom, where the market dominates everything and the state's role is merely reduced to enforcing contracts that are generated by the market (see Krings, 2009; Rudra, 2008).

One can argue about how likely such an outcome is where the German government bows to the power of the market and the market in turn shapes German trade policies. In this type of situation there would be little to no room for democratic agenda

setting and accounting for public will. This type of view is based to some degree on the notion that once globalization has gained enough traction it becomes this unavoidable phenomenon that only leads to policy convergence (see Drezner, 2001). However, this outlook does not have to be so negative, in fact "[g]lobalization is not inevitable. The continued integration of national markets and growth of the global economy depend on domestic political support" (Hays, 2009, p. 150). This means that governments ultimately will not just simply bow down to the pressures of the market in a globalized world, because domestic political support determines the rate of convergence and could even result in a reversal of globalization trends in settings where there is strong public opposition. One should not forget the intricate relationship between executive branch and legislative branch in a country that frequently influences convergence. As Martin (2000) points out, parliaments are usually not directly involved in the negotiation of treaties or other forms of cooperation that are designed to increase economic cooperation. This does not mean that parliaments have no power to shape trade negotiations, rather they have delegated their power to the executive. Any bargain struck by government leaders will have to pass through a domestic implementation process and it is here where agreements without parliamentary support will get bogged down and possibly fade into oblivion. Ultimately this can lead to "an implementation deficit" (Martin, 2000, p. 189), which weakens a government's position for future negotiations, as its inability to push implementation of agreements decreases its credibility and reputation abroad. This means that voters can influence the implementation of international agreements by electing a party that reflects their personal preferences. This logic only makes sense if voters are offered different choices by the competing parties. Political parties, for their part, should

have an incentive not just to control the executive power, but to also secure strong parliamentary support in order to strengthen the Executive and make it more credible as it engages in negotiations on the international stage.

These general theoretical concepts can undoubtedly apply quite differently within a state depending on the particularities of its political system. Within a parliamentary system the government has a majority in parliament and can usually count on support from the legislature when it comes to the implementation of treaties which the executive has negotiated. By comparison, within a presidential system such as the United States, the President might face significant opposition if his or her party has lost control of congress. Nevertheless, Martin's logic of the potential implementation deficit is still relevant for a parliamentary democracy such as Germany, because, while its government can rely on parliamentary support in the Bundestag, the Executive will still have to consider parliamentary support across the whole spectrum including the opposition, especially if the general population is unsupportive. Usually, the government will be able to whip the votes in the Bundestag to secure support for an international agreement that it has negotiated, but if the electorate opposes it, then the ruling party can face stiff opposition at the next state election.

At first glance this might be counter intuitive, because the state elections for Germany's 16 Bundesländer should, in theory, be about the issues within the particular state and not about matters and disputes at the federal level, but here the concept of second-order elections becomes relevant. This concept goes back to Reif and Schmitt (1980), who used this term to distinguish between two kinds of elections. The vital elections, the so called "first-order" elections, are either the national parliamentary

elections in parliamentary systems or the national presidential elections in presidential systems. The other set is a deluge of “second-order” elections. These are by-elections, local and regional elections, those to a second chamber and the like. The particular significance of these elections lies in the dichotomy that they have institutionally binding consequences only at the level at which they are carried out; nevertheless their outcomes are both shaped by and felt at the national level. Parties do not solely garner votes based upon their policy proposals for the specific context of the second-order arena, but also according to issues at the primary political arena of the state. In other words, any treaty that Germany’s government negotiates and adopts will be, at least to some extent, put to a vote at the next state election. Widespread opposition to the new treaty can be bad for the government for two reasons. First, if this opposition leads to a loss of votes at the state level there are relevant consequences at the federal level. The dilemma for the federal government is that often a change of leadership at the state level in one or two states is sufficient to tip the balance within Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, thus restricting the federal government’s policy options, despite strong support in the lower house, the Bundestag. Furthermore, the public will draw inferences from the performance of a party in second-order elections, thus attempting to assess a party’s chance of a potential win or loss in a first-order election at the national level.

The issue of how globalization affects parliamentary power certainly warrants a closer look at the election programs of Germany’s parties and what positions they formulate with regard to international agreements. Important questions in the respect are:

- Do parties address international treaties and cooperation at all in their election program and if so;

- Do they offer divergent positions or are they relatively uniform across the whole party spectrum?
- Are these positions very broad and general or are they specific and precise?
- Are there continuing trends over multiple elections or do positions seem rather ad hoc and opportunistic policy proposals that correlate with salient issues around the time of an election?
- Do the responses to these questions reflect any patterns based on a political left/right cleavage? Essentially the point of asking these questions is to get a feeling for how well, if at all, parties do communicate their goals when it comes to international agreements.
- Do they involve voters in order to build support to globalization and to guarantee a successful implementation?

3.2.4 Why the Issue of Identity Matters So Much

When it comes to globalization and the determination of how people might respond to globalization, the most rational approach is to evaluate an individual's economic self-interest and to conclude whether globalization affects it positively or negatively. This rational approach frequently fails to align with reality. For example, Rankin (2004) examines the relationship between economic self-interest and the emotional factor of identity for Americans and Canadians, regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He finds economic self-interest can be difficult to determine for the average citizen, as it requires access to information and some degree of analytical skill to determine the effects of NAFTA on that citizen's individual economic

situation. Messages about national identity, however, rely on attitudes, symbols, and emotions that are generally more accessible and easier to address for individual citizens. Heuristics such as images of fellow Americans who have blue collar jobs that will be lost to Mexican competitors lends an easier way for citizens to understand trade agreement impacts, even if it tends to pitch international trade partners as competitors. It is important to note that identity does not have to be primarily national. Forms of identity that allow for a wider, more comprehensive and inclusive type of identity are possible too. Such forms of identity will be more open to supranational arrangements.

Hooghe and Marks (2004) study the relationship between economic rationality and national identity, and how these factors influence individual attitudes towards European integration. While their study focuses on European integration, rather than globalization, their findings can reasonably well be extrapolated to a globalization framework. After all, Europeanization is "a 'nested' phenomenon, in that it is taking place within a broader process of globalization, and may even be contributing to it" (Anderson, 2003, p. 42). Additionally, economic integration is a key factor of European integration. Likewise, Mitchell's (2014) research demonstrates that the stronger an individual's European identity is, the greater or stronger their support for further economic integration. Subsequently, a straight forward cost benefit calculation does not exclusively determine preferences on economic integration, rather a number of "soft" factors such as identity play in, because "[a]t its most encompassing level, globalization implies the diminishing importance of national boundaries in circumscribing the way people act and think" (Anderson, 2003, p. 38).

One of Hooghe and Marks' (2004) findings is that economic calculations are

important when it comes to an individual's attitude toward increased integration, but economic factors become less important as national identity becomes more salient to an individual. They refine this finding by emphasizing the crucial distinction of exclusive and inclusive national identity. It is the exclusive national identity that ignores rational economic calculations and opposes further integration. This finding is in line with Rankin's (2004) reasoning that supranational identity can significantly decrease resistance to economic integration. Hooge and Marks (2004) further point out that political parties have a key position when it comes to shaping inclusive or exclusive national identities. This is especially true for parties that vie for votes of European constituencies, because of the strong supranational character of the EU. European parties that want to invoke a supranational identity have it relatively easy within the EU, because "European identity is not empirically opposed to national identity" (Kohli, 2000, p. 126).

The EU is not just an abstract institution or an idea that is hard to comprehend for Europeans. Instead, the idea of a shared European identity is constantly being reproduced. This happens through the political process within the EU, where domestic politicians regularly present their policies within a European context. This can take many forms, such as blaming the EU for forcing domestic politicians to implement EU regulations. A European context is frequently invoked for the purpose of benchmarking national policies; either to justify one's own policies because compared to the rest of Europe the national achievements look quite good, or to discredit the opposition because all other European states are achieving better outcomes. There are also the physical symbols that persistently remind European citizens that they are part of something bigger than just their particular nation. European citizens are frequently exposed to the EU when

they deal with their own state, like government buildings that feature not only the national flag but also the European flag. Similarly, state issued identification cards like passports or drivers' licenses refer to the EU, as do car license plates. Most important for those states that are part of the European Monetary Union is the legal tender (the Euro) that millions of EU citizens handle every day and that is issued by the European Central Bank.

It is important to note that even in this European setting, political parties must operate within a specific national social, cultural, and historic context. This context has significant influence on how easily a party can shape identities towards inclusive or exclusive identities and how easily political actors can tap into and foster supranational identities. In the United Kingdom reference to a supranational identity is much more difficult. British identity has generally been defined in opposition to Europe (Gamble, 2003) or outside of it, due to the historic experience of the British Empire (Kent, 1993). German elites have used Europe as a means to overcome the trauma and political realities of World War II, the process of European integration offering Germany a way of leaving its blemished national identity behind (Poguntke, 2007). Europe also became an instrument for "achieving an 'equality of rights' with their European neighbors […and…] the rehabilitation of Germany's international credentials" (Anderson, 2005, p. 79). Historically, a European identity has been a key feature of the Federal Republic. Therefore, Germany's political parties should be able to tap into and foster a European identity to overcome resistance to economic integration. It is necessary to closely look at how parties address the issue of the EU and a European identity.

- In which way do parties address the issue and does their approach seem likely to

increase or decrease Germans' feeling of belonging to a wider European collective?

The additional indirect factors that are important to this study have been summarized in Table 3.1 to provide for a clear overview of what to look for when analyzing party programs. This table will make it easier to identify relevant themes and ideas that parties use to attract votes and how they relate to globalization in the long run.

3.3 Why Study Germany Since 1990?

This case study will be built upon theoretical sampling, meaning that the selected case is chosen for its theoretical significance and not statistical significance (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537). The section below outlines the theoretical reasons for selecting Germany after 1990.

Size matters in international relations, especially for structural approaches (Jervis, 1978; Mearsheimer, 2001; Walt, 1985; Waltz, 1979). This paper justifies selecting Germany by relying on a structural approach even though this epistemological choice might initially seem somewhat counterintuitive. Germany is certainly an economically important state with a GDP of $3.98 trillion.[2] However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Factbook lists the EU, the USA, China, India, and Japan ahead of Germany in terms of their respective GDP. This leaves Germany in sixth place, which is not a bad position, but it makes Germany less interesting to someone taking a structural approach. Using structural logic examining the EU, the US, or China is far more relevant, especially since their respective GDPs dwarf that of Germany's; so why not choose to examine one

[2] All GDP figures on this page are from the CIA World Factbook and are based upon purchasing power parity.

of these three economic behemoths more closely? Any of these three entities would make for a very worthwhile research project, but they are all very distinct when it comes to political parties, party competition, and their potential effects on globalization. The theoretical framework of this research does not fit China's particular type of one-party rule, thus leaving only the US and the EU. As stated previously this project is not designed to be the sort of statistical analysis that is based on data from the CMP. Rather it is striving to be a "thick" description and content driven analysis, and any attempt to encompass both of them would have to be so superficial in order to be manageable that it would be nearly meaningless. In essence, one must choose between these two economic giants and this research focuses on the EU, which is probably the more complex and varied economic player of these two due to its supranational makeup.

However, the theoretical framework of this research is also not well suited to analyze the EU, because its structures of governance are broadly distributed over the supranational, national, and subnational levels (Risse, Cowles, & Caporaso, 2001), with authority dispersed between them (Rosamond, 2000). This makes it hard to decide which level to emphasize and analyze. Intuitively one might be inclined to look at the overarching supranational level, but this is a great deal more difficult than it would initially seem. Party competition certainly occurs at this level, but elections for the European Parliament (EP) are "second-order" elections (see Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005; Weber, 2007). In other words, elections to the EP are never purely about who should represent Europe's citizens at the supranational level. Instead they always reflect to some extent the respective 28 national elections. This is because elections to the EP are held nationally by national parties under national electoral laws. The news

coverage is done by the national media apparatus, and the public discourse in relation to the election focuses on domestic issues, often dominating the campaigns. However, although EP elections have the appearance of national parliamentary elections, they differ in a very decisive way as they do not determine the allocation of political power within member countries. Hence there is little at stake for national parties (Weber, 2007). Additionally, EP elections offer very little in terms of a real choice over alternative policies that determine the future of Europe, nor is the average voter interested in such matters (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004). Hence, parties run their familiar campaign strategies, platforms, and slogans that they coined for their primary national elections. In other words, "elections to the EP are fought by national political parties to win the support of nationally minded voters on national political issues" (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004, p. 284). In order to examine the effects that political parties have on globalization, one should study the undiluted "first-order" elections. Yet again, an in-depth study of 28 national party systems is unrealistic. Instead, this research focuses exclusively on Germany and there is good support for this choice: hegemonic stability theory.

Krasner (1976) claims that states are the only relevant actors in the international system and that their behavior is determined by the structure of the system. In particular, Krasner is interested in the institutional appearance of free trade. He explains the occurrence of a stable free trade structure, in the otherwise anarchic international realm, through power imbalances. In so doing he undoubtedly builds upon Kindelberger's notion, that "[f]or the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (Kindelberger, 1973, p. 305). This powerful stabilizer or hegemon has a significant incentive to create and enforce a stable free trade system. Because of its size

the benefits of a free trade area outweigh the costs of establishing such an order. Krasner's logic has become known under the label "hegemonic stability theory" (Snidal, 1985) and has attracted a lot of attention because it provides a mechanism for overcoming the logic of the anarchic self-help system.

The traditional structural argument is that every state has to fend for itself securing its own survival and security. In this setting, states are not interested in absolute gains, they are rather concerned with relative gains, meaning that the fact that one's power, influence, wealth, etc. is increased based upon cooperation with other states is not good enough if other states gain more, relative to one's own state. This makes any form of cooperation unlikely because there will be very few instances when two or more states can profit from cooperation to the same extent. With regard to free trade arrangements this means that there will always be one participating state that has an incentive to create a tariff for some industry in order to obtain favorable relative gains. The consequence, of course, is that since balancing of power is the default response of states in the international system (Waltz, 1979, p. 126) all other states will have to raise their own tariffs, thus curtailing cooperation and free trade. Similarly, negotiations over nontariff barriers to trade, such as safety regulations or environmental standards, among multiple states with diverse preference will never find an outcome that provides equal utility to all involved. As the game theoretical concept of "asymmetric coordination games" illustrates, once a state agrees to a certain solution, this solution becomes self-enforcing with the result that one state consistently does better than the others.[3] Therefore, the stakes are extremely high and usually a bargain will not be struck, unless there is "an

[3] For an example of an asymmetric coordination game, see Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998).

undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties [who] helps ease distributional tensions through […] side payments" (Mattli, 1999, p. 56). Another key element of hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon must be large enough and well-structured in order to provide for other states a position on which to converge. In some sense the hegemon must be a role model that other states will want to follow. Germany certainly plays this role within the EU (Crawford, 2015, p. 338; Mattli, 1999, p. 104). It has the necessary size to provide a substantial position upon which to converge, but more importantly it also has institutions that have proven to be strong foundations for growth and prosperity,

However, there have been ample critiques pointing out the possibility "that hegemony is a historical accident and is inherently unstable" (Stein, 1984, p. 384), because even Britain and the US, at the zenith of their power, only created "subsystemic" orders (Stein, 1984, p. 367). It is hard to foresee that any state will become so powerful and big that all states have an incentive to converge on its position. This leads to the question, how should one view hegemonic stability theory in light of this critique? A reasonable assessment is that "critiques of hegemonic stability theory have not destroyed its analytic foundations, they have advanced the debate about it in unquestionably important ways" (Gowa, 1994, p. 28). For example, Mattli (1999) has been able to validate hegemonic stability theory at the regional level, especially in the case of the EU. He demonstrates that Germany is exactly the "one stabilizer" (Kindelberger, 1973, p. 305), the paymaster of Europe and the creator of a regional order. As Eichengreen (2000) points out, when it comes to monetary issues, Germany's hegemonic position stems from its formidable financial market power and its ability to act as the organization's primary

source of liquidity, as well as being the monetary union's key creditor state, a type of lender of last resort (Matthijs & Blyth, 2011; Paterson, 2011, p. 73). Germany is motivated, in large part, by the fact that it absorbs a disproportionate amount of the negative externalities that arise from the lack of a free trade order. Germany profits disproportionately from trade, especially within the EU, and trade is the lifeblood of its economy. In other words, Germany has a strong incentive to create and support a system that radically lowers transaction cost, such as a free trade area and a monetary union. These economic incentives constitute a necessary condition for Germany to assume the role of regional hegemon, but they do not represent a sufficient condition. As Mattli pointed out, for the coordination problem to be resolved there must be a leader "whose membership or cooperation in the group is perceived, by all or by a majority within the group, to be more important to the group than that of any other state" (Mattli, 1999, p. 55). The following four paragraphs each give a different reason why Germany is the unrivaled leader of the EU in general and the Euro zone in particular.

One way to determine if other Euro zone countries view Germany as an indispensable state is through simple inference. As Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, Germany is at the very heart of almost all trade relationships. The only exception is Ireland, whose economy is centered on the Anglo-American economies. The other states in the Euro zone would lose one of their most important trading partners and in many cases *the* most important one, if Germany were not part of the free trade and monetary zone. However, the indirect consequences of an EU without Germany would be even more profound. For example, as Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, Portugal receives 12.9% of all its imports directly from Germany, but its most important import partner is Spain which provides

almost 33% of Portugal's imports. However, the close to 33% that Spain exports to Portugal is dependent on Spain's imports from and exports to Germany. Without imports from Germany, Spanish manufacturers would have to pay higher prices for their production inputs. Similarly, Spanish companies would not achieve the same economies of scale without access to the German market, which absorbs 11% of Spanish exports. Both examples mean that Portugal would have to pay higher prices for the 33% of imports it obtains from Spain. Germany, on the other hand, would be much less affected if there were no trade relations with Portugal, because for Germany, Portugal is only one of its many trade partners. A similar analysis is true for other Euro zone states and their relationship to Germany. Just as Krasner (1976) predicted, Germany is the state with the political power in these relationships, because it incurs less cost if the relation is terminated. This is also evident in the way voting rights have been designated in the EU, ensuring that no state surpasses Germany in the way votes are allocated to states in the European Council or seats are allocated in the European Parliament.[4]

Another way to determine if other states regard Germany's leadership role as legitimate is revealed through the process of policy adaptation. "Adaptation to the policies of the leader makes not only political but also economic sense; that is, it is likely to be the least costly change within the group" (Mattli, 1999, p. 55). Possibly the most important policies, with regard to the monetary union, revolve around the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB). As Hayo and Hofmann (2006) point out, the Bundesbank has served as the template for the ECB, in other words, adaptation of the German model into the monetary framework confirms the Euro zones implicit acceptance of Germany's

[4] For more details see the decision making process in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (Fontaine, 2010).

leading position. This type of logic allows one to interpret the British reluctance to join the Euro zone not so much as a decision based upon economic calculation, but rather as an expression of an underlying averseness to accepting German leadership.

A third justification for Germany as the undisputed leader of the EU is its assumption of the "role of regional paymaster" (Mattli, 1999, p. 56), thereby resolving a lot of the tensions that arise from integration. The logic of a paymaster is that cooperation between actors is at times undesirable to one of them because another actor profits more from the cooperation. This problem can be overcome when the actor who profits more from the cooperation than the other actors uses some of the additional benefits and shares them with the other actors. The term paymaster has caught on in the media ("Germany: Europe's Reluctant Paymaster," 2009) and is well illustrated by the EU's 2011 budget. One clearly recognizes that Germany bears the brunt of the cost associated with Europe's integration. Its national contribution of €23.1 billion accounts for 19.3% of all national contributions to the EU's budget. By comparison, the next three largest contributors are France, Italy, and Britain with €19.6 bn, 16.1 bn, and 13.8 bn respectively. This, however, does not necessarily justify why the term paymaster should be used exclusively for Germany, because based on the contributions alone one could identify two or even more paymasters. A close look at the net contributions to the EU allows for a different interpretation, as the gap in funding for the EU becomes much bigger. Germany's net contribution is €9 bn, whereas France, Italy, and Britain only have a net contribution of €6.4 bn, €5.9 bn, and €5.6 bn, respectively, which equates to roughly 71%, 66%, and 62% of Germany's contribution.[5] Germany unmistakably overpays. This is referred to

[5] Member states primarily fund the EU in three ways. The most important source is a percentage of the Gross National Income that every state contributes. The second type of revenue is a Value Added Tax that

within game theory as making side payments. Within the setting of the EU Germany is willing to overpay, because it ensures cooperation.[6]

Finally, the ongoing Euro crisis is another great example of Germany's importance for both the EU and the Euro area. The media is full of analysis and speculation regarding the Greek and Italian debt crises, the involvement of French banks, a possible breakup of the Euro zone etc., while at the same time Portugal, Ireland, and Spain desperately hope not to be dragged down by the current developments ("Europe's currency crisis," 2011). While there are many actors involved, such as the affected nation states and their respective financial sectors, the ECB and ample other high profile EU institutions, in the end, everybody knows that the most important response to the problem will come out of Berlin, not Brussels, Paris, or any other capital ("The euro crisis," 2011). It is not hard to see that the Euro crisis unmistakably reveals how power "works in the European Union, putting Germany in the driver's seat at the expense of the European Commission and other member states. [… Merkel …] is now calling the shots, with France as a distinctly junior partner, setting out demands for economic policy coordination along German lines and using her leverage as Europe's paymaster to gain consent" (Taylor, 2011, n.p.).

Germany's role as regional hegemon and its willingness to take on that responsibility are vital for the EU's future. The fact that this is not a theoretical thought

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each member state collects on behalf of the EU and the last one is based on import duties, for services and goods brought into the EU, which members amass for the EU. The two primary expenditures of the EU that go directly towards specific member states are agricultural support, based upon the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and structural funds, which are sent according to the EU's regional policy. Additionally Britain receives a sizable rebate, in form of a refund, due to the fact that the UK receives very little money from the CAP, due to its relatively small agriculture sector. The difference between the funds that a state pays to the EU and the money it receives back in form of the CAP and structural funds makes up a state's net contribution.

[6] For a detailed view of expenditures and revenues by member states see European Commission, 2012.

experiment was amply demonstrated by the words of Poland's foreign minister Radek Sikorski (2011) when addressing his host in Berlin, the German foreign minister: "I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: *I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity*. You have become Europe's indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead" (pp. 9-10; emphasis in the original). Therefore, it is legitimate to extrapolate Europe's mid- to long-term position on globalization based upon its indispensable nation's position, i.e., Germany's position.

Now the task remains to explain the selected time frame. This study covers a 23-year time span, starting in 1990 and ending in 2013, and will examine all German general national elections within the time frame. The year 2013 is a natural cut-off point as it marks the year when Germany held its most recent elections at the national level. The choice to limit the sample to the year 1990, however, is certainly more contestable; why should the time span not be extended or even contracted? Every nation has historic experiences that are of such magnitude that they become defining events. They represent a break with the past and the beginning of a new and different future. These incidents can reshape identity, culture, and collective awareness and result in a post- and prehistoric event consciousness, like with the US and 9/11. Certainly, October 3rd 1990 is such a day for Germany, restoring its unity and sovereignty. Since this research project is interested in an in-depth analysis extending the scope to pre-1990 would increase the complexity to a significant degree, because one would have to go back at least between 1 and 2 decades so as to contrast pre-1990 developments with postunification ones. It is also not clear that expanding the time frame of this study would lead to better results, with regard to our understanding of how political parties might influence globalization. Especially since

others, for example Milner and Judkins (2004), Kriesi et al. (2006), Haupt (2010), and Camyar (2012) have already covered this time period. However, what has not been analyzed by any of these authors is the time period between 2003-2014, which is a unique period in post WWII history, because it covers the time frame when globalization started to significantly slow down for the first time since the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 ("Special Report: The World Economy," 2013). It is essential to address whether political parties in Germany changed the way they address globalization during this time period, but first, a brief look at the Federal Republic's party system is necessary to provide a useful frame of context for the subsequent research.

3.4 The German Party System

Originally, Germany's party system was very polarized between the Union of CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/ Christian Social Union in Bavaria) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany). Both organizations had very pronounced political, programmatic, and cultural differences. The Union had a clear conservative and Catholic background, and propagated strong allegiance to the West, meaning Europe and the USA. The SPD viewed itself as the champion of democratic socialism, representing unions and workers. The party favored neutrality between the two superpowers and vehemently objected to Germany's integration into NATO (Alemann, 2015). In other words, the two major German parties used to have very tight links to specific social groups, and this is also true for the smaller FDP (Free Democratic Party) which was particularly attractive to entrepreneurs and the financially better off (Alemann, 2015). These social identities did not start to lose their political relevance until the 1960s,

at which point German parties tried to change their profiles in order to be more attractive to a wider swathe of the population. The most important change was the SPD's rejection of Marxism and the acceptance of the social market economy as Germany's economic foundation (Scarrow, 2002, p. 81). During this same time another interesting development took place in terms of the makeup of the Bundestag. A plurality of political parties existed in parliament after the 1949 election, with 10 parties sending delegates to the Bundestag. This diversity was quickly replaced through an effort to consolidate the number of parties in the1950s, by changing the electoral law in order to introduce a threshold. Parties that could not muster at least 5% of the popular vote would not be granted any seats in the Bundestag. The goal behind the change was to limit the fragmentation of the legislature and to avoid giving power to small extremist parties (Elff, 2012, p. 55). As a result, the number of parties in parliament shrunk to only three throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The CDU/CSU and SPD took turns governing with the help of the FDP, who played the role of kingmaker by forming a coalition with the strongest party, thus achieving a majority in parliament.

Germany's political parties are traditionally the gate keepers with respect to political mobilization and interest formation. This quasimonopoly was only once seriously challenged in the mid-1970s and 1980s, when concerned citizens felt that the established parties were unable to articulate and respond to the burgeoning worries of environmental destruction and an increasing nuclear arms race. Initiatives formed by citizen were, for the first time, able to circumscribe parties' ability to dictate the political agenda. While some have seen this development as a sign of party failure, in the long run political parties still remain the primary actors in the political system (Scarrow, 2002, p.

96). The activism during this period led to one important lasting change in the party system, which is the formation of the Green party. Its political relevance was established when the party was able to clear the 5% threshold in the 1983 election, a feat the party has been able to replicate in every subsequent election.

In the Soviet occupation zone the political process was much simpler. Under direction from Moscow social democrats and communists were forced to join and form a new party: the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or simply SED). The purpose of the party was to organize social and political life and to ensure that the German Democratic Republic follows Soviet leadership. Smaller parties existed in East Germany too, but their relevance was negligible, due to the fact that election outcomes were always predetermined by the SED. Politics in East Germany was dominated by this party, but the party's power didn't stop there, as it controlled many aspects of life. It was in charge of the unions, and it regulated all youth programs, sports, and all other forms of social event or organization. The party also significantly restricted freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and repressed any form of civil society. Only religious organizations had some form of autonomy, but they too were largely marginalized due to the state's espousal of atheism (Alemann, 2015). German reunification in 1990 was a pivotal moment for Germany and had profound consequences for Germans socially, economically, politically, and culturally, but when it comes to Germany's party system the consequences were surprisingly small by comparison. Instead of two parties on the right and two parties on the left there was now a third party on the left. The former communist party that had ruled East Germany for decades quickly rebranded itself as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and ran for

office in 1990 (Elff, 2012, p. 52). In general the months before formal unification were used by the western parties "to effectively colonize the new and newly democratized parties in the east, a process which culminated in formal mergers between eastern and western parties by the end of 1990," just in time for the federal election that year (Scarrow, 2002, p. 80).

Despite the process of unifying the country, party politics seem quite constant as a whole. Change prior to reunification has been very measured and even the formation of the Green party and their electoral success resulted, for a long time, only in a new distribution of seats in the Bundestag. 1998 saw a new government constellation take shape when the Greens joined the government of Gerhard Schöder. Unified Germany also did not produce any significant changes other than adding the former East German communist party to the pool represented in the legislature. The PDS caused a shift at the federal level in the two plus two power left-right split to which Germans had become accustomed (Elff, 2012, p. 69). At the beginning of the new century Germany's economy was struggling and unemployment was affecting more than 10% of the labor market. This downward trend had a negative impact on the acceptance of the two biggest parties, especially the, at the time governing, SPD which suffered a significant lack of support. This lack manifested itself at the national level in 2005, when both large parties' electoral losses disqualified either of them to govern with one of the smaller parties. The only option left, other than to form a coalition with more than two parties which has not happened in Germany since the 1950s, was to form a Grand Coalition under the leadership of the CDU/CSU with the SPD as the junior partner. In 2013 Angela Merkel chose this option again, because the Grand Coalition promised to be the most stable

government coalition. It will be interesting to see if one of the two major parties will be able to increase its support to the point that they can govern again with a smaller party.

Even though Germany's party system has been very stable since 1949 this does not guarantee that its future will be as calm and durable. Populist parties, especially on the right side of the political spectrum, receive support and voting for these parties is a form of registering protest with the five dominant political parties. While such protest parties receive bursts of support especially at the local level, the only party that has been able to move from protest party to being represented in the Bundestag is the Greens in the 1980s. The Left party did join the other four parties in 1990, but instead of being a protest party, it can build on historically grown support due to the fact that it controlled the political landscape for close to 50 years in former East Germany. The bigger challenge for Germany's five major parties is a more general disenchantment with politics and criticism regarding the way that parties operate and how they are structured. One way that this disapproval expresses itself is through decreasing party membership and the lack of young people who are engaged in political parties these days. Nevertheless, the consistent creation of new political parties demonstrates that the concept of relying on organized parties to express political will and to represent particular positions is alive and well in Germany (Alemann, 2015).

It is important to note that the German party system consists of more than five parties. There is actually a great number of parties that participate in elections to the Bundestag, but only a handful of them are able to secure seats in parliament, for reasons outlined above. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, there have been between 22 and 33 parties participating in federal elections since 1990. However, those parties that are able to

obtain a seat in parliament number, at a maximum, five. This paper only focuses on (and considers meaningful) the five parties that were able to secure seats in parliament since 1990. This is justified by these parties' ability to convince at least a certain minimum of voters, of their merit. These parties have also been consistently involved in the political debate and receive regular attention in the media where basic party positions are examined. Other parties, take for example "The Violets – For Spiritual Politics"[7] or the Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany[8] are rather out of the ordinary and most voters will be very unfamiliar with their specific party programs, if not even completely unaware of their existence.

To summarize, this chapter illustrates why party election programs are a good measure to assess the overall political disposition towards globalization and other key policy areas that have an effect on globalization. This chapter also highlights other more indirect factors that parties might address in their election campaigns and it identifies the significant long term effects that these factors may have on globalization. It also provides an overview of Germany's party system and a theoretical justification for why it makes sense to select Germany for this study and why the 1990-2013 election programs of the five major parties are a sensible subset of all possible elections and parties. The following chapter, Chapter 4, will outline the methodology that is applied throughout this research.

[7] For more details see http://die-violetten.de/
[8] For more details see https://www.mlpd.de/

Table 3.1

Overview of Other Relevant Questions and how They Relate to Globalization

Do parties address the globalization dilemma? Do parties propose policies that strengthen the welfare state?	Yes	Increased support for globalization, because voter feel increased protection.
	No	Decreased support for globalization due to a feeling of insecurity.
Are these policies geared towards the majority of people or are they focused on special interest groups?	Special	Effect can be broad or affect only special interest groups depending on whether or not the message is geared towards the population as a whole or only towards a subset.
Theoretical foundation:	Rudra (2002), Rodrik (1997), and Cameron (1978)	
Do parties address the issue of regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement?	Yes	Voters get a better understanding of the potential consequences of globalization. This creates certainty and increases support.[9]
	No	Voters are uncertain as to what the consequences of increased economic liberalization are. This decreases support for globalization.
Theoretical foundation:	Rodrik (2000) and Ranjan and Lee (2007)	

[9] A clearly defined unpopular policy can of course generate strong opposition, but overall the idea here is that uncertainty about the consequences of any process will generally create opposition. Uncertainty does not generate support for any policy.

Table 3.1 Continued

Do parties communicate their goals with respect to international agreements and do they offer voters clear choices?	Yes	Voters fell involved and governments can more easily implement international agreements.
	No	Voters are not involved and have no way of expressing their opinion via a vote. Increases the likelihood of opposition to international agreements and potentially affects their implementation adversely.
Theoretical foundation:	Martin (2000) and Hays (2009)	
Do political parties try to use European identity to overcome resistance to Economic integration?	Yes	Voters' European identity is used to overcome resistance to Economic integration.
	No	Voters might not see economic integration with in Europe as desirable and oppose further forms of liberalization or advocate for increased economic closure.
In which way do parties address the issue and does their approach seem likely to increase or decrease Germans feeling of belonging to a wider European collective?	Special	Parties could be referring to the EU/Europe with negative images, which will lead to less European integration and decrease acceptance to globalization
Theoretical foundation:	Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004)	

Table 3.2

Import Partners for the Eurozone's Eleven Largest Economies (Excluding Germany)

Germany highlighted for easier identification						
Euro Member State	Largest Partner	% of Total Trade	Second Largest Partner	% of Total Trade	Third Largest Partner	% of Total Trade
France	**Germany**	**19.5**	Belgium	10.7	Italy	7.7
Italy	**Germany**	**15.4**	France	8.7	China	7.7
Spain	**Germany**	**14.4**	France	11.7	China	7.1
Netherlands	**Germany**	**14.7**	China	14.5	Belgium	8.2
Belgium	Netherlands	16.7	**Germany**	**12.7**	France	9.6
Austria	**Germany**	**41.5**	Italy	6.3	Switzerland	6
Greece	**Germany**	**10.7**	Italy	8.4	Russia	7.9
Portugal	Spain	32.9	**Germany**	**12.9**	France	7.4
Finland	**Germany**	**17**	Sweden	16	Russia	11
Ireland	UK	32.5	USA	14	France	10.2
Slovakia	**Germany**	**19.4**	Czech Rep.	17.4	Austria	9.1

Source of data: CIA (2017), The World Factbook.

Table 3.3

Export Partners for the Eurozone's Eleven Largest Economies (Excluding Germany)

Germany highlighted for easier identification

Euro Member State	Largest Partner	% of Total Trade	Second Largest Partner	% of Total Trade	Third Largest Partner	% of Total Trade
France	**Germany**	15.9	Spain	7.3	USA	7.2
Italy	**Germany**	12.3	France	10.3	USA	8.7
Spain	France	15.7	**Germany**	11	Italy	7.4
Netherlands	**Germany**	24.5	Belgium	11.1	UK	9.3
Belgium	**Germany**	16.9	France	15.5	Netherlands	11.4
Austria	**Germany**	29.4	USA	6.4	Italy	6.1
Greece	Italy	11.2	**Germany**	7.3	Turkey	6.6
Portugal	Spain	25	France	12.1	**Germany**	11.8
Finland	**Germany**	13.9	Sweden	10.1	USA	7
Ireland	USA	23.7	UK	13.8	Belgium	13.2
Slovakia	**Germany**	22.7	Czech Rep.	12.5	Poland	8.5

Source of data: CIA (2017),The World Factbook



Figure 3.4 Comparison between parties that participate in Germany's federal elections and those that obtain seats in parliament (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2017).

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

"Knowledge is understood to be the best understanding that we have been able to produce thus far, not a statement of what is ultimately real" (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 2). With regard to the link between globalization and political parties Chapter 3 already highlighted a lot of the knowledge that has been attained within the field of political science over the last few decades. One thing that sticks out within this literature is its *almost* exclusive reliance on large-*N* statistical cross-country analysis. The question one should ask in this situation is: Could our understanding be improved by applying a more diverse methodology when it comes to studying the effects of globalization on national politics?

This research is built on the assumption that a multiple method approach is in fact advantageous for increasing understanding of an issue in general and for the complex issue of globalization and how it relates to party politics in particular. This work utilizes a case study methodology that employs process tracing to complement the existing large-*N* statistical cross county analyses that have already been done. Certainly, the analysis over the remainder of this work will have to prove this assertion, that there is an added benefit to drawing on multiple methods, but first this chapter will discuss the benefits of case studies and explain process tracing as a method of scientific inquiry.

4.1 Case Studies

The term case study here is understood as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). For the purpose of this research the single unit is the Federal Republic of Germany since its reunification. Studying how domestic political alliances in Germany are affected by international trade will allow for a better grasp of how Rogowski's theoretical concepts apply in the real world. This knowledge can ultimately be used to generate further research and subsequently increase understanding of how domestic alliances are impacted by globalization in other developed economies.

Before elucidating the particular type of case study that will be carried out in this study, it will be helpful to demonstrate the merits of pursuing a case study, especially since this is not the predominant approach within the field of political science (see Schwartz-Shea, 2003). What are the advantages of pursuing a case study for this research project in the field of international political economy over alternative methods like quantitative research or formal modeling?

Case studies are "able to identify plausible causal variables, a task essential to theory construction and testing. […] Indeed, analytic theory cannot do without case studies. Because they are simultaneously sensitive to data and theory, case studies are more useful for these purposes than any other methodological tool" (Achen & Snidal, 1989, pp. 167-168). George and Bennett (2005) state that case studies have an advantage over statistical methods due to "their ability to serve the heuristic purpose of inductively identifying additional variables and generating hypothesis" (p. 45). Case studies are also excellent at developing typological theories, meaning theories that illustrate how different

arrangements of independent variables can lead to various types and levels of dependent variables. Such typological theories instead of looking at variables in isolation will generally emphasize the interaction between different variables (see George & Bennett, 2005, p. 46). Likewise Odell (2001) argues in favor of case studies over quantitative studies when it comes to their ability to introduce novel concepts, enable classifications, generate hypotheses, and for producing new persuasive and substantive theories. The reason for this superiority stems form case studies' "[m]ore comprehensive and more detailed contact with concrete instances of the events and behavior about which we wish to generalize" (Odell, 2001, p. 169).

This closeness generally leads to a very detailed and rich analysis, which makes case studies an outstanding method for constructing contextualized explanations of individual instances (Kacowicz, 2004, p. 120). While constructing a specific historical explanation is not the focus of this research, a detailed explanation of the manner in which political parties within Germany compete for votes is an important part of the puzzle. Such contextualized historical explanations have a distinct advantage, because as Odell (2001, p. 170) points out, statistical methods tend to prefer and emphasize structure over process. One should not detract from the importance of structures, but statistical methods are usually not adequate at explaining variation that occurs within a structure. Change within structures is best analyzed by looking at the processes of how that change came about. The best tool for doing this is by means of a case study. It is informative to see the extent to which and how the process of competing for votes in Germany's federal elections has changed with increased globalization and what this change reveals about the political elites' views on globalization.

Certainly case studies are no panacea and like every other approach they have their shortcomings. Overall, case studies sacrifice parsimony and wide-ranging applicability in order to gain well-defined subcategories with a high level of detail. Some do criticize that case studies tend to run contrary to Occam's razor and therefore are inferior due to their lack of elegance and persuasiveness. The logic is that parsimonious theories are superior, because of their falsifiability criterion. Theories with a limited number of assumptions are easier to test and have a broader reach, since they can be applied to more cases (see Popper, 2002). One way to counter this notion, that parsimony is per se superior to more complexity in the social sciences, is to point out the inherent danger of reducing social phenomena to the fewest possible number of assumptions, also known as oversimplification (Martin, 2002, p. 32). King, Keohane, and Verba assert that parsimony is an assumption about the make-up of the world, which implies that it is simple. “In the social sciences, some forcefully defend parsimony […], but we believe it is only occasionally appropriate. Given the precise definition of parsimony as an assumption about the world, we should never insist on parsimony as a general principle of designing theories” (King et al., 1994, p. 20). In other words parsimony is only useful when we can assume that the world we are trying to observe is simple, which is probably not the case when it comes to political processes that affect economic growth, income equality, employment, etc. on a global scale.

Even when methodologists agree that parsimony is not necessarily a great guiding principle in the social sciences, they nevertheless tend to view the contributions to theory made by research designed around a single case as quite limited (King et al., 1994). Not to dismiss this critique, which seems intuitive, there is a case for depth over breadth.

Bennet (2004) points out that some of the most influential work in political science, which has demonstrated the limitations or flaws of accepted theories, has been based upon single case studies (see also Rogowski, 1995). For example a case study that has been very influential over the years in the field of political economy is Schattschneider's (1935) work *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff*. An even more famous and far reaching case study is Kindleberger's (1973) work which illustrates that stability is only achieved if there is a stabilizer. His case study has become the fundamental building block of hegemonic stability theory as outlined in Chapter 3.

Single case studies can be quite influential and offer new insights. Furthermore, one should keep in mind that the goal of this research is not to weigh the relative importance of individual variables. Questions of relative importance are best addressed by statistical analysis. "[C]ase studies remain much stronger at assessing *whether* and *how* a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing *how much* it mattered" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25). Accordingly, the findings of this research are not intended to generate universally applicable inferences and rank them based upon their relevance. Instead the goal is to help with what case studies are best at; refining concepts, identifying potentially missing relevant variables, and testing causal mechanisms.

Before the actual case study can begin one more critique needs to be addressed, because it calls into question whether or not case studies can meet the most basic principles of scientific research: objectivity and comprehensiveness. Every researcher must resist the natural tendency to focus on evidence that substantiates their claims while at the same time overlooking or downplaying observations that fail to corroborate their assumptions. Often the claim is that systematic statistical analysis with its standardization

is the best solution for this dilemma. Defining explicit criteria for coding procedures combined with statistical techniques make theory testing and the formulation of inferences easy (Braumoeller & Sartori, 1999, p. 141). The logic is that research that does not apply rigorous statistical analysis is inherently in danger of being subjective.

While the warning is pertinent one needs to keep in mind that any form of categorization is always subjective. There are very few if any natural categories: Even seemingly obvious categories such as gender, race, and nationality are constructed. The same is true of any statistical research, the way information is coded, divided, categorized, and selected is always subjective (see Martin, 2002). Additionally, any conclusion reached on the basis of statistical inquiry is always "compromised to the degree that the variables as measured fall short of reflecting the respective theoretical constructs perfectly, and to the degree that the analysis has omitted variables that could not be measured" (van Evera, 1997, p. 79).

In other words subjectivity is an issue for any kind of research and not just for case studies. It is questionable if there is any research in the social sciences that is objective in the sense of being free from any form of personal biases. This is why objectivity to scientists simply means an "agreement on the results of a given observation" (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 36). This type of agreement is often easier to achieve for statistical work with its specific data sets, categories, coding, etc. A human content analysis by contrast can suffer from the disadvantage that "the number of inferences to be drawn from a text can be tantamount to the number of readers" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 236). This disadvantage can be overcome by providing a detailed explanation as to how the case study is conducted, allowing others to understand the

process that led to the findings of this research to allow them to reproduce its results, at least to a significant extent.

4.2 Explanation for how Key Terms Are Counted

Chapters 5 through 9 each summarize seven election programs of a specific party and analyze the programs with regard to globalization. The analysis in these five chapters follows a standardized pattern. First, there is a brief historic overview for each party, this will allow for a better understanding as to where the party comes from, where it falls within Germany's political spectrum, what the party's core policy goals are, and who the party's core constituents are. The first analytical step is the counting of key terms throughout the party's seven election programs from 1990 through 2013. The idea is to look for key references that are linked to globalization and to see how often a party uses these terms and in what context the terms are used. The following few paragraphs serve as an explanation as to how this counting is done. References regarding globalization are clustered according to key terms and their normative implication. The relevant terms are: globalization, export, import, trade, and free trade. The first three of these five terms have very straightforward equivalents in German: *Globalisierung, Export, and Import.* The term trade is more complicated in German. The noun trade is simply *Handel*, but the verb to trade is *handeln* in German, which depending on the context can refer to trading or to taking action. The number referenced in this analysis only counts those instances that explicitly refer to trade, and omits those that refer to taking action. The term free trade has a very literal translation in German with the identical meaning as it would have in English, which is *Freihandel.* The reason for these five terms is that they best capture the

economic side of globalization within election campaigns as they represent very commonly used and known terms by Germany's public. Additionally, selecting five specific terms to address in election campaigns makes it also easier to compare and contrast the programs of all five parties. It is necessary to note here that the counting of references is not so much about individual references as it is about the dispersion of references throughout election programs. Therefore, multiple references in one paragraph are only counted as one. The logic is that one can distinguish between parties that mention globalization 10 times in different paragraphs of an election program and those that mention it 10 times in one paragraph. Ten dispersed references imply a much higher salience then highly concentrated ones. This research claims that globalization is an important issue that should be linked to multiple policy fields and not be treated as singular field by itself, which is why in this analysis, references are counted by paragraphs and not individually.

The term normative implication refers, in this context, to what the specific term implies. Every globalization term is placed into one of five categories based upon what it is saying or implying. The categories are *Risk/Danger*, *Unjust*, *Neutral*, *Positive Outcomes*, and *Opportunities*. This means that every reference in any of the seven analyzed election programs is placed in one of those five categories. For example, a globalization reference that is mentioned in a context which claims that globalization creates a lot of uncertainty for the domestic job market is counted in the R*isk/Danger* category. The *Unjust* category captures references which assert that globalization increases income disparities or leads to exploitation of weaker or less developed economies, like the Greens' (1998, p. 133) statement that globalization aggravates

unequal development between regions. Any reference that links one of the five key terms to a favorable consequence is placed in the *Positive Outcomes* category. A great example would be the CDU's statement in 2013 that Germany's exports guarantee millions of well-paid domestic jobs (CDU, 2013, p. 7). It also includes the SPD's claim that Germany is a strong export nation and ought to remain one (SPD, 2009, p. 10). In the second example, exports are mentioned in a positive context but it does not imply a positive cause and effect relationship as the first example does. This serves as an important reminder that this exercise is only about counting references; it does not say anything about the quality of the individual references. The category *Opportunities* is for references that refer to a potentially beneficial future development, like the statement that the creation of a free trade zone is viewed by the CDU as a way to prevent trade disputes (CDU, 2002, p. 68). This type of analysis is included in each party's chapter as a means to give an overview of how Germany's major parties position themselves on globalization and related economic issues.

This exercise of counting references for each party and assigning them to one of the five categories will provide a good overview on how parties position themselves on the issue of globalization, but in and of itself it is insufficient to truly understand a party's position on globalization. This is why each party analysis will also include a summary of each election program that was published during the covered 23-year time period of this research. This makes it possible to understand a party's overall position on various social, economic, environmental, demographic, or cultural issues, for example. Through this exercise the individual globalization statements can be better placed and understood within a party's broader context.

To summarize, using a case study as a systematic method for examining party platforms with regard to globalization constitutes a novel approach. It is important to keep in mind that the point here is not to identify the one best research method and then closely pursue. Instead, one needs to keep in mind that both statistics and case studies have weaknesses that can be offset by the other method (van Evera, 1997, p. 83). The reason for building this research on a case study is that the literature that examines the effects of globalization on domestic politics and institutions relies almost exclusively on statistical cross country analysis of large- *N* samples, for which the *Comparative Manifestos Project* provides a majority of the data. The consequence is that the field as a whole misses out on the opportunity to "validate knowledge" which is most readily achieved when different methodologies are viewed as complementing, rather than trumping, one another (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 13). The goal is to gain additional insights by applying a different approach

Before progressing to the actual analysis it is important to address three additional issues. One is the creation of a yard stick against which to measure party election programs in terms of how rational actors ought to deal with the topic of globalization given Germany's particular economy and the relevance of trade. The second issue that requires further elaboration is to provide more background on the role of election programs for the Federal Republic and what the program creation process looks like. The final issue is to determine if parties should be seen as strategic actors that seek to maximize votes or if they are primarily policy focused with an emphasis on achieving programmatic consistency. The following sections will address each one of these points in detail before moving on to the party program analysis.

4.3 Defining a Yardstick

How parties present the issue of globalization to voters in an election program certainly depends on various factors, many of which vary substantially from party to party. Chapters 5 through 9 provide details on the parties' general positions, their historic development, core values, who their primary supporters are, and so on. Nevertheless, based upon Germany's particular economy there are a few things that one should be able to expect, if parties deal with globalization in a rational and constructive manner. Certainly, parties do not present a unified view on the matter and neither should they, but it is reasonable to form some kind of expectation as to how the issue is addressed. The same logic is true of other topics, for example when it comes to the guiding principle for Germany's economy, here all parties support and reaffirm the concept of the social market economy. They all oppose both pure capitalism and Marxism as a framework for the economy. Instead all parties praise its achievements and identify the social market economy as a key building block for Germany's prosperity and stability. Parties certainly do fight over the precise meaning of what it means to be a social market economy or whether Germany's current policies are in harmony with this particular type of economy, but there is a basic consensus regarding its general benefit. Additionally a specific party's particular views on the social market economy can be reasonably well extrapolated from its general position within the political left-right spectrum. Similarly, one should be able to expect German parties to agree on a few key points when it comes to globalization and to communicate these to voters, because Germany's economy is relatively wealthy and strong while at the same time relying disproportionately on trade, for an economy of its

size.[1]

Therefore, this study asserts that it is reasonable to expect German parties to address globalization and trade as important elements in their election campaigns. Undoubtedly, parties will look at the issue in different ways and emphasize diverse aspects of globalization. They will also come to different conclusions regarding its utility, depending on their specific point of view, but the expectation is that the issue is addressed in relation to various policy fields and not just in the context of foreign policy. Additionally, this research presupposes that globalization should be dealt with in a constructive manner clearly outlining its benefits and downsides dependent on each party's specific values and general policy preferences. A discourse by the parties that is one-sided in the way it deals with globalization, by presenting globalization either as a scourge or panacea, has to be considered populist. Instead, parties should outline policies that are purposefully designed to maximize the benefits from globalization and to ensure its universal reach, without neglecting to account for its environmental, cultural, and social impact.

4.4 The Election Program Formation Process

In order to explain the process that it takes to write an election program in Germany it is important to understand the central role that political parties have when it comes the formation of the political will, a role that is legitimized by Germany's constitution (see Grundgesetz Article 21). How German parties fulfil this role is specified

[1] Examples of Germany's very strong involvement in the international economy are for example its foreign trade to GDP ratio, defined as export ratio plus import ratio, which amounted to 86% in 2015. Similarly, its position within Europe is unparalleled as the continent's major trading country (see Sections 3.4 and 6.4 for more detail).

in the 1967 Law on Parties (German: Parteiengesetz). One element of this law, which is highly relevant for this research, is the provision that all political parties must outline their goals in written political programs (see Parteiengesetz Article 6, Section 1). The law also specifies a requirement that all such programs must be submitted to the Federal Election Chair prior to an election (see Parteiengesetz Article 6, Section 3). This means that written election programs are not a voluntary tool of parties for communicating with the electorate, but the fulfillment of a legal requirement. Naturally, parties attempt to use this legal stipulation as a means to persuade voters and it is clearly written with voters in mind, but it is also a means of meeting a legal requirement. This guarantees that all parties publish a program prior to an election, which makes them a great tool for scientific research, because it creates consistency which is important for tracing developments over time and for comparing different periods with one another.

This is one reason why there is ample scientific analysis that examines the content of election programs and its implications,[2] but by contrast there has been very little exploration regarding the process of how election programs are formulated and written. In general "it is surprising that only scant attention has hitherto been devoted to the intraparty practice of writing manifestos" (Dolezal et al., 2012, p. 870). A view that is shared by Däubler (2013, p. 338) and Korte and Schoofs (2013, p. 3) asserts that election research has addressed the process of how election programs are created in a rudimentary fashion at best. In other words lots of attention has been paid to the content of election

[2] The whole idea of the Manifesto Project is to allow the scientific community to carry out content analysis of parties' electoral manifestos. The project's data set covers over 1000 parties in more than 50 countries since the end of the Second World War. This data set is widely used by researchers who examine election programs, as previously pointed out under Section 3.2. For details see https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents/information.

programs, but the process of writing an election program remains rather vague. The literature on German election manifesto formation does, however, outline some common practices. The whole process is initiated with the party leadership, who will begin with the development of a program up to 2 years prior to an election, by forming an election program commission. This body's responsibility is to organize the program formation process by dividing the program into subfields and to organize the participation of the general party membership in the process (Däubler, 2013, pp. 342-343).

The details of how parties allow their members to engage in the program formulation process differs somewhat from party to party, but there is an overall shared pattern. All parties combine various avenues for participating in the program formation process. In order to give the whole process structure, the program is subdivided into several policy fields which are then addressed by individual work groups. These groups hold various sessions where they debate their specific policy field and develop programmatic suggestions. Oftentimes, prominent party functionaries will be assigned to help guide these panels. These discussions are also used to allow the general membership to discuss policy ideas with party subject matter experts (Korte & Schoofs, 2013, pp. 4-5).

All parties allow their members to submit program suggestions at their local party office, which are then submitted to each party's respective federal office in Berlin and the respective work groups. Parties also use special events like workshops or conventions that are either centrally organized by the party's federal office or at the state or even regional level. The parties differ a little bit in how much they consolidate these events, with the CDU and SPD usually holding more centralized conferences whereas the other

parties, especially the Greens, tend to focus on regional events that allow for wider participation (Korte & Schoofs, 2013, pp. 4-5). In recent years parties have also begun to use the internet to allow party members and even the general public to provide feedback on specific policies or to discuss topics in a more open and general manner online (Korte and Schoofs, 2013, p. 6). The idea is to gather input and ideas from a wide audience and to identify a broad consensus within the party. Each work group is tasked with bundling the information and writing a draft chapter for the election program for their particular policy area.

The next step in writing a program takes place under the leadership of the election commission and involves a handful of people at best. The task of this small circle is to revise the individual sections and to combine them into a complete draft program. This draft will then be reviewed, revised and approved by the party leadership (Däubler, 2006, p. 343). Party elites and the candidates for a seat in parliament then discuss the draft program and gather feedback. Depending on the party this can also mean going back to a candidate's respective constituency and debating the party program at the local level. Feedback is subsequently collected by the party's election commission and incorporated into the party program. Once completed, the party executive has one more chance to tweak the program before the program is presented for ratification at a special party convention (Däubler, 2006, p. 343). The program can still be amended as requested by the ratifying body. It is rare that passages are deleted from the program at this stage. Once the program is accepted by the general party body at the party convention the party begins to publish and to disseminate the work. This happens via handing out printed copies of the program in public places, making them available in party offices, or by

making the material available online on the parties' respective websites. In recent years, making the program available online on the parties' various websites has become increasingly popular and one can expect that in the future online publications will increasingly replace hard copy programs.

The step of presenting the election program for approval to the general membership is actually a means of fulfilling the legal requirement, which states that a party's election programs must be ratified at a party convention (Parteiengesetz Article 9, Section 3). The election program is thus much more than a strategic paper that was written by the party elite to maximize votes. The party certainly has voters in mind, but it is much more than that. It constitutes the programmatic roadmap of an entire party for the next legislative period. It is important to note in this context that programs are not devised every 4 years from the ground up, instead they are largely developed by building on the existing material of previous elections (Däubler, 2006, p. 340). This means that German election programs present a lot of continuity from one election to the next. However, this continuity does not represent a dogmatic attachment to the concepts and values of previous election programs. A good example of a strong and unprecedented policy reversal from one election program to the next is the CDU's position on abandoning nuclear energy by 2020 (CDU, 2013, p. 30) even though the party had, in previous elections, always reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear energy as an important element of Germany's energy mix to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Significant policy changes within parties are possible, but quite rare. One can speculate that the 2013 program would not have included a 180° change without the extraordinary circumstances of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011. The reason that election programs are

largely based upon previous manifests is that parties highly value consistency across programs, which means that programmatic considerations are very important in the program development process and purely vote maximizing calculations are limited (Däubler, 2006, p. 355). One might still contend that even if parties are largely consistent in their programs there are still plenty of opportunities to slip in populist statements on less important issues that are only of momentary importance. Section 3.1 looks at this issue and summarizes a body of research that shows that parties largely do try to implement campaign pledges. Mansergh and Thomson (2007) summarized it best when they state that "[t]here is little truth to the argument that pledges are cheap, in the sense that they are confined to peripheral policy areas or to specific issues that are of little consequence. Parties generally make the most pledges on the policy themes they emphasize most" (pp. 322-323).

It is also important to note that German election programs are largely influenced by a historic process and much less by professional campaigning. While parties in Germany have started to use outside consultants to help with running election campaigns and to use a more top down approach, such developments are still relatively new and are fledgling at best, compared to the level of professionalism that campaigns present in the United States when running for office at the federal level (Alemann, 2015). This means that the manner in which election programs are written in Germany allow for limited opportunity of party elites and candidates to leave "an unequivocal personal mark on them" (Elf, 2012, p. 68). The picture looks different for smaller populist parties, but they have not been able to clear the 5% electoral threshold at the federal level and have thus not be able to wield power within the legislature. The five centrist parties examined by

this study largely forgo populist discourse, because the risk of losing voters at the center is perceived to be much higher than the risk of losing voters to left-wing or right-wing fringe parties (Elf, 2012, p. 69).

4.5 Two-Level Games and Honest Broker

Another important issue in this context is to determine whether or not parties are strategic actors that focus on vote maximization or if they are primarily concerned with policy goals and programmatic consistency. This determination has a direct bearing on the research conducted by this study and therefore requires additional attention. The validity of this case study is compromised if parties create election programs primarily as vote-maximizing tools, because then it largely reflects a party's best effort to differentiate itself from other parties and to attract a maximum amount of votes by presenting popular positions. It is worth remembering the debate in Section 3.1 in this context, which demonstrates that parties generally do not make campaign promises that they do not intend to keep. That discussion does not to need to be repeated, as summary statement on that issue will suffice here: "[w]ith respect to the program-to-policy linkage, there is generally more congruence between the election programs of prospective government parties and subsequent government policies than conventional wisdom would expect" (Mansergh & Thomson, 2007, p. 324). In other words, parties are not strategic actors in the sense that they focus on attracting voters by making empty campaign promises in their election programs; such behavior has negative long-term effects as it undermines party credibility. Strategic actions of political parties do not have to be so blatant, as Klingemann and Volkens (1997) demonstrate. They examine party behavior by defining

two archetypes of parties, the program orientated and the competition oriented party. The program orientated party focuses on the programmatic integrity of its programs while the competition emphasizing party aims to maximize votes. Subsequently programs will either reflect more actual values and policies that are coherent with a party's past programs and historic heritage or it will be more or less a manifestation of a precisely engineered vote-maximizing tool. They use these two ideal types to guide their analysis of German election programs that spans close to 5 decades. One of their conclusions is that German parties have a tendency to emphasize programmatic consistency over party competition calculations (Klingemann & Volkens, 1997, p. 532). They also assert that German party politics demonstrate a relatively low level of polarization compared to other Western political systems (Klingemann & Volkens, 1997, p. 535). This is an assertion that is corroborated in the preceding Section 4.3, which illustrates the distinct preference of German parties to emphasize programmatic consistency across elections in their campaign program writing process. Besides the empirical evidence that German parties are more concerned with programmatic consistency as opposed to strategic vote maximizing calculations, there is another reason that further justifies looking at election programs as largely genuine programmatic expressions of a party in the context of globalization.

When it comes to examining national parties and the issue of globalization, parties need to not only take domestic considerations into account, but also international ones. The term that is used in this regard is that of two-level games, because actors need to combine the national level with the international one. This creates additional demands and constraints on actors, because they must devise policies that align with both levels

(Putnam, 1988). In terms of party election programs, this means that all parties, whose goal it is to form a governing coalition, must devise policy proposals for international issues, like globalization, with other states actors in mind. Populist policy suggestions will not be implementable when they need to be negotiated and agreed upon with other states. If parties disregard this logic then they decrease their chances of forming a coalition government, because it will signal to other parties that cooperation on foreign policy issues will be difficult at best. Germany's history since 1949 shows that its governments have consistently tried to be a responsible partner to its Western allies and institutions. Transatlantic alliance and European integration are ways for German governments to signal reliability and to prove that it is a strong bilateral and multilateral partner (Oppermann, 2013, p. 28).

Once parties are able to form a government and begin to devise international policies they will have to act between two spheres: the international and the domestic. Governments, and by extension the parties that make up the governments, take on a special role between these two levels, they become a form of mediator or broker between the two. There is certainly not just one correct way to conceptualize this mediating role, the one that is chosen for this research is that of "honest broker." The honest broker is the most effective actor when it comes to these two-level games, because credibility is key when it comes to cooperating at the international level and for building international agreements. Due to a lack of formal enforcement mechanisms that are available on the domestic level, honest brokers become much more relevant when it comes to foreign interactions. Formal rules are much less of a constraint on such mediators and their actions in general are not necessarily guided by strategic profit maximization

calculations. Instead, the honest broker is much more controlled by norms of appropriate behavior (March and Olsen 1998). The key norm in this context is "the expectation of neutrality […] constitutes the most prominent norm" (Talberg, 2010, p. 248). Party elites or governments are certainly not without personal preference or bias, and brokerage does not necessarily mean impartial, instead it is "about making sure all relevant views were represented" (Burke, 2005, p. 232). In this sense the responsibility of an honest broker is to "promote a genuine competition of ideas" (Porter, 1980, p. 26). This means that political parties that are interested in shaping policy at the international level, such as economic policy, can only hope to do so through consistent and rationally founded proposals. Strategic vote maximizing policy proposals will fail, because brokers must "persuade parties through the power of better argument[s]" (Talberg, 2010, p. 248).

To summarize, there are two reasons that legitimize this research's decision to look at party election manifests as primarily expressions of a party's programmatic preferences. These are first, the program formation process that emphasizes consistency and circumscribes party elites' abilities to include personal preferences. The other reason is the need for parties to engage in two-level games and to act as honest brokers between the domestic and international levels, which is a role that emphasizes transparency, inclusiveness, and cooperation while limiting gain-maximizing calculations. The following chapters will look at the five major German parties and analyze their election programs from 1990 onward using the above outlined method.

CHAPTER 5

CDU

The Christion Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands), which is usually just referred to as the CDU, is Germany's major conservative party. Before addressing the CDU's policy proposals regarding globalization for all federal elections since 1990, it is important to briefly present a background on the CDU, to show where it is coming from and which role it plays in German politics. The CDU cannot hark back to a pre-1933 organization, as the party was only formed after the western Allied victory powers took control of what would become West Germany, in 1945. However, the CDU has ideological roots in the wider European Christian democracy movement which erupted in the middle of the 19th century as a response to a modern state that infringed on the traditional sphere of influence of institutionalized churches. The movement's aim was to establish mainstream political parties across all social classes which derive their values from the concept of Christian solidarity. In this respect they distinguish themselves from the secular conservative parties (Zolleis, 2008). The most predominant representative of this political development in Germany was the German Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei), which came into existence after the establishment of the German Reich (Reichsgründung) in 1871. Although the party was never able to achieve widespread support, its position in

the middle of the political spectrum meant that it was a frequent coalition partner, even providing the most chancellors during the Weimar Republic, until it was dissolved in 1933 by the Nazis (Bellers, 1991, p. 28). Following the events of 1945, Christian political parties tried to re-establish themselves, yet there was an obvious break with the previous Christian democratic movement. While trying to stay connected with the tradition of its predecessor organization, new parties were established with the intention of bridging denominational differences by replacing the close link to the Catholic faith with more abstract Christian values (Zolleis, 2008, p. 63).

The early formation of political parties after 1945 was strictly supervised by the Allied occupation forces and limited to local and later regional parties. The official formation of the CDU in the Western occupied zones at the federal level did not take place until 1950, even though the first federal election took place in 1949. Konrad Adenauer, who was a successful Centre Party politician and mayor of Cologne until 1933, was sustained as the chairman of the new party at the first party convention in Goslar. Consequently, Adenauer personifies the link between the CDU and its predecessor, the Centre Party (Bellers, 1991, p. 27).

The only region where local Christian centrist parties did not join the larger CDU organization was in Bavaria. Here, a local movement formally created the Christian Social Union (CSU) in 1946. One issue that caused heated debates from the start was the Bavaria question, referring to whether or not the CSU should join the wider Christian movement, which ultimately would have meant joining the CDU. The reason for these highly passionate debates and resistance to joining the CDU is rooted in Bavaria's historic experience, a primarily agrarian and heavily Catholic society that was deeply

skeptical of the industrial developments taking place during the second half of the 19th century, because of the way that industrialization was seen to change norms and values of society, especially in the urban centers. It was regarded as essential to maintain an ideological separation from Prussia and the instability that it brought, during the years of the Weimar Republic (Schlemmer, 1998, p. 18-20). This view was even extended to Nazi rule, which from the perspective of Bavarian conservative circles, was inextricably linked to Prussianism. In that respect, it became paramount to purge anything Prussian from Bavaria and not to link oneself to outside groups (Schlemmer, 1998, p. 20). Another reason for refraining from joining larger Germany-wide political movements was that after losing the Second World War there came into existence a type of renaissance of federalism. Federalism was viewed as a panacea to totalitarian rule and dictatorship. This Federalist movement was not unique to Bavaria, but there it actually resulted in the formation of an independent, slightly more conservative, sister party of the CDU (Schlemmer, 1998, pp. 20-21). The CSU has since then remained independent from the CDU and exclusive to Bavaria, but at the federal level the CDU and CSU form a joint faction, which is usually referred to as "the Union" in the federal parliament (Bundestag). Its basis is a binding agreement known as a *Fraktionsvertrag* between the two parties, which closely links them together and usually means that they participate in elections with one election program, which later forms the foundation for the *Fraktionsvertrag.* Of the seven Union party programs analyzed in this research there was only 1 year in which the CSU presented their own program to voters in Bavaria, 1990. For the other six elections, there is only one shared program for each election. Since the CDU has greater appeal to the majority of German voters (in 15 of 16 total states) and since the CDU is the

dominant partner in this relationship, the election program analysis below will refer to the CDU when both parties are intended.

In general, the CDU can be placed in the center right position on Germany's political spectrum and builds upon three primary pillars. The first pillar is Christian values, as indicated by the party's name and already briefly outlined in the history party overview. Referring to its Christian roots and values is not as pronounced in the party's rhetoric, identity, and policies as one might find with the conservative right in the United States (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004). Nevertheless, there are regular references to Christian values, God, and the Creation. For example, in their 2013 election campaign the CDU writes that their policy proposals are always guided by their Christian view of humanity (CDU, 2013, p. 78).

The other two pillars are social conservatism and economic liberalism. Social conservatism is exemplified by the CDU's views on social and family policy. For example, the CDU has made a consistent effort to promote more traditional gender roles than any of the other four major parties. The CDU has also frequently advocated policies that reinforce a rather hierarchical organization of society, which is historically rooted in Europe's feudal systems. One way this has expressed itself, especially in the past, is the CDU's efforts to uphold Germany's traditional three-tier school system, in which students are sorted from a very early age and placed on academic tracks that largely determine future opportunities for those students. Another area where the CDU's conservatism has shone through is the liberalization of criminal law, especially on issues such as abortion and divorce (see Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2017). The third pillar, economic liberalism, is the party's commitment to Germany's liberal economic

order, which is based on competition, markets, deregulation, and individual responsibility, but that does not exclude the social element of Germany's social market economy. Social element refers to the government's active intervention on markets to promote social equality and stability. The CDU has, over the years, regularly advanced aspects of the social system in Germany, such as introducing the concept that time spent raising children will be recognized and rewarded when determining retirement benefits or the creation of public long term care insurance (FDP, 2009, p. 2).

Overall, the CDU has been the Federal Republic's most successful party in terms of filling the Chancellorship with its leaders. There have only been two periods in which the German Chancellor has not been a member of the CDU party. The first, from 1969 to 1982, saw Willy Brandt (SPD) and then later Helmut Schmidt (SPD), leading Germany's government. The second period was after Germany's reunification in 1990, from the time Gerhard Schröder succeeded Helmut Kohl in 1998, until Schröder lost a vote of no confidence and the subsequent election in 2005.

In terms of popular support, the CDU/CSU has done even better. There were only 3 (out of 18) federal elections where they did not receive more votes than all other parties. They were second to the SPD in 1972 and 1998 and tied with the SPD in the 2002 election. Overall this means that the CDU has been in a position to shape German politics from the top down longer than any other party. The party has had a tremendous impact on German politics over the years. During the time period considered in this study, only the election programs for the 2002 and 2005 federal elections were written at a time when the CDU was the leading opposition party. The implication of this is that CDU election programs are particularly important, because given the party's electoral

track record, one can assume that there is a greater chance that the policies proposed by the CDU will shape government decisions. Not just because the CDU is more likely to form the government after an election, but also because it can expect to have its government program measured against its campaign promises. Opposition parties always have the benefit of being able to promise a lot, because they will not be in a position where they must deliver policies based on their electoral campaign. This is especially true, the more unlikely it is for a party to take on government responsibility. A great example for this tactic can be found in the 2013 program of Germany's most left party. Building on the general discontent over bank bailouts in the wake of the financial crisis the party promises to solve the issue of reckless banking practices by socializing private banks (Die Linke, 2013, p. 29). Even if there was a legal basis for such a socialization of banks, no other party would support such a policy and if the party had entered negotiations to form a government they could always easily have said that the socialization of banks was an issue that they had to sacrifice in order to join a coalition government.

Besides the traditional presentation of the path forward, for at least the next legislative period, the majority of CDU programs are a bit different, because they are not centered on attacking the sitting government. Instead they are about explaining and justifying past policy decisions, as well as highlighting the accomplishments of the government and party while in office.

5.1 The CDU Election Programs

This section summarizes the key points from each election program as they relate to globalization. The intent is to highlight the primary message the CDU communicates to voters for each election. While the emphasis is certainly on globalization, trade and other economic issues, the goal is to take a broader look at the election programs, at least to some extent. This is very beneficial in addressing the questions previously raised (see Chapter 3), as some of them require a broader view: for example, Haupt's (2010) assertion that parties on the left have limited policy options to protect the working class as globalization pressures governments to intervene less. The review of the seven election programs is followed by an analysis of what the CDU says about globalization and how the CDU's programs relate to the theoretical positions on globalization as outlined in Chapter 3.

5.1.1 The 1990 Election

The 1990 election program, with its barely 23 pages, is significantly shorter than the average CDU election program. Additionally, it has a fairly large font and large picture/diagrams which gives this program, compared to the other CDU campaign programs, more the feeling of an excerpt than that of a full-fledged election manifesto. The overarching theme is the reunification of Germany and the integration of the so-called new federal states (neue Bundesländer). For the CDU this means primarily demonstrating a strong commitment to the social market economy, which has been the foundation for Germanys postwar prosperity. The central elements for the CDU, of this type of economy, are individual responsibility and a fair distribution of growth.

Economic growth needs to be distributed fairly so that all Germans can achieve their own prosperity and social security (CDU, 1990, p. 5). It is interesting to see that the CDU almost exclusively focuses on the idea of some sort of universal prosperity, given that this election is so fundamentally different. Because millions of new voters are up for grabs who have not been socialized into the political tradition of the Federal Republic, one might expect more details about what is at the heart of the CDU and what its vision is for a unified Germany. Instead, there are only vague references to less government and increased self-reliance among citizens, so as to make it clear to Germany's new citizens that the familiar reliance on the state will be significantly curtailed. The future will be about creating opportunities to independently attain personal prosperity (CDU, 1990, p. 5).

With regard to globalization, there is no direct mention of the issue. The election program is, generally speaking, preoccupied with the issue of a unified Germany, but international competition is addressed and presented as something mostly positive. According to the CDU, Germany's international competitiveness is a fundamental building block in Germany's strong export growth since the early 1980s, and it is this international competitiveness which makes Germany a global export leader. According to the CDU, the German economy is especially competitive when it comes to high-tech products and sophisticated services; these represent tremendous opportunities for Germany and need to be further advanced, but not without keeping social protections in place (CDU, 1990, p. 6). One essential factor for attaining prosperity and social protection is the partnership between employer associations and unions, which needs to be further strengthened (CDU, 1990, p. 10). The election program does not specify how

this should be done; instead it makes ambiguous references about making German farmers more competitive. The only specific elements in that context are a) a commitment to improve the rural infrastructure and b) to better enforce European production quotas for the agricultural sector, as overproduction in other states hurts German farmers (CDU, 1990, p. 10). Other than the special interest in the agricultural sector there is no distinctive mention of any other group that needs special support or protection from either global or European competition. In fact, the program talks about the creation of the European monetary union as a tremendous opportunity for Germany, as long as the monetary union uses the German Mark as a template for its monetary policies (CDU, 1990, p. 20). This example reflects a general trend with regard to German identity and Europe. The CDU unmistakably communicates strong allegiance and identification with a German fatherland, but the party also asserts that Europe is Germany's future and that the CDU is ready for a true partnership based on the European spirit (CDU, 1990, p. 19). It is important to keep in mind that the CDU envisions a Europe that is largely shaped by German influence.

When it comes to international agreements and standards, the CDU in 1990 pushes for international agreements to increase environmental standards in general. It also includes a specific ban on chlorofluorocarbon, as well as special protection for the polar ice caps and the Alps. Additionally, the CDU commits to reward developing countries with debt relief programs if they make special efforts to protect the environment (CDU, 1990, p. 16). Furthermore, the 1990 program also makes a reference to trade liberalization, stating that the Uruguay round, as part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade framework, needs to be finalized to reduce harmful protectionism

that negatively impacts Germany and third world countries (CDU, 1990, p. 22).

5.1.2 The 1994 Election

By 1994 the initial reunification euphoria had subsided and the reality of rebuilding a country that had become less prosperous with every decade that had passed since the Soviet Union separated it, first economically and later physically, from the rest of Germany, had begun to sink in. In 1990 the unemployment quota for West Germany was at 6.4%, but now the figure for the unified country had risen to 9.6%, leaving 3.5 million job seekers without employment. The East-West difference within the unified Germany was significant at that time. While the unemployment quota in West Germany was at 8.1% it was, at 14.8%, getting close to twice as high in the new states. Other differences included a mostly unprofitable economy, outdated infrastructure, rundown housing, lower wages and government benefits. All of these issues are addressed in the CDU's 1994 election program (see CDU, 1994, pp. 8-12). Another large section of the program focuses on creating private jobs that do not rely on government help. There are also a plethora of policy suggestions that aim to create more jobs: increased flexibility and less protection on the job market, privatization, deregulation, and less bureaucracy are all proposed as remedies for unemployment. Most of these issues are addressed rather vaguely and leave a lot of room for interpretation (see CDU, 1994, pp. 12-18).

Further policy proposals include reducing taxes and decreasing the state, which relates in particular to the initial increase of government activity and involvement as a response to integrating East Germany's planned economy into the rest of the country. The CDU commits to reducing government involvement, but without providing details. The

motivation for this plan is that a leaner state will be able to reduce taxes, in particular corporate taxes especially for small businesses and thereby improve Germany's global attractiveness to foreign direct investment (see CDU, 1994, pp. 18-19). Overall, there is a sense of urgency, due to competition, in the CDU's 1994 program. The fear is that if changes are not made quickly to the economy, then Germany's competitiveness will be jeopardized and its prosperity will decrease (CDU, 1994, p. 20). A very important issue in this regard is the privatization of government assets and companies. Privatization is a very salient topic for the CDU in 1994. While the issue is mentioned in almost all CDU election programs (with the exception of 2013), the concentration of privatization references in the CDU's 1994 program is very high, with 13 separate mentions. As a point of comparison, privatization is mentioned only nine times in all other CDU election programs combined. Another important issue for the CDU in their 1994 election program is the restructuring of Germany's welfare state. The goal is not to overburden the social safety net, which for the CDU means, on the one hand more self-reliance, and on the other hand better support for the truly needy (CDU, 1994, p. 31, pp. 38-39). However, it is neither clear what increased self-reliance specifically means, nor who qualifies as truly needy.

The program also signals a strong commitment to NATO as Germany's primary guarantee for safety and peace, but also includes clear support for the integration of the Eastern European states formerly within Russia's sphere of influence. This includes their integration into the European Single Market, which certainly means more competition for the domestic economy, but also opens up ample export opportunities. However, this is not discussed within the program and the voter has to draw this conclusion by him-

/herself (CDU, 1994, p. 52). The most direct and important statement about globalization can be found in the last chapter. The CDU writes that access to industrialized states' domestic markets is a crucial factor for the progress of developing countries. That is why the CDU proposes a reduction of protectionism and the strengthening of free trade, to enable those countries to develop without outside assistance (CDU, 1994, p. 53).

5.1.3 The 1998 Election

The 1998 program with its 33 pages, is the second shortest CDU program overall and a good deal shorter than the average number of pages. About half the program addresses issues like security and measures to cut crime rates, or how younger and older generations will live together as one society. Here, issues like retirement, long term care, and respect for one another are important topics. Improving living quality, both among rural as well as in urban populations, is an issue as well. This includes support for farmers, better infrastructure, and introducing environmental standards. As part of their agricultural program the CDU not only speaks out against production caps and subsidies, but also calls for deregulation to give producers increased flexibility as to how they want to act in the market and how they fund themselves. Additionally, the CDU states that negotiations at the WTO should be used to ensure that European, ergo German, consumer, animal, and environmental standards become global regulations (CDU, 1998, p. 26), so as to protect German farmers against less regulated and, hence, cheaper imports. Tax harmonization with regard to energy sources within the European market is also addressed, because of its potential to adversely affect German companies' competitiveness (CDU, 1998, p. 27).

The other half of the program heavily focuses on the economy, employment, and most importantly the rebuilding of East Germany. A major theme in this context is the privatization of state owned companies or selling of state held shares of companies, but it also promotes the privatization of government services like all nonmonetary unemployment assistance (CDU, 1998, pp. 5-6). It is also suggested that in the process of overcoming the structural deficits that have their roots in the East's communist past, the principle of competition should guide the transformation of Germany's social net (CDU, 1998, p. 9). These statements are very ambiguous. There is no explanation as to what this might mean in terms of policy proposals. The only thing that is clear is that there will be more competition. This is especially important for East Germany where the aim is to increase the competitiveness of products and to transfer government responsibilities to private entities. The claim is that combined with more deregulation and less government this will lead to more dynamic exports (CDU, 1998, pp. 10-11). In a nutshell, the CDU's economic policies have the primary goal of creating a competitive economy (CDU, 1998, p. 13).

Another theme in this context that the CDU promulgates in this election program is the maxim that anyone who works must be financially better off than those who do not work (CDU 1998, p. 7). While this is a reasonable idea (if social welfare benefits are more lucrative than low paying jobs, people have an incentive not to take those low paying jobs) the reality translates to less government support for people without employment. This can increase fear of international competition, as the cost for being out of work rises. The expected result is a tendency for the public to call for protection and trade barriers.

The program concludes with a six-page final chapter about Germany and its role in the world and in Europe. This includes a commitment to support NATO, to cut back on immigration, and a very brief passage about development. Here the message is that the poor states have to help themselves, but that Germany will support them in their efforts to be self-reliant. Prerequisite for this support are sufficient standards with regard to human rights, the rule of law, and an economy based upon the principles of a social market economy. This final section also includes a statement that Germany will promote its environmental standards abroad and seek harmonization of global rules and norms in this regard (CDU, 1998, p. 33).

5.1.4 The 2002 Election

The Christian view of humanity, for the CDU, is the compass that leads them in their efforts to shape a responsible and sustainable human society (CDU, 2002, p. 24). A core building block for such a human society is the renewed social market economy, which encourages freedom and creates incentives for individual responsibility. This way, Germany's economic performance will be strengthened (CDU, 2002, p. 6). The CDU proposes the following policies for achieving this economic vision: deregulation of the job market (CDU, 2002, p. 10), and structural reformation of labor laws, with the intent to generate a new balance between security and flexibility. In this new relationship there is clearly increased emphasis on flexibility (CDU, 2002, p. 12). With regard to the unemployed, the message is best characterized by the idea of conditional support. This reflects the idea that government support, or at least some of its services, will increasingly be made available only to those who meet certain requirements. Although it

is not clearly defined what this means, one practical example would be that those who receive unemployment benefits need to demonstrate that they have been looking for work (CDU, 2002, p. 13).

The CDU also maintains that the economy will broadly benefit from additional support for small and medium sized businesses. This will largely happen on its own once the government takes a step back and is less involved in the economy. Concrete steps for achieving less government participation are to reduce taxes and to cut back on red tape (CDU, 2002, p. 16). A sore spot for Germany's overall economic performance lies with a lack of investments in East Germany. The CDU plans to remedy this imbalance, once in power, through special subsidized loans with an emphasis on small and midsized businesses in East Germany (CDU, 2002, pp. 27-28). The CDU also points out a need for better support of families with children; this includes a special emphasis on helping women in the work force by creating a more gender-neutral system. Additionally, mothers and fathers need better working conditions in order to more easily combine work and life with children. According to the CDU, this is an issue for which unions should increasingly fight (CDU, 2002, p. 36).

Of course, the 2002 program also includes the staples of any political campaign at the highest national level such as a commitment to increase safety by fighting crime and terrorism with more determination, and to avow that the funding for Germany's retirement program is secure. In terms of international trade and globalization this program is rather sparse. There are two brief references that call for increased tax harmonization across Europe (CDU, 2002, p. 9, p. 53). With regard to international trade institutions this campaign program mentions the WTO twice, both times in conjunction

with consumer rights. The CDU states their aim is to negotiate with the WTO higher global consumer protection standards and more stringent guidelines for farming (CDU, 2002, p. 51, p. 53).

When it comes to national identity this election campaign, compared to previous CDU campaigns, has definitely stepped up the references to German identity, or as the CDU calls it "enlightened patriotism" (CDU, 2002, p. 4). It is not clear what distinguishes enlightened from ordinary patriotism. For the CDU this patriotism includes a sense of national belonging where the majority identifies themselves with a shared destiny, which is created by a common history, language, cultural heritage, religion, philosophy, works of art, etc. (CDU, 2002, p. 60). The CDU further propagates a strengthened national identity with a meaningful form of commemorating the peaceful revolution against the East German regime (CDU, 2002, pp. 31-32) and it clearly defines Germany as a special place for Christian churches (CDU, 2002, p. 32).

5.1.5 The 2005 Election

For the 2005 federal election the CDU opens up with a chapter about the fundamental principles that should determine Germany's direction for the next legislative period. The very first issue addressed is the fear of globalization. The CDU acknowledges that many people are fearful of the prospects of increased globalization; they counter this apprehension by presenting a very positive view of globalization. According to the CDU, international trade and global economic activities entail the greatest of possibilities for Germany's future. It is the CDU's aspiration that the German people fully participate in and benefit from these developments. Politics must promote

democratic values and the social market economy, but also recognize and seize Germany's opportunities, something that is not possible with a continuation of the "carry on as usual" attitude of the Schröder government (CDU, 2005, p. 3).

Employment is an important issue, with a current unemployment rate of more than 10%. Policy proposals include supporting research and development more effectively, to implement European legislation without adding additional national regulations, and cutting back on red tape. Novel ideas include the deregulation of the job market, if these suggestions would significantly impact workers and unions. For example, there would be no termination protection for new employees in small companies for the first 2 years of employment or only temporary contracts to begin with. The overall number of exceptions to collective labor agreements would increase or there could even be a temporary moratorium on union regulations for companies that are in a critical position, if two-thirds of employees agree. Another measure that employers could utilize, according to these policy proposals, is that wages for new hires can be 10% below the union standard wage rate (CDU, 2005, p. 12).

Infrastructure is also an issue that is addressed in the context of competitiveness and the CDU commits to increase funding to better connect Germany across borders particularly via rail (CDU, 2005, pp. 20-21). Additionally, nuclear technology is supposed to be maintained as a hallmark of German technology with great export potential (CDU, 2005, p. 19). The recurring special attention to the agricultural sector is also present in the 2005 program. The focus is, again, the harmonization of environmental and animal standards at the WTO to secure that German competitiveness is not adversely affected (CDU, 2005, p. 23).

The program ends with a final paragraph about foreign aid and how the German government will prioritize help to those developing countries that have structures of governance in place, which will allow them to use the aid effectively. This paragraph also talks about the need to partner more closely with developing countries to secure German interests, because in a globalized world the increasing problems and struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America directly endanger Germany's security and prosperity (CDU, 2005, p. 38).

5.1.6 The 2009 Election

This election program begins with an overview of the CDU accomplishments over the last 4 years in government and then moves into addressing the global financial crisis, explaining what caused it and how to prevent similar developments in the future. The most important message for the CDU is to explain that more government involvement is not the answer. A government led economy does not create prosperity, according to the CDU, which is why it emphasizes hard work and ingenuity as ways for creating a prosperous Germany. People need incentives and creative freedom; this is the source of prosperity and solidarity. The state should only intervene in times of crisis according to the CDU (CDU, 2009, pp. 7-8).

Of course, there is the usual talk about decreasing bureaucratic obstacles, debt reduction, balancing the budget, and lowering taxes. A point that appears more important for the CDU is to emphasize that unemployment should not be financed by the government; instead it must only support measures that effectively fight unemployment. In this regard two principles are vital: first, that any support rendered automatically

entails an obligation for the recipient and, second, that those who work must be financially better off than those who do not (CDU, 2009, pp. 30- 32). This does not mean that the CDU is against supporting the unemployed. For example, the manifest states that it is better to save low paying jobs by subsidizing them instead of paying for unemployment benefits. This position seems to be quite contrary to the CDU's assertion that the government is not adept at making entrepreneurial decisions, but this juxtaposition is not addressed in their election program. Other positions which are promoted with regard to social standards are the call for more flexibility and individual choice in the health care sector. The goal here is to increase independence, individual prevention and personal planning for both health care and long-term care (CDU, 2009, pp. 34-37).

Global problems need to be addressed at the global level. For example, the regulation and control of the financial sector needs to be internationally harmonized. The CDU clearly states that it is committed to global free trade and against protectionism. It will also forcefully fight against any form of distortion when it comes to competition on global markets. Furthermore, they want to promote a fair treatment of developing countries during WTO negotiations. There should be a better framework for developing countries to participate on international markets. With regard to the global economy, they also campaign for better regulation to protect intellectual property, environmental standards, animal rights, and health standards (CDU, 2009, pp. 27-28).

Another important element that must not be overlooked in this particular election program is the CDU's basic motivation, which is their love for their country and their desire to serve their fatherland (CDU, 2009, pp. 10-12). The CDU also likes to point out

that Germany is a European culture-nation with a rich cultural heritage. This heritage originates from the variety of Germany's states and shapes its national identity (CDU, 2009, p. 52). In the same vein the CDU demands that the European Union pay more attention to national identity and do more to protect it (CDU, 2009, p. 53). One important reason for this emphasis on national identity and identification with the homeland is that it provides orientation and belonging in an age of globalization where people are losing their roots (CDU, 2009, p. 60). These types of patriotic assertions are framed by the unusual layout/format of this program. Throughout the entire program all pages have a header that consists of the programs title, page number, and Germany's national colors, thus conjuring up feelings patriotism, identity, and belonging for the reader. This manifest specifically addresses the governments need to take into account "proximity" in the age of globalization. All countries are practically Germany's neighbors and therefore have an impact on Germany. Therefore, the CDU asserts, that globalization needs to guide all policy formation (CDU, 2009, p. 90). Unfortunately, this proposed future shaping of all policy fields by globalization never materializes; by the time the next election comes around in 2013 the CDU does not pay any special attention to globalization in their election campaign, as will be demonstrated in the summary of the CDU's 2013 program.

5.1.7 The 2013 Election

The 2013 program begins by reviewing the struggles of the last few years: financial crisis and recession, ongoing European debt crisis, significant demographic change, and fast growing international markets with new opportunities. The CDU asserts

that the best way forward for Germany in this environment is to solidify its role as export champion, but this is only possible as long as Europe is doing well. This is why Germany must be active in stabilizing Europe and to ensure that the government runs a balanced budget (CDU, 2013, p. 4). The middle class needs to be supported especially when it comes to opening and running businesses, but it also requires better provisions for workers. While they reject a legally binding universal minimum wage, the manifest does support collective bargaining agreements and calls for employers and unions to agree on minimum wage standards for their respective sectors/industries (CDU, 2013, p. 5). Additionally, in order to overcome these challenges the CDU focuses on strengthening families, on providing national security, and creating a home country that is worth living in. In this respect, the important message is that Germany is a culture nation, whose cultural heritage merits preservation (CDU, 2013, p. 7).

The bulk of the 2013 program addresses many traditional CDU issues, such as support for elderly citizens and how they ought to be an active part of society even at an advanced age. The CDU again addresses increasing mobility through better infrastructure, Christian values, education, technological advances, more funding for research, health care, and cheap energy. With regard to global competition and globalization, the CDU once again pays special attention to agriculture by stating that providing special support in accessing global markets will help agriculture to seize opportunities (CDU, 2013, p. 60). They also assert that Germany's prosperity and stability are closely linked to the political, economic, social, and ecological developments in Europe and also globally. The 2013 program suggests that, due to globalization, states are increasingly dependent upon one another and Germany has a significant interest in

taking an active role, internationally. Germany needs to actively promote peace, cooperation, and human rights on a global scale. International institutions like the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the EU are indispensable for Germany when it comes to achieving these international goals. The CDU is deeply committed to maintaining and even increasing Germany's role within them (see CDU, 2013, p. 74).

It is the CDU's goal to promote sustainable development and more global justice. The idea is to increase development aid in order to generate more growth among developing countries. This manifest points out that this must not lower human rights or harm the environment. In this context the CDU speaks of a social and ecological market economy. Such developments are best achieved when Germany cooperates with its partners, in particular the EU (CDU, 2013, p. 77). With regard to development and international institutions the CDU declares that it will push the World Trade Organization (WTO) to resume negotiations with the intent to meet the interest of developing countries better, to let them participate more fully in global markets (CDU, 2013, p. 78).

5.2 Initial Election Program Analysis

This section outlines a basic analysis of the five key terms as they appear in all of the seven CDU election programs since 1990. An in-depth explanation of how the programs were analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regard to the key terms can be found in the previous chapter under 4.3. Figure 5.1 shows all direct references regarding globalization sorted according to the five key terms. A close look at the numbers reveals some important patterns. First, the term globalization appears to be

relatively new to the vernacular of election campaigns. While the data do not say anything about the CDU's use of the term prior to 1990, it is safe to assume that the term was at least not used in any systematic fashion prior to 2002. Related terms such as trade and exports have been used in programs in the 1990s. This suggests that even though the CDU discussed globalization related issues for a long time, the party did not view the concept of globalization as a relevant issue which warranted discussion with voters in their election campaigns. The data also clearly show overall references regarding any of the five key terms have significantly increased over the years, with the majority of references appearing in 2009 and 2013.

These data must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because the 2009 and 2013 election programs are also the two longest ones with 94 and 80 pages, respectively. The average CDU program is 58 pages long, with the shortest in 1990 containing only 23 pages. However, the overall trend is clear: There are more references of the key terms in the later programs showing that the party views the issue with increasingly greater importance for the electorate. Two more important observations need to be addressed in this context; the CDU mentions the term free trade only four times in all of their programs. This seems to suggest that while the party is comfortable with discussing globalization as a topic, the CDU seems much more hesitant to use the term free trade, possibly due to the lack of control that is associated with the term. If trade is free, then governments lose their ability to steer and direct trade in a favorable manner. It is unclear if the CDU avoids using the term free trade because it would relate to a loss of power for the government over the economy, or if it is motivated by a desire to avoid giving voters the impression that the government is not going to protect the domestic economy from

harmful trade.

The most interesting observation is the disparity between export and import references. There are only two references to imports in 2009. One deals with energy imports in a neutral manner (CDU, 2009, p. 24), and the other suggests that import standards are necessary in conjunction with transatlantic trade (CDU, 2009, pp. 84-85). The two references in 2013 call for increased energy independence and cleaner energy through a reduction of energy imports (CDU, 2013, p. 15, p. 28). It is as if imports are not important to Germany and if the topic is addressed at all, it is narrowly focused on the energy sector and defined as something that needs to stop because energy imports are bad, as they are environmentally more harmful than domestic options or they are politically undesirable because they support Russia, for example. The reason for this imbalance is that exports are seen as something good: they reflect strength and superiority, because other economies want and need German products more than their own domestic options. Imports, on the other hand, are regarded as the opposite, something that denotes weakness and threatens domestic jobs.

Figure 5.2 shows the normative meaning that goes along with any of the globalization key terms. Comments that are regarded as neutral in nature by this study make up the largest single group of references, but there are also a significant amount of references that present the globalization related terms as something that has either generated positive outcomes or as something that creates new opportunities for Germany. There are also some references that link globalization to risks and danger, but they are clearly outnumbered (about four to one) by references that emphasize the positive outcomes and new opportunities in conjunction with globalization and the other key

terms. Since Figure 5.2 relies on the same data set, one can observe here too, that the number of references has significantly increased over the years.

Figure 5.2 shows an aggregate summary for all key terms, but this does not illustrate how the CDU values each of the individual terms. Therefore, the next step is to look at each one individually. Beginning with trade, one can see that the CDU communicates a predominantly positive message regarding this issue (see Figure 5.3). As previously mentioned the term *free trade* is only used four times by the CDU and seems to suggest that while the party is comfortable with discussing trade it seems more hesitant to use the term free trade. However, when it does mention free trade then it is in a largely positive context, with three positive and one neutral reference (see Figure 5.4). References on export are significantly more numerous in CDU election campaigns than those on free trade as one can see in Figure 5.5. They too appear in a mostly positive context (about two-third of instances) and only 7% are linked to risks and dangers, while the remainder are considered neutral (see Figure 5.5). This is not surprising as Germany's export prowess is generally considered a great accomplishment.

Despite the fact that trade and exports are addressed in such an overwhelmingly positive light, it is surprising that imports are only mentioned four times, two of them being neutral and another two mentioning imports in a negative context. The term globalization is a relatively new term to the party's election program vernacular and as such it is not yet unequivocally used in a positive context like exports are for example. Here positive and negative references appear roughly an equal amount of times, but the largest group are the essentially neutral references, as demonstrated by Figure 5.6.

5.3 Election Programs and the Theory on Globalization and Political Parties

Before delving into how the CDU election programs relate to the previously outlined theory in Chapter 3 it is important to reemphasize the role that trade plays for the Federal Republic of Germany and the generally rather peculiar position that the CDU takes on the issue of trade liberalization, given that Germany is over proportionally involved in trade. For example, Germany's exports of goods and services in 2015 totaled 46.9% of its GDP, which is a very high percentage for a developed economy of its size. By comparison the average export rate compared to GDP for the other Group of Seven countries and China is 23.7%.[1] Clearly Germany excels at selling its products abroad, but the picture that the CDU paints of globalization is rather different. The CDU often presents these issues as part of a strategy to assist developing countries, or that due to globalization the problems from poorer regions in the world are now affecting Germany (CDU, 2005, p. 38). Occasionally trade liberalization is even presented as doing something altruistic for poor developing countries (see CDU, 1994, p. 53). One could argue that it doesn't really matter why governments engage in trade liberalization as long as they do it. It is certainly true that a strong export economy like Germany's will benefit from general trade liberalizations regardless of whether they are justified in terms of supporting fledgling economies around the globe or as a measure for promoting the domestic economy. The problem is, if voters come to primarily associate trade liberalization with assisting others, then in times of uncertainty or domestic need, real or perceived, popular support for a liberal trading system could rapidly wane.

[1] Compare to USA 12.6%, France 30%, UK 27.4%, Italy 30.2%, Japan 16.2%, Canada 31.5 % and China 17.9% (source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016a).

A similar danger lies with one-sidedly emphasizing the increased dangers of interdependence that globalization creates when it comes to political, economic, ecological, and social stability (for example CDU, 2013, p. 74), when there are plenty of advantages from an interdependent world (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Voters can jump to the conclusion that in order to improve domestic stability and prosperity one needs to push for more protectionism and isolationism. It is a fight for the national interest which needs to be protected from international institutions and international trading regimes. The idea that taking back control means increasing prosperity is a very powerful one as the 2016 Brexit debate has shown. For example Michael Gove (2016), Britain's justice secretary asserts "if we vote to leave, we take back control" (n.p.). It would be much better for a country whose prosperity depends so much on international trade to openly discuss the pros and cons of being actively engaged in a globalized world. This would certainly include addressing the domestic benefits of an open international economy, thus minimizing calls for protectionism in times of crisis.

First off, important themes identified within the literature are not at all addressed by the CDU. Brawly (1997) outlined the importance of looking at the issue of partial factor mobility, which is not addressed at all by the CDU. It appears that partial factor mobility is too complex an issue for the CDU to address in its election programs. The issue of volatility, which was primarily defined by Woodruff (2005) as oscillating between economic busts and booms, is only addressed in a limited form by the CDU when the party addresses the 2007-2008 global financial crises in its 2009 campaign. The reason the CDU does not talk more about volatility in its election program might be due to the fact that the CDU was the governing party for the majority of the time frame

analyzed here. As such, the CDU had an inherent desire to be associated with a period of stability and not volatility. Additionally, the issue of volatility, which is the result of the effects that economic cycles have on trade and subsequently on employment, are most likely also too complex for an election program for the general electorate.

The question of how parties address labor subgroups as put forth by Midford (1993) is easily answered for the CDU. There is no distinction between labor subgroups except for some special attention which is paid to people who work in the agricultural sector. This sector accounts only for 1% of Germany's GDP and the attention the CDU pays to agriculture in their election programs is much more part of an effort to emphasize the CDU's efforts to protect Germany's countryside and farming as part of its cultural heritage and identity than it is an attempt to discuss economic policies let alone to formulate a response to globalization. The CDU does much better when it comes to addressing the role of unions, which is an important element in addressing the negative consequences of globalization as outlined by Garst (1998). The CDU clearly recognizes unions as an important part of Germany's society and economy. Due to Germany's traditionally strong unions, voters can feel some sense of security knowing that unions are an important element in defending their interests in a globalizing world, but the influence and the effectiveness of unions have been waning since reunification. As Behrens et al. (2003) point out, Germany's unions have been active in a wide array of fields but are missing a strategic long-term focus and are falling short of their potential. While the CDU does not question unions' legitimacy it is also not really interested in advancing their position or formulating a vision for unions in a globalized world. There is no mention of how or if unions need to adapt in any way to a globalized world. This

constitutes a missed opportunity for the CDU.

Caproso's (1997) question of whether or not political parties present meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or do they merely use the issue for scapegoating, needs to be addressed in two parts. First, the CDU does not treat globalization like a whipping boy. In general CDU election programs do not blame globalization as the cause for Germany's broader problems, but globalization is often presented as an ominous force that has the potential to negatively affect Germany (for example CDU, 2005, p. 90), in particular its culture (see CDU, 2009, p. 60), but these instances are overall balanced out by positive references about the potential benefits (for example CDU, 2005, p. 3). When it comes to presenting meaningful policies with regard to globalization, here the CDU falls short. There are brief but consistent references about ensuring that developing countries have better access to global markets. While this is certainly an important topic, the CDU's proposals are very vague. There are no specifics as to how that will be accomplished. The only other issue that is otherwise consistently discussed is increasing Germany's competitiveness by occasionally referring to tax cuts. But usually, it is more about tax harmonization with other countries. Given that globalization is such an important and all-encompassing topic (CDU, 2009, p. 90), it certainly deserves more attention and precise policies to deal with issues such as social mobility and worker protection in a global economy, or how to let developing countries better participate on global markets, etc.

Three other important questions are: Do parties address the issue of regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement (Ranjan & Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000)? Do parties communicate their goals with respect to international agreements, and do they offer

voters clear choices (Hays, 2009; Martin, 2000)? These are issues that the CDU takes up; for example, they address regulatory harmonization in every campaign since 1994. There is a heavy focus on policy upload, meaning the CDU promises to ensure that German environmental, consumer, agricultural and animal rights standards will become the standard for the WTO and the EU in particular, but also for other states in general (see for example CDU, 1994, p. 26; CDU, 1998, p. 51; CDU, 2009, p. 71-72). Likewise, the harmonization of taxes and financial regulations are a recurring theme. Again, the goal is to ensure that other states adopt German standards (see for example CDU, 2002, p. 9, p. 53; CDU, 2013, p. 19). This is, in essence, also what the CDU communicates to the German electorate when dealing with the party's aims concerning international agreements. It is all about the policy upload. International agreements must be based upon German environmental and consumer rights. Other agreements which the CDU strives to achieve are increased deregulation and privatization (CDU, 1994, p. 15), increased access for domestic producers in the agricultural sector to global markets (CDU, 2013, p. 60), and special arrangements for developing countries to allow them increased market access (CDU, 1990, p 16; CDU, 2009, p. 28).

While the CDU does present some policies regarding regulatory harmonization and international agreements, these policy proposals are lacking in clarity and quality. For example, the CDU almost exclusively focuses on the policy upload. The message that the CDU wants to send to voters is clearly that a CDU government is strong and can take action on the international stage. The inherent election promise that goes along with argumentation is that Germany does not need to change; instead the world will be changing in order to adopt Germany's environmental, labor, and consumer standards as

well as German taxes. Instead of presenting policies that represent rather wishful thinking than answers to a globalizing world, the CDU could address in more detail with whom they will partner and how they are going to generate global support for their idea. This should also include an outline of areas in which Germany might have to change, because negotiations at the international level will ultimately result in some form of policy download as well. While it probably does not make sense to outline detailed changes, some general areas could be highlighted. Additionally, it certainly requires a good deal of hubris to assume that German standards are always superior, as recent developments in the automotive industry have shown. American emission standards are in many ways far more stringent and better at protecting the environment that German ones (Ewing, 2016). It would be far more honest and constructive to include policies and practices that work well in other countries and to outline potential ways of implementing them domestically.

Another problem is that the CDU's positions are very ambiguous. For example, what does it mean that developing countries should receive special support in accessing global markets? If taken at face value this must include access to the world's largest market: the EU's internal market. A primary export of developing countries are agricultural products, which cannot compete effectively due to the protection that domestic/EU internal agricultural products enjoy. Granting access and abolishing special protection for the agricultural sector clearly conflicts with the CDU's calls for increased support to German farmers, who receive special attention throughout election campaigns, not just in regard to international agreements. While the average voter probably does not necessarily detect such incongruence within the CDU's election programs, it nevertheless shows that the CDU does not have a coherent response to globalization in the way they

communicate with voters.

The literature on globalization and its domestic response highlights the need for political elites to discuss the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). This is a key building block for alleviating fears of social instability and a loss of prosperity. If the CDU were interested in increasing support for globalization, then its election programs should focus more on the size and scope of government with regard to globalization, in particular with regard to its welfare spending. This is an issue that the CDU completely omits in their election campaigns. Instead, they focus on a message which calls for a smaller state with more responsibility for individuals to take care of themselves. This is combined with the CDU's recurring message that competitiveness is everything, which creates a potent combination that certainly creates a measure of anxiety for people who feel threatened by competition. This is an especially poignant concern for those individuals who are less educated or have not acquired sought after specialized skills that will make them attractive to employers. A diminished social net and a government who expects them to be more independent will likely increase calls for protection from outside competition and demand a more closed off economy. In essence, with a smaller welfare state people feel a diminished sense of security and are less willing to accept the uncertainty that a globalized world entails.

The last important theoretical building block that must be addressed is the issue of identity. Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004) have put forward the idea that emphasizing a European identity is an effective tool for most European states to decrease negative attitudes about globalization. Analysis of the CDU election programs reveals that the CDU does not attempt to foster any form of European

identity that could offset resistance to more economic integration. Within the CDU's rhetoric there is no room for an open multilayered identity. Instead the CDU frequently refers to Germany as a homeland, a place of belonging and identification, a place of special cultural heritage that needs to be preserved. Perpetuating a distinct German identity and cultural heritage has been an integral part of the CDU's election campaigns as part of addressing the party's social conservatism. People who read the CDU's election programs could easily feel that globalization threatens this unique German homeland. As a matter of fact, the CDU itself links globalization to people losing their roots, which the CDU claims is a trend that needs to be reversed. Emphasizing and protecting the German homeland is what will give the people orientation and a sense of belonging in the world today (CDU, 2009, p. 58). Similarly, the CDU's emphasis on Germany's Christian heritage and identity also does more to create a feeling of needing protection from the outside world than to promote a sense of openness towards other cultures and religions.

It is amazing that the party that has had such a vital role in shaping Germany's economic success over the last 6 decades, an accomplishment that has increasingly relied on international trade especially within the EU but also globally, has not been able to find a way to address its three primary pillars in a mutually reinforcing manner. The CDU continues to address Christian values and social conservatism in a way that undermines the sort of international economic liberalism at which the CDU has shaped Germany to excel.

5.4 Conclusion of CDU Analysis

In 2009 the CDU proclaimed that in the future the issue of globalization needs to guide all policy formation in Germany (CDU, 2009, p. 90). This is what one would expect from the government of a country that is so profoundly linked to the international economy. While globalization and trade are mentioned more frequently in the last few election manifests, these references still fall short of what one would expect. This vital issue still does not receive the attention that it should; instead the CDU spends time and energy on other matters. For example, in the 2009 election program the CDU spends three and a half pages about volunteer work and sport (see CDU, 2009, pp. 54-57), but by comparison the topic of globalization is only sparsely addressed in a comprehensive fashion. The number of references is shooting up, but the quality is not. Most references that do mention exports, globalization, etc. are usually meaningless. There are references about globalization, which are linked to some other issue, such as, in times of globalization local government increases in importance (CDU, 2009, p. 69), or that the tourism industry is under tremendous globalization pressure (CDU, 2009, p. 68). References such as these do nothing to define the kind of globalization that the CDU is pursuing, how globalization is good for Germany, or what its weaknesses are and how Germany will address these weaknesses to maximize its profits from being engaged in an increasingly interdependent world. Why does the CDU not discuss what worker protection means in a globalized world? Similarly, it would be beneficial for voters to hear how globalization affects social mobility. Most importantly, the CDU must communicate the benefits of imports to the German economy. International trade is not a one-way street and the CDU must stop treating imports negatively, as something bad that

is best ignored. There is always an inherent danger that the German public will, in a time of crisis, expect their government to do something to restrict imports in an effort to protect domestic employment. This would be myopic since “protectionism is an ineffectual and counterproductive response to the economic problems of much of the work force” (Irwin, 2016, p. 91). It is time that the CDU takes an unequivocal stance on globalization, clearly outlining its benefits for the German economy and how to share its benefits more equitably. This could, over time, build a persuasive consensus that well managed openness is the best guarantor for Germany’s prosperity in the 21st century. However, as long as the CDU presents globalization with ambiguity and as something that threatens German identity, then every economic downturn will lead to calls for more protectionism and give rise to populist parties that present strong positions against an open economy.



Figure 5.1 CDU Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms



Figure 5.2 CDU Globalization References Sorted by their Normative Implication



Figure 5.3 Trade References CDU



Figure 5.4 Free Trade References CDU



Figure 5.5 Export References CDU



Figure 5.6 Globalization References CDU

CHAPTER 6

SPD

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), generally just referred to as SPD, is not only rich in tradition; it is also Germany's oldest political party. It has survived four political systems and has been a key party for most of its existence. The SPD has its roots in a meeting in Gotha when the General German Workers' Association (Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverein) met and merged with the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei) in 1875. Both groups were less than a decade old when they merged. There were internal ideological differences over how to advance the interest of the working class. One wing called for the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist order, while the other believed in improving the position of workers through social reform with gradual steps through a parliamentary process (Decker, 2017a). Due to the Socialist Laws, which were enacted in 1878, the party's ability to do its work was severely curtailed. The Socialist Laws (officially in German: Gesetz gegen die gemeingefährlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie) were a series of acts from 1878-1890 that were aimed at curbing the dangerous influence of Social Democrats in Germany. Two failed assassination attempts against Germany's Emperor, whose perpetrators were attributed to the political left, were justification enough for enacting the laws. The new legislation did

not outright ban the party, but severely restricted publications and meetings of Social Democrats and could even lead to arrests. This prompted Social Democrats to print their banned publications abroad, to run their candidates as independents, and for a good deal of work to be performed in secret. The only group that was largely spared from this direct harassment were Social Democrats who were part of the legislature, due to their parliamentary immunity (see Evans, 2005). Even though the Socialist Laws were designed to suppress the new merger of the General German Workers' Association and the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, in reality the repression ended up strongly unifying the two formerly distinct parties and fostered strong party discipline.

While the SPD was not dependent upon any other organization, it did immediately establish a close and mutually beneficial affiliation with the trade unions, while still maintaining a clear separation from them. The repeal of the Socialist Laws in 1890 was a prerequisite for the organizational development and regional restructuring of the SPD, which occurred at the turn of the century. It was finalized at the Jena Conference of 1905, when the organization "underwent centralization […] and organizational homogeneity was imposed on the local associations" (Panebianco, 1988, p. 76).

In 1914, SPD membership surpassed the 1 million mark and reflected the parties assent as Germany's strongest political party. At the end of the First World War the more radical wing of the party broke off to form what eventually became the Communist Party of Germany, their reasoning being that the parliamentary process did not bring about the desired progress of the workers movement as effectively as a revolution might. This secession weakened the party and while the SPD was able to rule Prussia continuously

from 1919 until 1932, the party was not able to replicate this success at the national level. During the years of the Weimar Republic the party was part of multiple coalition governments, but the overall political instability of the young republic, as indicated by the nine general elections over 14 years from 1919 until 1933, also affected the SPD. The last coalition government with SPD involvement fell apart in 1930. During Hitler's rise to power, the SPD was too weak to prevent the end of the Weimar Republic. When the SPD voted against Hitler's Enabling Act in 1933 the party was shortly thereafter banned and its members heavily persecuted (Decker, 2017a).

The SPD's reorganization after the Second World War in the Western occupied zones did not initially lead to electoral success. In fact, during the first decade of the fledgling Federal Republic, the SPD was relegated to the opposition. The SPD's predicament was caused, in part, by its lack of transformation. The leadership of the post-World War II era consisted primarily of the same party functionaries who led the party before 1933, and the basic statutes, which laid the foundation for the SPD's outlook and conduct, closely resembled old decrees (Jun, 2004, p. 253). Additionally, the new political and economic climate in the young republic substantially transformed the labor movement. The so-called "economic miracle" (Wirtschaftswunder), with its increase in real wages and increased consumption opportunities, even for the working class, slowly worked against Marxist ideas. The party started a transformation process in the 1950s, which was completed in 1959 when the SPD completely purged Marxism from its program at its party convention in Bad Godesberg. The programmatic resolution was symbolic for the transformation from a single-issue party, based upon class, to a people's party (Jun, 2004, p. 254).

In 1972 the SPD succeeded for the first time at becoming the strongest party of the Federal Republic at the national level. The key to this success was that its policies and proposals were able to attract both the party's traditional clientele of industrial workers as well as large portions of the aspiring middle class. Its programmatic core was based upon organizing the economy according to the principles of Keynesianism, deescalating tensions between East and West Germany, and introducing new social policies. In 1982 the party took on the role of opposition leader as the Kohl era began (Decker, 2016). Gerhard Schröder's victory in 1998 over the incumbent chancellor Kohl was considered to be a political rupture. It marked a generational change with the first government, which for the most part consisted of members who did not experience the Nazi era or World War II. The first legislative period of the SPD-led government was marked by the lack of a clear course when it came to economic and social policies. It was only in 2003 after his reelection that Chancellor Schröder pursued a clear goal as he pushed a market liberal reform agenda through parliament. This Agenda 2010 constituted a solid challenge to the policies that the party had pursued in the past and large parts of the party were not prepared to accept this strong programmatic realignment (Decker 2016).

While the SPD barely missed capturing the majority of votes at the early election in 2005, ever since, the party has not even come close to the share of votes that its main rival, the CDU/CSU, regularly wins at federal elections. In 2009 and 2013 the party reached its worst election results since 1949 with only 23% and 25% of the overall votes, respectively. This is a serious failure for a party that considers itself a large people's party with broad appeal and having garnered around 40% of the votes at general elections since the 1960s. This dramatic drop in electoral support is best explained by the programmatic

shifts that the SPD enacted in the post-WWII era. In 1959, with the adoption of the Bad Godesberg program the party officially renounced Marxism and affirmed its commitment to democracy, the social market economy, and deescalating East-West tensions. This transformed the SPD from a much narrower worker's party into a broad people's party (SPD, 1959). The next significant programmatic shift was solidified 40 years later, at the party's 1989 convention in Berlin. The Berlin program expanded the SPD's focus beyond its traditional issues of social justice, worker's rights, and international cooperation to include strong concern for environmental protection, gender equality, and international peace (SPD, 1989). The most recent paradigm shift was formalized in the Hamburg program of 2007, which was necessary to embed the significant liberal market reforms that Chancellor Schröder had pushed through parliament from 2003 until 2005.

The Agenda 2010 reforms were Schröder's response to the EU's Lisbon strategy, which was designed to transform the EU's economy into the most competitive knowledge based economy in the world by 2010. The intention was to create a better framework for economic growth and to decrease unemployment in Germany. The implementation of this reform agenda meant that the SPD more or less broke with its long tradition of advocating for more worker's protection and increased social equality. Despite the opposition in his own party, Schröder announced significant reforms in March 2003 in a government declaration before parliament. He stated that the efforts of the state must be curtailed. Instead, the state will encourage more individual responsibility and demand greater personal efforts from everyone. No group in society will be spared; everyone has to contribute their share (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 2479). Agenda 2010 was largely implemented by the SPD and Green government from 2003 until 2005. At the heart of

these reforms was a provision that limited payments from Germany's state run unemployment insurance. Under the new guidelines, income based unemployment benefits would end in most cases after 1 year, after which further benefits would require a means test and would be based upon the general welfare provisions. Additional changes made it easier to hire and fire employees, increased the retirement age, and increased employee's contributions to the social safety net. Agenda 2010 was regarded by many party members and supporters as a betrayal of some of the fundamental principles of social justice and democracy. As a response former members of the SPD and union members founded a new party in January of 2005 called Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative (WASG), which stands for Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative. Even the SPD's former party chairmen and candidate for chancellor in the 1990 election Oskar Lafontaine joined the new party and became its most important figure. He later organized a coalition of the left with the former East German communist party, which was the basis for the founding of the Left party (for more details see Chapter 9). This new party established an alternative for voters left of the SPD on the political spectrum, whose political relevance is underpinned by federal electoral successes in which they received approximately 10% of votes.

6.1 SPD Election Programs

This section summarizes the most important points from each election program as they relate to globalization. The goal is to identify the core message that the SPD communicates to voters for the examined 23-year time span in federal elections. The emphasis is on globalization, trade, and other economic issues, but the goal is to take a

broader look at the election programs in general. This is necessary to address the broad questions previously raised (see Chapter 3). The review of the seven election programs will be followed by an analysis of how the SPD relates to the issue of globalization and trade, as well as how the SPD programs relate to the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter 3.

6.1.1 The 1990 Election

In the introduction of their 1990 election program, the SPD asserts that the ecological-social market economy must be a key element of a modern Germany. Furthermore, the party proclaims that the SPD represents security in all social areas like no other party. Of course, it also mentions the challenges and opportunities that go along with the reunification of Germany, like improving living standards in East Germany, making sure that people find employment, and restructuring the planned economy. The 1990 program also promises a policy change in Germany's military spending. The SPD vows to drastically reduce the defense budget and to use the funds instead for improving social equality in Germany, Europe, and the Third World (SPD, 1990, p. 6).

The first chapter in the 1990 program is all about environmental policies. The SPD starts out by asserting that the ecological restructuring of the industrial society and the ecological realignment of the social market economy is the paramount political goal of the next decade (SPD, 1990, p. 7). Accordingly, the program talks about the need to reduce energy consumption. The SPD supports measures for renovating buildings to make them more energy efficient and to make energy saving appliances that are produced in Germany an export hit (SPD, 1990, p. 8). The program also includes calls for increased

taxation for using cars and a new energy strategy, one that does not rely on nuclear technology. The final building block of the SPD environmental policy proposals is a call for more harmonized environmental standards and regulations (SPD, 1990, p. 9). Another important topic for the SPD is the important role that unions play in German society. According to the SPD, they are a vital element for modernizing Germany's economy (SPD, 1990, p. 20), but they also protect the rights and interests of regular workers through the principle of codetermination and they also push for environmentally friendly production processes (SPD, 1990, p. 25).

Issues such as the creation of new affordable homes that people can live in with dignity, better family support, increasing equality between genders, care for the elderly and securing living standards for seniors make up the middle section of the program. One issue that is fleetingly mentioned is health care (see SPD, 1990, pp. 13-18). Within these pages there is also a brief point that addresses international competition, stating that Germany is an excellent location for companies and that the SPD will improve this position even further. The rest of the program does not pick up on this issue though, so it is not clear how this will be achieved. The only policy proposal that directly addresses competitiveness is the suggestion that small business will be granted tax free saving as long as the money is used for investments into the company (SPD, 1990, p. 13).

The SPD heavily criticizes the CDU government for their decision to declare the Deutsche Mark as the only legal tender for East Germany. According to the SPD this exposed the uncompetitive East German economy instantaneously to global markets without allowing any time for structural reforms, which caused a tremendous amount of unemployment and burdened the state with huge fiscal obligations (SPD, 1990, p. 19).

The SPD's proposed solution to this problem is to heavily invest in qualification measures, to increase privatization, to increase investment in infrastructure, and to support new entrepreneurs more effectively. Another important issue for the SPD in 1990 is the peace dividend. Since the iron curtain peacefully collapsed and East-West tensions had largely subsided the SPD calls for a much reduced number in the troop strength of the Bundeswehr and in the number of foreign troops stationed in Germany. The SPD also demands that no nuclear weapons be stored on German soil and they promise to support a lower number of military forces in Europe as a whole, though it remains committed to NATO as Germany's primary security alliance. The issue of globalization is not mentioned at all in the 1990 program and trade is only mentioned once in the context of creating trade policies that are more in favor of developing countries, so as to build a socially and ecologically responsible global trade order (SPD, 1990, p. 23).

6.1.2 The 1994 Election

In 1994 the SPD puts an emphasis on creating jobs, especially in East Germany and a general drive to modernize the economy, the state, and society as a whole. They acknowledge that this is only possible if Germany's economy remains highly productive and internationally competitive. This is why the Social Democrats want to foster more structural reforms and ensure that German products have an internationally recognized high standard of quality and innovation. This also applies to products from the newly integrated federal states, which require some additional support and protection to become competitive. The economy as a whole is faced with tremendous opportunities as a result of its geographic proximity to the newly opened markets in East and Central Europe.

These new export markets will be made accessible and developed with the help of federally backed export credit guarantees (SPD, 1994, pp. 10-13).

This program focuses on strong unions and the ability to engage in collective bargaining as vital building blocks for a prosperous and social society. Employees must have the right to go on strikes and labor laws and protections need to be adapted to better reflect new technological developments. One opportunity that needs to be advanced is to have machines run much longer, while at the same time ensuring that workers do not work overtime. Thus, jobs could be created and employees would be able to improve their work life balance (SPD, 1994, pp. 15-17). Additionally, it is important to ensure that as the economy grows, and with it the workforce, that women are able to more fully participate. It is a task of the state to ensure gender equality and to build job training and academic programs that are specifically targeted at women to improve their qualifications (SPD, 1994, p. 19, p. 21).

Another issue that has a high priority for the SPD in its 1994 campaign program is to build a social and ecological society which is backed by a stable and effective social support system. Goals in this context include to push for global environmental standards and to persuade EU partners to introduce taxes that create more green incentives. Furthering environmentally friendly research and development is the best way to guarantee that German manufacturers have green products that are essential for the markets of the future (SPD, 1994, pp. 26-27). This also includes a competitive and ecologically responsible agricultural sector that adapts to new environmental requirements and grows to utilize more of Germany's land. However, the SPD also includes a pledge to support part of their traditional clientele, coal miners. The support

for this particularly dirty form of energy extraction is certainly juxtaposed to the otherwise environmentally protective message of this election program (SPD, 1994, pp. 29-31).

Of course, the SPD also addresses the need for a state with a strong social agenda and refers, in this context, to the constitution which defines Germany as a social state (SPD, 1994, p. 58). In terms of policies this means that the SPD advocates for strengthening the state's ability to provide a good education for all children in society regardless of their background and to strengthen families with children. Further policy issues that are addressed are providing more subsidies for home builders, ensure affordable housing, and protection for retired people in general, but especially for those who are in need of long term care (SPD, 1994, pp. 38-49). Securing a successful transformation of the East German states is also an important concern for the SPD. Failure of the system in East Germany does not mean that the people are a failure. Therefore, opportunities must be created for everyone, and the burden of rebuilding the former socialist state must be equally shared (SPD, 1994, pp. 50-51). Additionally, the SPD supports policies that create more gender equality, a balanced budget, better policing against crime (SPD, 1994, pp. 50-69), and more support for culture and the arts. Artistic freedom and culture are essential elements for society and must be available to anyone, according to the SPD. The government should actively encourage projects and institutions that promote culture that transcends national concepts (SPD, 1994, p. 22). The SPD expresses concern over nationalism, also in conjunction with international cooperation, because in the party's view, overcoming nationalism is vital for building a peaceful and cooperative Europe (SPD, 1994, p. 74).

The final chapter of the 1994 election program focuses on the new role that a unified Germany must find on the international stage. Germany's goal must be to take on more responsibility globally and to promote peace and security. Part of this responsibility includes supporting development efforts in the southern hemisphere that are sustainable and in harmony with the environment, while at the same time promoting social justice and sustaining personal liberty and abhorring exploitation (SPD, 1994, p. 72).

The SPD also expresses strong support for the EU and NATO as the two pillars upon which Germany's stability and security are based. The party also acknowledges that transatlantic cooperation at the end of the 20th century is more about economic cooperation between the USA and Europe than it is about questions of mutual security. While the SPD never mentions the term globalization anywhere in its election program, it does state that Germany is integrated into the global economy like no other state. It is therefore in Germany's interest to promote economic cooperation and to foster sustainable development within a fair global trade order. While trade must be open and fair, it is requisite that it does not promote environmental or social dumping. According to the SPD these provisions need to be included in the next round of GATT negotiations, but without creating new restrictions to trade (SPD, 1994, pp. 73-75).

6.1.3 The 1998 Election

The SPD refers to their 1998 program as a blue print for a better and more just Germany (SPD 1998, 79). Unsurprisingly, this idea of a better Germany begins with an argument to finally vote the CDU led government out of office. The SPD claims that policies which promote unity within Germany's society and social justice are long

overdue. A fair distribution of collectively achieved prosperity is necessary. Therefore, a renewal of the social market economy is indispensable with a promise of more jobs, innovation, and justice (SPD, 1998, p. 12). It is paramount in this respect that companies and unions sit down together to jointly agree upon the measures that they want to take to reduce unemployment (SPD, 1998, p. 11). With regard to globalization, the SPD wants the German economy to utilize all the opportunities that go along with an increasingly globalized world. The best way to make use of these opportunities is by advocating for policies that increase domestic reforms and international cooperation. A particularly important building block for this cooperation is the European unification process which creates new possibilities for increasing prosperity and jobs. It must be the goal to extract a maximum of utility from competition and markets, but globalized markets require a fair global economic order. This order needs to be built upon the foundation of a social and ecological market economy and ought to work against any form of protectionism (SPD, 1998, pp. 14-15).

The SPD campaigns unequivocally for the right of unions to engage in collective bargaining, as it is a hallmark of Germany's social makeup. It guarantees flexible solutions for individual industries and prosperity for society as a whole (SPD, 1998, p. 18). The SPD also calls for more protection for employees by, for example, making it harder to fire people or increasing benefits for workers who have been laid off. Companies that are willing to hire the unemployed are promised financial incentives like discounts on lower indirect labor cost or to get reimbursed for on the job training (SPD, 1998, pp. 23-24). Tax policies under a SPD led government will increase corporate taxes, but will generally lower taxes for individuals and reduce the number of tax exceptions

(SPD, 1998, pp. 27-30). The SPD's election program includes a chapter called social security and justice, which is where the party lays out its policies on retirement benefits, health care benefits, affordable housing, and immigration (SPD, 1998, pp. 37-44). The guiding principle for all these issues is that any form of community does not just afford rights but also includes obligations (SPD, 1998, p. 38).

Other issues that the SPD addresses in their election program are increasing support for families, new policies that promote more gender equality, better education opportunities for youth, ensuring secure retirement benefits, and advocating for ecological modernization with harmonized European environmental regulation and international standards against environmental dumping (SPD, 1998, pp. 45-61). The SPD also promotes a state that acts as a partner for citizens in building a strong community. This can be accomplished by providing excellent public services, creating more local opportunities for democratic participation, and increased funding and support for culture. It is important to note here that for the SPD culture means diversity and not the perpetuation of a specific national identity (SPD, 1998, pp. 62-67). Pledges to increase crime prevention efforts and to unequivocally punish offenders are also included in the SPD's 1998 program. The party asserts that there is a social component to the overall crime rate. This is why crime prevention for the SPD also includes steps to reduce mass unemployment, provide better education, and an overall strong social net, especially for families, so that everyone can participate in society and its material prosperity (SPD, 1998, pp. 68-69).

The final chapter of the 1998 program addresses what the SPD calls the new international responsibility of a unified Germany. The party formulates a decisive

commitment to the European integration process, because a unified Germany is the best guarantee for peace, security, and social stability. It is vital that Germany be an engine for European and international cooperation with the intent to raise social standards across Europe, but also to promote tax harmonization in Europe and to combat tax havens (SPD, 1998, pp. 72-73). The SPD also seeks to promote an economic order that is shaped by the principles of a social and ecological market economy. International organizations like the UN, OECD, WTO, International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Group of Eight must build an economic order that creates fair global competition and is built upon environmental and labor standards, which prevent exploitation of humans and the environment. In this regard, it is an important step for the SPD to strengthen the role of labor unions so that employees everywhere have a way to get their voices heard (SPD, 1998, p. 75). The SPD also reaffirms its commitment to NATO as the key for the security and stability of Europe and a pledge to agitate for reforms of the UN to strengthen its role and independence (SPD, 1998, p. 77). The most important tool for the Social Democrats in terms of succeeding in a globalized world is the European economic and monetary union. The introduction of the Euro as legal tender creates the opportunity for the members of the monetary union to shape the future conditions of globalization (SPD, 1998, p. 74).

6.1.4 The 2002 Election

The SPD's 2002 program begins with a preamble, which outlines the SPD's achievements during the previous legislative period, stating that the party has pursued policies for the center that started a renewal of Germany. The party plans to continue this

renewal process and to pursue further reforms that modernize Germany and make it fairer, more ecologically responsible, and more progressive. The SPD presents fundamental alternatives such as consolidating public spending or irresponsible expenses that create risks for future generations, social cohesion or the polarization of society. The very first so-called fundamental alternative that the SPD presents is choice between reasonable rules for the globalization of the economy or markets that are left to themselves (SPD, 2002, pp. 7-8).

The remainder of the SPD's program is a list of policies sorted into 20 different policy fields. Interestingly, the very first one is about Germany's role in the world. Typically, this type of chapter is at the end of the election campaign and not at the start, which says something about how relevant the party considers the topic to its electoral success. This program is clearly an exception; international issues in general and globalization in particular are given unusually high importance by the SPD in 2002. The party states that globalization is a reality; any attempts to stop it are illusionary. To let it run its course is dangerous. Instead it is crucial to shape it and to use its potential for everyone (SPD, 2002, p. 15). The goal must be an economic order that is built upon the goals of a social and ecological market economy. The SPD advocates for global trade relations that focus on the interests of the developing countries. This means also that the SPD will fight for further trade liberalization in future trade negotiations. All these efforts must be realized under the guiding principle of strengthening employee rights and improved environmental protection. Specific policies that the SPD pursues in this regard include a stable financial system that can function as an engine for economic growth. Developing countries should receive better access to markets for their products and

medication should be more available to their people. Additionally, developing countries need a fair integration into the global trading system. More access to the WTO and a say in its structures will ensure that poor countries can see their own interests reflected in global trade regimes (SPD, 2002, pp. 15-16).

When it comes to Germany's role in a globalized world, the SPD campaigns for a strong EU and while the European integration process has its own intrinsic value, it remains the indispensable answer to globalization. Therefore, it is paramount to strengthen the European society and its social model. The Euro is a key element in this regard as well as the EU enlargement into the former Soviet bloc states. The sizeable increase in the EU's internal market entails significant opportunities for the German economy (SPD, 2002, pp. 16-18). At a later point in its program, when the SPD talks about the economy and employment, the SPD acknowledges that global economy developments influence domestic development, because Germany is part of a globalizing world. It is important that Germany play an active role in building clear rules into the global economy that reflect the party's social and ecological values. The EU is an important tool in this regard. In fact, it is the SPD's goal to shape the EU into the world's most dynamic and competitive economy by 2010, an economy that supplies global markets with high quality products (SPD, 2002, pp. 20-22). In this context, the SPD identifies five lead industries: automotive, chemicals, energy, electrotechnology, and machine construction. These industries are global leaders and must remain such. This is why it is highly important that Germany remains a very interesting and competitive location so that companies keep investing in Germany (SPD, 2002, p. 21). This instance constitutes the only point where the SPD singles out certain industries. Otherwise the

party only talks about the economy as a whole, except for the sporadic references about coal mining. The 2002 election program includes one such instance as well. The SPD places a particular focus on renewable energy without oil or nuclear energy, in order to build a sustainable and green energy supply for the future. Interestingly enough, the SPD emphasizes that domestic coal remains an important element of this modern energy plan as long as it used in an environmentally friendly way (SPD, 2002, p. 36). Clearly, this is not motivated by concerns for the environment, but is an attempt to pander to some of the party's oldest supporters.

Other policy goals include tax reforms, with significant income tax cuts, better support and training for the unemployed, more flexibility with regard to labor laws in order to make it easier for companies to hire and fire people, better and more job relevant education and higher education for everyone regardless of their socioeconomic background (SPD, 2002, pp. 23-33). In general, the program tries to find the right balance between reforms that create more flexibility and opportunities at the expense of some security, while at the same time reforming government programs so that they work more efficiently and effectively. Overall the goal is not to create flexibility at the expense of the social safety net (SPD, 2002, p. 27). Specific efforts that the SPD plans once it is in power are to implement the idea of demand and support. Besides demanding more flexibility from voters the Social Democrats support people in need with better services for the unemployed, more transparence with regard to social security payments and its eligibility requirements, affordable housing, more support for children, and increased flexibility for single parents (SPD, 2002, pp. 44-48). Furthermore, the SPD advocates for more gender equality, a health care system that provides services based on need and not

on income, consumer protection, domestic security, and immigration (SPD, 2002, pp. 53-64).

In terms of culture and identity the SPD reaffirms that Germany is a pluralistic society which is based upon mutual respect and recognition. The SPD asserts that it has always been a party that fights for justice and against exploitation and marginalization. In order to improve the cooperation between various diverse groups and people in Germany the SPD fights for the recognition of all different cultures and that they are accepted as equal (SPD, 2002, p. 67). The party also calls for a form of culture that includes a European dimension as well as inclusivity of minorities, allowing minorities to be reflected within Germany's culture. This strengthens the overall cohesiveness of Germany's society (SPD, 2002, p. 69).

6.1.5 The 2005 Election

The SPD's 2005 election program starts by justifying the election for which SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had called, 1 year earlier than scheduled. Germany's economy was stagnating and unemployment historically high at the turn of the century. The SPD-led government felt that the only way out of this situation was significant reform of Germany's social net and employment structure. These reforms were highly controversial within German society, but also within the SPD itself. When Chancellor Schröder came under threat of losing his parliamentary majority he called for an early election hoping that voters would support his reform course and give him a new mandate.

The 2005 election program starts out with a format of broad declarations and an analysis of Germany's current situation. The basic message that the party wants to

convey is that it still affirms its commitment to a strong economy that fairly distributes its gains and is the foundation for everyone's prosperity. In this context, the SPD advocates for a strong state that provides a maximum of social security to its citizens (SPD, 2005, p. 3). The program then proceeds to list all the problems that the current SPD-led government inherited from the Kohl era and how hard Schröder and his cabinet had to fight to overcome this legacy. This appears to be a bit out of place, given that the SPD had been in power for almost two full legislative periods. In addition to blaming the coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP for increased government debt, increased indirect labor cost, and the failed transformation of East Germany, the SPD also claims that the previous government has created a social safety net of illusions and shaped labor policies without perspectives, which has led to a situation where Germany is unable to meet the challenges of globalization and demographic change (SPD, 2005, p. 4).

One indication of Germany's very strong economy is that no other country exports as much as Germany (SPD, 2005, p. 5), which fits nicely with the general perception that German parties like to communicate; exporting goods is a sign of strength whereas a high level of imports reveals how moribund an economy is. While the SPD emphasizes Germany's exporting strength, it also very directly criticizes the CDU/CSU and the FDP for continuously propagating the misconception that prosperity is best achieved through unrestrained markets. According to the SPD global markets need rules and regulations to work effectively, but the economic policies of the Union and the FDP advocate for more market power, which would transform Germany into a different country, one where the social market economy would not be seen as a prerequisite of economic success but rather as a liability to Germany's prosperity. Instead of politically

shaping globalization, the CDU/CSU and FDP would simply subjugate Germany to globalization's forces. Deregulation and market forces would only lead to insecurity and a lack of prosperity (SPD, 2005, p. 13). The SPD also tries to differentiate itself from its competitors on the left of the political spectrum by vilifying their positions. SPD argues that other left parties' proposals are absolutely unsuitable for addressing the problems of a modern knowledge based society in a globalized world, primarily because their solutions would bankrupt the state and create a culture of state dependency. The SPD calls this 'irresponsible populism' (SPD, 2005, p. 14).

The election campaign then changes format and goes from this broad declarative style to an action point format by formulating a list of 21 goals for Germany, which will determine the policies that the SPD will enact during the upcoming legislative period. The SPD's plan includes further investment in higher education and job training, as well as stronger support of women in jobs that are traditionally male jobs. The platform also propagates a restructuring of employment centers. Here the emphasis is on providing more personnel to increase support for job seekers to reduce the time that an individual is unemployed (SPD, 2005, pp. 16-22). They also reiterate their support for a minimum wage, employee protection laws to prevent a hire and fire culture, as well as the right for labor unions to autonomously negotiate with employers (SPD, 2005, pp. 23-24)

The SPD states that employees have made a lot of sacrifices in the past few years to get Germany's economy back on track and to reduce unemployment numbers. Some of the reforms that the SPD legislated were not easy to stomach for large parts of the German public, which is why it is now the time for employers to make similar sacrifices. Now that the economy is doing better, it is only fair that employees benefit fairly from

increased profits (SPD, 2005, p. 23). Another social issue that is important for the SPD is that household income increasingly determines the educational opportunities of children, which is why the SPD wants to better fund schools and provide more school programs that offer children developmental opportunities throughout the entire school day. Early childhood education would also receive more funding by the SPD, for example by providing government subsidized day care for a growing number of parents. Here, there is special emphasis on supporting children of immigrants who are more likely to have language barriers (SPD, 2005, pp. 28-29). Retirement and long term care, along with sports and culture, are touched upon only briefly and without much substance (SPD, 2005, pp. 35-36). Culture is discussed in a very intangible way and is linked to identity, not to a type of homeland, Christianity or some narrow definition of identity and culture, to which the CDU regularly refers (SPD, 2005, p. 32).

With regard to taxes, the SPD promotes the idea that those who are more prosperous than others need to do more to support society as a whole, which is why a flat income tax is not acceptable. A progressive tax system and a reduction of tax exemptions are at the core of the SPD's social agenda. In that context, the SPD also clearly speaks out against using taxes exemptions, especially in the EU, as a tool for creating incentives for companies to relocate to a more tax friendly location. This only leads to a disastrous race to the bottom, which is why the SPD calls for urgent tax harmonization across the EU (SPD, 2005, p. 38). Other issues that the SPD addresses are the need for a global energy solution and a competitive agricultural sector. Unfortunately, there is nothing global in the positions that the SPD outlines. Instead there is only talk about clean energy and a reduction of Germany's energy dependence. Concrete policy proposals include

subsidies for green forms of energy production while at the same time promoting new highly efficient coal plants. It is interesting to note that the SPD sees coal mining as a profession with a future in Germany. Such statements can only be meant to please some of the party's oldest supporters: the coal miners (SPD, 2005, pp. 25-26).

On the last two pages of their 2005 program the SPD addresses Germany's global role. First, there is the affirmation that the EU is a vital tool for cooperation and that it can increase peace, security, and global justice (SPD, 2005, p. 41). The SPD assures voters that it has learned that security is not just based upon military strength, but that a peaceful and forward looking approach can increase stability and peace. In order to accomplish this goal, it is paramount that Germany strengthens its alliances and the high profile international institutions (UN, NATO, EU) of which it is a member. The SPD asserts that Germany must play a more pronounced role in these institutions and take on more leadership responsibilities. With regard to development issues, the SPD states that it wants to realize the UN's Millennium Development Goals and in an effort to show its commitment the party promises to increase the budget for international development from 0.51% to 0.7% of Germany's GDP. Other concrete policy proposals include more debt relief for poor countries, to promote fairer global trade via the WTO, and to stop subsidizing agricultural exports (SPD, 2005, p. 42). The following are two of the most well-formed ideas on globalization contained in the entire platform: Germany has an important role in shaping globalization so that its effects are more just (SPD, 2005, p. 41), and Germany must build an alliance with NGOs and religious organizations to shape globalization in a positive way (SPD, 2005, p. 42). It is interesting to note that the SPD not only recognizes and communicates to voters that globalization needs to be shaped or

formed, but also that it affirms that it is possible to shape globalization. Unfortunately, these declarations remain vague and rather limited. It would be much more helpful to explain in more detail how the SPD is planning to make globalization work better for the German people. Given the impact that globalization has and its impact on a broad range of policy fields it would be more sensible to address the issue throughout the election program and not just squeeze in two ambiguous references on the last two pages of their election platform.

6.1.6 The 2009 Election

One of the SPD's primary goals is to generate a social partnership between companies and unions to share responsibility for sustaining peace and stability. This creates a society where every citizen takes on personal responsibility for shaping a social home or homeland. While the SPD uses the same German word, "Heimat" that the CDU does throughout their election programs, for the SPD this word has a very different connotation. It is not linked to a particular nationality, culture, or religion; instead it reflects a place of acceptance, inclusion, and belonging regardless of race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, age, or religious convictions (SPD, 2009, p. 13, p. 59). The core goals for this type of society are employment for everyone, an easier transition for youth into the labor force, a more sustainable energy concept, comprehensive gender equality, increased support for families of all shapes and types, and a stronger Europe that stands for international cooperation and peace. All of these goals must be built upon the proven foundation of the social market order which has created 60 years of success for Germany. All that is necessary now is to restart the social market order that Social

Democrats and the unions have built in the past (SPD, 2009, pp. 13-14).

The SPD also claims responsibility for transforming Germany from the sick man of Europe to its uncontested powerhouse. According to the SPD, it was the reforms that the Schröder government introduced that brought about this transformation and generated an innovative and powerful export sector with a strong domestic market (SPD 2009, 15). While there is generally a consensus among experts that the SPD-led reforms at the beginning of the 20th century have helped to strengthen Germany's competitiveness they are also associated with social coldness and have created many heated debates within the SPD, as well as drawing a lot of critique among traditional SPD supporters. Therefore, it is important to see the party referring to those policies as the key building blocks in Germany's success, while at the same time calling for a new social beginning and a turning away from the seemingly unjust policies of a Merkel-led government.

The key economic goal for the SPD in 2009 is overcoming obstacles to social mobility (SPD, 2009, p. 31). The building blocks for achieving this goal are universal employment at an income level that allow households to be self-sustaining (SPD, 2009, p. 20, p. 31). A big concern for the SPD in this regard is the company practice of hiring cheap contractors who work for less money instead of offering fulltime employment with full benefits and protection. In order to combat this development, the SPD would introduce policies that require companies to pay equal wages to both regular staff and contract employees if they are doing the same work. The other big issue that the SPD pushes, in order to promote social mobility, is collective bargaining. This bargaining must take place autonomously and its outcomes need to be unequivocally honored. The SPD demands that as part of any collective bargaining all negotiating parties need to

agree on a minimum wage standard for their particular industry. This would allow employees to lead self-sustaining lives based on a livable wage (SPD, 2009, pp. 31-32). Besides a minimum wage, the SPD also calls for a lowering of taxes, housing subsidies for people with low incomes, and more financial support for families. These measures are designed to guarantee a sustainable financial situation for anyone and everyone who works (SPD, 2009, p. 33).

Additional policies that the SPD suggests in order to create more social mobility are reforms of the education system to create fewer path-dependencies and to make academic achievement less reliant on parental income. Germany also needs more employment options for older workers, a legal right to child care so that parents can work, gender equal pay, and better integration of immigrants and people with disabilities in the workforce (SPD, 2009, pp. 33-42). Secure retirement and available long-term care are also necessary along with an overall good health care system that provides universally good care and not care based on individual wealth (SPD, 2009, pp. 51-54). It is also interesting to see that the SPD emphasizes the social component of its environmental policies. The party argues that pollution and noise disproportionately affect poor people and their health. Therefore, social justice demands greener technologies and more environmentally friendly production processes in order to improve the quality of life for all citizens (SPD, 2009, p. 73).

Towards the end of their 2009 election campaign the SPD talks about a global community of responsibility. Globalized markets require political globalization, a multilateral political process that devises fair rules and is designed to generate new global structures. In this process, there must be a special emphasis on support for the poorest

individuals. Financial, economic, and resource crises must not be pushed on the world's poorest. Instead there should be a global solidarity to help especially those with the greatest needs. The SPD would address these issues by strengthening the United Nations and reinforcing its role as the only legitimate global leader. In the wake of the global financial crisis the SPD perceives an opportunity to reorder the international financial system. It is an opportunity to strengthen the role of the IMF and World Bank and to give developing countries a bigger say within those organizations. Another important building block for global solidarity is free and fair global trade; the financial crisis must not lead to a walling-off of markets or protectionism. Instead the WTO needs to find better ways of enabling developing countries to participate in worldwide trade; this includes the abolition of agricultural export subsidies as well as social and ecological minimum standards (SPD, 2009, pp. 81-82). The SPD also campaigns for greater acceptance and implementation of human rights as well as a greater effort to achieve the UN's Millennium Development Goals (SPD, 2009, pp. 87-89).

6.1.7 The 2013 Election

In 2013 the SPD celebrated its 150th anniversary and the party used that year's federal election program to remind voters of their long tradition, that they are Germany's oldest democratic party and the party with the longest social democratic tradition in the world. Since its founding in 1863 the party has fought for freedom, democracy, and justice. Its members have always promoted solidarity and a progressive society, which protects and enables individuals (SPD, 2013, p. 4). Based upon this tradition the SPD campaigns for a Germany that is better and more justly governed, which primarily means

creating a new social balance (SPD, 2013, p. 6). The SPD asserts that the reforms and in particular the agenda 2010 which it initiated while in government from 1998 until 2009 created a great foundation for success in Germany, because it caused an increase in spending on education and research. The reforms also vastly expanded sources of renewable energy and got thousands of people off of welfare payments and into the labor market. The SPD asserts that social democratic policies during this period have transformed Germany into a strong country with great potential (SPD, 2013, p. 7).

However, the current Union and FDP government squandered these opportunities. The risk of not being able to participate in Germany's society has increased during their reign. This is especially true for people with disabilities, single parents, people who have only minimal professional qualifications, or those who have a weak socioeconomic background. Additionally, a successful education largely depends on parental income, which does not help to overcome social mobility in Germany. Thus, current policies increase divisions within society (SPD, 2013, pp. 8-9). The SPD believes that this development is only exacerbated by the Merkel government and its stringent austerity policies, because it adds to the crisis and curtails the state's ability to build structures that enable all citizens to participate fully in society. The SPD does not suggest increasing government debt. In fact, it advocates saving, but not when it comes to education. A well-educated and highly specialized workforce is key for achieving a prosperous, inclusive society, therefore the SPD wants to increase spending on education and research, which should be financed by tax increases for rich people (SPD, 2013, pp. 10-12). This emphasis on education is all encompassing from providing more childcare opportunities for small children to designing a school system that does not categorize students early in

their development (which creates path dependencies). The SPD's educational goals also include ensuring better student performance, free university education, excellent trade and crafts programs, as well as secondary opportunities for anyone who wants to improve their skills and education throughout their life. In general, education policies need to be designed to provide constant opportunities for all walks of life (SPD, 2013, pp. 47-49).

An important element of the SPD's 2013 election program is its critique of what it refers to as market radicalism. For the SPD, the conservative and neoliberal ideology that markets by themselves will be able to generate prosperity and a better society has been proven to be incorrect in the wake of the global financial crisis. The solution to this problem is a new beginning for the social market economy, new economic policies that do not allow for market radicalism that is able to take risks which privatize profits, but leave society with all the burdens if anything goes wrong. What is necessary is a new economy with a culture of sustainability and long term growth. This requires compensation models for top managers that reward long term growth and more participation of ordinary employees in company decisions. Additionally, a larger share of company profits needs to be distributed among all workers and not just top executives (SPD, 2013, pp. 13-14). To this end the SPD reiterates multiple times the need for strong unions and independent collective bargaining. One of the primary goals of this bargaining should be to ensure that all employees are compensated equally if they do the same work. This is intended to address the problem that a significant share of Germany's workforce labors in contract positions, which do not get compensated as well as regular positions, and also afford fewer benefits and protection compared to regular positions (SPD, 2013, pp. 17-19). One basic step to achieve a modicum of fairness in this regard would be a

universal minimum wage. This is an issue that is addressed in detail on four pages of the 2013 campaign program, plus it is mentioned seven more times throughout the program (SPD, 2013, pp. 18-21, p. 31, p. 52, p. 66, p. 78, p. 79, p. 87, p. 103).

Other policy goals for the SPD in 2013 are intended to boost prosperity and equality include overcoming the gender gap in pay, creating more employment opportunities with benefits, to build a better qualified and trained workforce, to make it easier for foreigners to get their credentials recognized in Germany, to generate more incentives for private investment, and to create an atmosphere that makes it easier for entrepreneurs to start their own businesses (SPD, 2013, pp. 20-31). The Social Democrats also campaign for better support for retirees. The transition into retirement needs to be more flexible, and benefits for people who have made retirement contributed for more 30 years need to be adequate to sustain a living standard that is above the welfare level. Additionally, the definition of contributing to retirement funds needs to be widened to include time for rearing children and providing long term care at home for family members (SPD, 2013, pp. 79-81).

Improved integration of foreigners into Germany's society is also an important issue for the SPD. First, they propagate a very pluralistic view of society and culture. There is no talk about a German culture, only of an inclusive culture that is open to anyone who is not opposed to Germany's democratic and pluralistic values. The SPD wants to allow everyone who is a legal resident in Germany to be able to take part in local elections and to allow dual citizenship (SPD, 2013, pp. 58-65). It is also important that diversity is reflected in Germany's cities, where neighborhoods are heterogeneous living arrangements that reflect society as a whole. The forming of ghettos, may they be

due to cultural backgrounds or based on income, must be strongly combatted. This is one of the reasons why the SPD advocates for rental and utility assistance for low income families (SPD, 2013, pp. 84-87).

Environmental policies are also addressed. The SPD acknowledges that green policies have an important social component to them, because poor people suffer more from environmental problems since they lack the means to mitigate environmental problems or the mobility to just move to a neighborhood that is less impacted by pollution (SPD, 2013, pp. 91-92). Another point that the party makes in this context is that Germany's energy transformation needs to be socially responsible. This transition is the determined move away from a national energy mix that includes nuclear power to one that exists completely without it and instead includes an increased share of energy from renewable sources. The SPD acknowledges that this requires significant investments that are largely financed by taxes on energy products, leading to relatively high prices. Therefore, policy must ensure that simple customer's obligations are eased and that manufacturing companies that consume a large amount of energy need special tax cuts on energy consumption (SPD, 2013, pp. 39-41). With regard to Europe, the SPD not only supports the economic and monetary union, but also calls for a social union (SPD, 2013, p. 106). The goal must be to build a stronger social market economy in Europe, because a unified Europe can be strong and resist the cold pull of markets. It can also enable its citizens to succeed regardless of international competition and it can promote its values all over the world. European unity is key in this regard and it must include a harmonized tax system within the EU. Otherwise fair competition within the EU's internal market is not possible (SPD, 2013, pp. 24-25).

The final chapter addresses globalization as part of Germany's foreign policy strategy. The SPD describes a rapidly changing world that often is not just and where especially the poor suffer from the consequences of climate change and unfair global trade. Injustice is increasing around the world and it is unclear if fair and socially just globalization is possible or under what type of structure it could materialize, with rising economic powers like China, India, and Brazil. According to the SPD, a multilateral approach is necessary for solving the problems of promoting peace and overcoming violent conflict, stopping climate change, alleviating poverty and hunger, and subjecting financial markets to sensible regulation (SPD, 2013, p. 112). It is paramount that the globalization of markets is followed up by political globalization. Multilateral organizations are viewed as the primary means for achieving this type of globalization and a more just global order. Chief among all possible organizations are the United Nations as a tool for peace and security, but also smaller or more regional organizations like NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, WTO, and the Group of Twenty are important elements for achieving peace and a fairer distribution of wealth. In essence these organizations need to be strengthened and at times reformed so that they can truly fulfill their mandate and promote a better global order. Additionally, Germany needs to play a bigger role within these organizations and use its influence to shape new rules for fairer trade and better regulation (SPD, 2013, p. 113). Key steps in building a fairer world are ensuring global standards that protect humans from exploitation and abuse. Laws against any kind of forced labor, more protection against child labor and improved efforts to protect women and guarantee gender equal pay. Employees everywhere need to have the right to form unions and to engage in

collective bargaining (SPD, 2013, p. 114). The goal of German foreign policy must be to create the global structures that can make sure that these key steps can actually be implemented.

6.2 Initial Election Program Analysis

The following is a basic analysis of the five key terms across all seven SPD election programs. A detailed explanation of how the programs were analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regard to the five key terms can be found at the end of the methods chapter under 4.3. Here, the goal is to jump right to the analysis. Figure 6.1 shows all direct references regarding globalization sorted according to the five key terms. By looking closely at the data, the following patterns can be detected. First, the term globalization appears to be relatively new to SPD election campaigns. The first time the SPD used the term in any of the examined election programs was four times in 1998. It is certainly possible that the party has referred directly to globalization in an election program prior to 1990, but one can assume that the term was at least not used in any systematic fashion prior to 1998. The most frequent use of the term globalization was during the 2002 and 2005 campaigns with a count of 15 times versus 10 instances for the 2009 and 2013 elections. This is remarkable since the campaign programs for the last two examined elections are almost twice as long in terms of page count than the SPD's first two election programs in the 21st century (113 pages versus 209 pages). In terms of saliency for the term globalization there has been a fairly sharp increase starting in 1998 through 2005, but since then the SPD has emphasized the issue less frequently.

Related terms such as trade, exports, and imports were used in the SPD's 1990,

1994, and 1998 programs, but only a combined total of 15 times. This appears to be a low count for a combined 180 pages of campaign material for those three elections, after all the combined level of exports and imports accounted already for about 40% of Germany's GDP for each of those three elections (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p. 20). Since 1998 these terms have been used a bit more frequently in SPD election campaigns for a total count of 42 instances on 322 pages, but still, given that during the last election in 2013 the combined level of exports and imports had reached about 70% of Germany's GDP (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p. 20) usage of these terms has not kept pace with economic realities. Trade related issues remain a marginal topic.

The term free trade is only fleetingly mentioned in the 2013 election program. One reference affirms the SPD commitment to building a comprehensive transatlantic free trade agreement, based upon progressive rules and regulation for protecting economic, ecological, social, and financial standards (SPD, 2013, p. 112). The other reference warns that free trade must never become a gateway for social and wage dumping (SPD, 2013, p. 114). A possible reason for largely avoiding the term "free trade" is that the SPD does not want to communicate the idea that trade would flow into Germany without any control. If trade is free, then governments lose their ability to steer and direct trade in a favorable manner and the average voter might fear that they will be worse off due to the negative impact of unregulated harmful trade and the lack of domestic protection. It appears that the only reason why the SPD mentioned the term in 2013 was the fact that negotiations about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) had just commenced. In the meantime, the SPD has revoked its support for TTIP (Sattar, 2016), referring to the deal as dead, thus confirming their

generally critical view regarding free trade agreements.

There is a serious inequity between import and export within the platforms. There is a four to one ratio between export and import references in favor of exports. There are six references on imports spread across all election programs except for the 1990 and 2005 programs. All of them are about energy imports and talk about imports in a negative context, emphasizing that Germany must decrease imports in order to increase its independence. The only import reference that is not related to the energy sector can be found in the 2013 program, which refers to the need to stop the imports of wild animals (SPD, 2013, p. 87). Exports are mentioned more frequently, but not necessarily in a positive way. The largest share of export references is used in a negative context. One line of critique addresses export subsidies for agriculture products that create an unfair advantage for rich countries over developing countries. This is why the SPD calls for a stop of these subsidies and advocates for the WTO to address this issue with adequate rules (SPD, 2002, p. 16). The SPD also warns that an economy which is so heavily involved in exporting, as is Germany's, becomes exposed to the internal struggles and problems of other countries, because if either the economy or political stability in another state is threatened this causes demand for German exports to decline and weaken Germany's economy, due to the fact that a lot of its growth is driven by international and not domestic demand (SPD, 2013, p. 10). Another point of critique regarding exports for the SPD is the issue of weapons sales and nuclear technology transfer to foreign states, which are generally viewed as negative by the SPD when they involve states that are not established democracies with a strong record when it comes to protecting human rights (see for example SPD, 1994, p. 77; SPD, 2013, p. 40).

References on trade are similarly mixed. The SPD warns that trade is often not fair and can have negative consequences (SPD, 1994, p. 73; SPD, 2002, p. 15; SPD, 2013, p. 108), but the Social Democrats also affirm that trade can have positive consequences or generate new desirable opportunities (SPD, 1994, p. 73; SPD, 2002, p. 34; SPD, 2005, p. 32; SPD, 2009, p. 74). These positive effects can most likely be harnessed when trade is free and fair (SPD, 2009, p. 82). Overall, Figure 6.2 shows that in the early 1990s there are very few globalization and trade related references in SPD election campaigns and that if these issues are mentioned, then it is predominantly in a negative context. For the period from 1998 to 2005 this changes. The SPD mentions these topics more frequently and the largest share is neutral in nature and not negative. In fact, references that refer to globalization and trade terms are more often positive than negative. This changes for the 2009 and 2013 elections: Now references with negative and neutral context are most common. The number of references that highlight the positive effects or opportunities for growth that can result from globalization and trade have decreased by almost 30% compared to the previous two election programs, even though the page count has almost doubled for the last two elections.

Is it justified for the SPD to change the way they communicate with voters about globalization and trade after 2005? In 2009 the combined level of exports and imports had reached 60% of Germany's GDP and in 2013 it rose another 10 percentage points (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p. 20), making trade a more relevant issue than ever. In terms of employment, Germany's economy was doing great; unemployment had fallen consistently from close to 5 million people in 2005 to about 3 million people without work at the time of the 2013 federal election (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016). However,

the global financial crisis also had its effects on Germany. The Federal Republic's GDP which had grown in 2006 and 2007 by close to 4 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively, fell sharply in the wake of the global financial crisis. In 2008, GDP growth fell below 1 percentage point and shrunk by more than 5.5% in 2009. Germany certainly felt the negative consequences of being so internationally connected, but GDP bounced back strongly in 2010 and 2011. It grew respectively by 3.9 and 3.7 percentage points (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016a). A more important indicator for the SPD's changed rhetoric was the fact even though more and more people were employed overall, people were losing real income. Aggregate real income fell by 0.5% in Germany from 2000 to 2013. It is only since then that real incomes have grown a little over 4%, until 2015 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016b). One can assume that the SPD leadership did not want to communicate that Germany's economic activities, including trade, were positive developments since the majority of voters generally did feel that they were personally increasing in prosperity.

Figure 6.2 presents an overall summary for all the examined key terms, but it does not illustrate how the SPD values each individual term. The following text will undertake this task. Figure 6.3 illustrates that the SPD presents a mostly balanced message on trade. An even share of references discuss trade with four specific connotations: neutral, praising its positive effects, illustrating its potentially positive outcomes, and highlighting the unjust nature of trade. Warnings of the risks and dangers of trade appear less frequently in the SPD's programs, compared to the other four connotations. This means that the SPD paints a slightly more positive picture of trade. As previously mentioned, the term *free trade* is only used twice, once in a positive context and one time negatively.

How the SPD addresses the topic of exports is illustrated by Figure 6.4. The SPD refers to exports 23 times in its election campaigns, with the largest share of them emphasizing the risks and dangers that can arise as a result of exports. The second largest share of references are neutral in nature and only about a fifth of all export references appear in a positive context. The SPD has a particularly hard time formulating any potential future benefits for Germany that might come as a result of its vast exports. The only instance in which the SPD does talk about future opportunities with regard to exports is in 1998, when the party states that Germany's economy can become the global leader for green technologies through the export of ideas, services, and high tech products (SPD, 1998, p. 57). This is somewhat surprising since Germans are usually rather proud of their export power (see Zeit, 1989). Imports are hardly mentioned in comparison to references on trade or exports in SPD election programs. There are only six instances and they all emphasize negative effects of imports such as increased energy dependence on foreign powers or adverse environmental effects.

The term globalization is relatively new to the party's election program language and is primarily used in a neutral or negative context, accounting for 59% and 24%, respectively, as shown by Figure 6.5. Only 7% of SPD references refer to the positive effects of globalization and only 10% of them illustrate the positive opportunities that it can bring about.

6.3 Election Programs and the Theory on Globalization and Political Parties

Before closely looking at what the SPD says about globalization in its election programs and how it relates to the theoretical concepts previously outlined in Chapter 3 it

is important to reemphasize the role that trade plays for the Federal Republic of Germany. Here it is important to remember that Germany is over proportionally involved in trade compared to other developed economies of its size.[1] Even though Germany has built an economy that is uniquely involved in an intricate web of imports and export of disproportionate size, the SPD's election programs hardly account for this. Trade and globalization should be a primary topic for a country whose economy depends so heavily on the import of goods and services not just for consumption, but largely for subcomponents that are used in the production process of products that are made in Germany, but are, to a large degree, exported to foreign markets. Instead, these issues remain marginalized in SPD election programs. In a first step, political parties in Germany should clearly communicate to voters the importance of the international economy and access to global markets for their country. In a second step, the parties should offer clear policy alternatives to voters as to how to deal with an increasingly globalized world. Instead Germany's economic global involvement is treated, at best, as a second-rate issue. It would be much more progressive for a major party of a country whose prosperity depends so much on international trade to put topics of globalization and trade front and center of its messages to the electorate. This would certainly include addressing among other things the domestic benefits of an open international economy more directly, thus minimizing calls for protectionism in times of crisis.

The issue of partial factor mobility as outlined by Brawly (1997) is not addressed by the SPD at all. Partial factor mobility is seemingly too complex an issue for the SPD to discuss with voters via election programs. Likewise, the topic of volatility, as defined

[1] For details see the overview of Germany's disproportionate trade involvement at the beginning of Chapter 5 or Section 5.3.

by Woodruff (2005) as oscillating between economic busts and booms, is only talked about in the context of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, which is an important topic for the SPD in the 2009 election campaign. The program references the term crisis 47 times, because for the SPD, this is not just an economic slump, but the result of an ideology that puts profit maximization over people (SPD, 2009, p. 5). The Social Democrats use the crisis as legitimization to call for a reboot of the social market economy (SPD, 2007, p. 8), which does sound somewhat hollow given the significant social restructuring of the SPD-lead Schröder government. This makes it somewhat difficult for the party to discuss volatility, since it was part of four out of the five most recent governments. This explains why the SPD is largely quiet on the issue of volatility, because the party has no interest to self-incriminate by linking its stay in government with a period of instability. Prior to governing Germany, the SPD did talk about volatility to some extent with regard to the unification process of East and West. The SPD regularly bemoaned the Kohl government's inability to provide a structured and socially responsible transition for the citizens of the former socialist state. Even though the political unification is complete there remains a deep East West divide which will not improve until social economic equality can be achieved (SPD, 1998, p. 31). In essence, the SPD only addresses volatility marginally. They do not use arguments that address the issue of volatility in a consistent and structured manner in the way that it competes for votes.

Midford's (1993) question about how parties address labor subgroups is simple in the case of the SPD. Generally speaking, there is no distinction between labor subgroups except for the special emphasis by the SPD on the coal mining sector, which repeatedly is

referred to as an indispensable resource for Germany. This continues all the way up to the 2009 election (SPD, 2009, p. 29) and while the 2013 program does not explicitly refer to German coal production, it does affirm its support for coal energy as a part of Germany's energy mix (SPD, 2013, p. 34). When it comes to the argument by Garst (1998) that unions are an important element in addressing the negative consequences of globalization, this is where the SPD shines. In Germany, the workers' movement fueled both the unions and the SPD. Fighting for worker's rights and to embed capitalistic pursuits into a larger economic and political process, which looks beyond narrow individual gains, has historically been at the heart of both organizations. Even though unions in Germany are organizationally and politically independent from political parties, the SPD was founded as a worker's party and unions have universally agreed with the party's political program, at least in principle. In turn the Social Democrats have accepted unions as a vital counterweight to the interests of capitalists (Oertzen, 1976).

There is a consistent thread that runs through all of the analyzed SPD programs, which is that unions are an important key for the SPD when it comes to building a strong socially just society. The SPD views unions as vital actors for helping to transform and modernize the economy (SPD, 1990, p. 20). The right of unions to engage in collective bargaining is, according to the SPD, a hallmark of Germany's social makeup, which guarantees flexible solutions for individual industries and prosperity for society as a whole (SPD, 1998, p. 18). For the SPD, unions are essential to Germany's prosperity and success, because unions are a vital tool for building a broad consensus and stability, through social equality. This is why the SPD in recent years has focused heavily on addressing the problem that an increasing number of Germany's workforce labors in

contract positions, which afford fewer benefits and protection compared to regular positions (SPD, 2013, pp. 17-19). This is one reason why the party is advocating for a universal minimum wage (SPD, 2013, pp. 18-21). The relevance of unions for the SPD is well illustrated by the way the SPD talks about mutual achievements. For example, it talks about how its cooperation with unions demonstrates that it is possible to civilize capitalism in Germany. This is supposedly apparent by the way that the rights of employees have been strengthened in Germany and how regulation has been created that defines social and ecological standards which allow for Germany's economic prosperity to be widely enjoyed (SPD, 2009, p. 85). Furthermore, prosperity and democracy have been underpinned by the social market economy, which has been mutually shaped by Social Democratic policies and unions (SPD, 2009, p. 14). In a nutshell, the SPD firmly believes that strong unions which are able to get things done are an essential element for shaping social democracy (SPD, 1994, p. 17). The SPD also asserts its desire to build a cooperative global world order that can shape the future by mutually solving problems. The SPD wants to build and shape this new order with broad support and influence from all sorts of groups and people, like civil organizations, social movements, churches, and unions (SPD, 2013, p. 106). However, one thing that is missing from the SPD's programs is a clear position as to what the role for unions is in an increasingly globalized world. Is their role changing due to globalization? Does the SPD envision unions to take on specific responsibilities that might be new for unions? These kinds of questions remain largely unanswered by the SPD, as if globalization and unions are two completely separate topics.

The question of whether or not political parties present significant policies when it

comes to globalization or if they rather use the issue for scapegoating, as put forward by Caproso (1997), deserves a nuanced reply in the case of the SPD. As previously stated the SPD refers to globalization in a more negative context than in a positive one, but that does not mean that the party presents the issue as the culprit for Germany's economic or social challenges. The Social Democrats have a hard time coming out and speaking in support of globalization, but the party has more or less shown its support for a while in favor of an open trade order. In 1994, the SPD emphasized the tremendous opportunities that resulted from access to the previously blocked markets in Central and Eastern Europe. The party even promised government funding to assist with the development of these new markets (SPD, 1994, pp. 10-13). This is why the SPD generally asserts that trade must be open and fair, as long as it does not lead to environmental or social dumping (SPD, 1994, p. 73). Even the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 did not change the party's stance on the issue; free and fair global trade remain essential; the financial crisis was not a reason to wall off markets and to promote protectionism (SPD, 2009, p. 82).

An important point to highlight in this context is the how the Social Democrats recognize and communicate to voters that globalization is not an unstoppable phenomenon that sweeps over a country. In the 2005 election program the SPD accuses the CDU/CSU and FDP of simply submitting to the forces of globalization, causing deregulation and unrestrained market forces to significantly increase anxiety and diminish prosperity (SPD, 2005, p. 13). A government under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder would, instead, ensure that Germany lives up to its important role in shaping globalization so that its effects are more just (SPD, 2005, p. 41). This applies both

domestically but also internationally, especially when it comes to building an international economy where developing countries have equal opportunities. Unfortunately, these assertions that globalization can be shaped and managed in a way that can help to create more prosperity and equality remain vague and rather limited. It would be much better if the SPD communicated more consistently and in more detail its vision for shaping globalization in the 21st century.

The complementary questions of how the SPD addresses the matter of regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement (Ranjan & Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000) as well as how it communicates its goals and how it offers clear choices to voters with respect to international agreements (Hays, 2009; Martin, 2000) will be addressed over the following paragraphs. The issue of regulatory harmonization is consistently addressed by the SPD. With regard to tax harmonization the party calls for such policies in general, but particularly for Europe (SPD, 1998, p. 73), because otherwise fair competition within the EU's internal market is not possible (SPD, 2013, pp. 24-25). The most prominent instance is in the 2005 program, which calls for the limiting of tax exemptions on an international level to avoid creating incentives for companies to relocate to places with a more beneficial tax code (SPD, 2005, p. 38).

The emphasis though is not necessarily on tax harmonization, but on advocating for a more just global order. According to the SPD the globalization of markets needs to be complemented by a form of political globalization and international institutions are the indispensable key for achieving this. They are also vital for promoting peace and a fairer distribution of wealth (SPD, 2013, p. 113). In this regard the SPD calls repeatedly on various organizations, but especially on the WTO, to liberalize markets, but not without

building shared standards, because social and ecological minimum standards are essential for preventing the exploitation of humans or the environment (SPD, 1998, p. 75, SPD, 2002, p. 16). The SPD also asserts that it is primarily developing countries who suffer as a consequence of protection. The WTO needs to assure easier participation for these countries in global trade. It is paramount in this regard that export subsidies for agricultural products need to be banned, but the SPD does mention again in this context that WTO rules and standards must include binding social and ecological minimum standards (SPD, 2009, p. 82). In a nutshell, the WTO is capable and has the obligation to develop a sustainable economic model with the necessary regulation to promote fair competition (SPD, 2013, p. 111). Another institution that the SPD referred to in its 1998 program in conjunction to international labor standards is the ILO, which is a subsidiary of the UN. The ILO is particularly concerned with empowering workers and guaranteeing their right to bargain collectively. It also fights to prevent any form of discrimination among workers and to end forced as well as child labor. The SPD's most comprehensive call for supporting the work of the ILO comes from 2013, when they expressly call for strengthening the organization and supporting its mission (SPD, 2013, pp. 111-113).

The SPD heavily emphasizes the need for markets and free trade to not be obstructed by beggar-thy-neighbor policies, but to be firmly guided by social and ecological rules. It is not always all that clear what these policies will entail in detail as the policy proposals presented throughout the SPD election campaigns are somewhat lacking in clarity and quality. For example, it is good to know that the SPD calls for ecological standards when it comes to the way globally traded goods are manufactured, but there is a great deal of ambiguity entailed in these policy proposals. There are

certainly various degrees of stringency when dealing with environmentally friendly manufacturing processes, but generally the SPD's proposals are not detailed enough to allow for a better or more specific understanding. It is probably part of the inherent nature of election programs to leave some sort of vagueness, but one thing that is particularly lacking from the SPD is the policy download with regard to trade and global markets. The SPD has a virtually exclusive focus on the policy upload, which means that it only communicates to voters that an SPD-led German government is strong and can take persuasive action on the international stage. This type of argumentation also means indirectly that the SPD is suggesting to voters that Germany does not need to change, or at least not in any significant manner. Instead, other states will be changing in order to adopt Germany's environmental and social standards. An approach that also includes the policy download would be more helpful and honest for voters, allowing them get a sense about how an SPD-led government would deal with the policies that other states are pushing for, or regulations that important international institutions are planning to introduce.

According to the literature, addressing the globalization dilemma is an important step for political elites if they are interested in a positive domestic response to globalization (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). Discussing the globalization dilemma is an important step for helping voters to overcome their fears of social instability and a loss of prosperity. The SPD does not address this issue directly; the party does not link globalization with a need to strengthen the welfare state, but due to its generally worker/employee friendly rhetoric voters will most likely pick up on the SPD's desire to support and strengthen the position of those people who are particularly

vulnerable to a more competitive environment, as the party repeatedly addresses the need to strengthen the social safety net. The only problem for the SPD is that its message will be compared to the reality of Agenda 2010, which removed protection and required more self-reliance by citizens. One specific way the SPD is trying to demonstrate its support for social equality is the introduction of a binding domestic minimum wage. According to the SPD this would achieve a minimum standard of fairness and suggest to voters that regardless of whether or not Germany is more or less involved in a globalized world, there a minimum standard below which no one can fall. The issue of a national minimum wage is addressed in one paragraph in the 2005 election program (SPD, 2005, p. 23), but in the following election program the Social Democrats discuss this topic in detail in two lengthy paragraphs. Additionally, there are six additional references throughout the program that mention a minimum wage (SPD, 2009, p. 10, p. 32, p. 33, p. 50, p. 57, p. 67, p. 68, p. 86). The 2013 election manifest closely looks at the topic on four pages, plus the SPD mentions and advocates for the issue seven more times in the remaining part of the program (SPD, 2013, pp. 18-21, p. 31, p. 52, p. 66, p. 78, p. 79, p. 87, p. 103). Thus, while they do not directly reference the globalization dilemma, the party does present policies that are generally well positioned to alleviate the fears that voters have in conjunction with globalization and the potentially resulting increase of competition. However, the party could do a lot more for greater acceptance of globalization in Germany. The SPD could communicate a more direct link between globalization and desired reforms to Germany's safety net that are designed to increase social security especially for low skilled workers. This could be a tool to considerably increase support for globalization, but it is not apparent that the Social Democrats have any interest in

such communication.

The final theoretical building block that must be addressed here is the work by Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004), who have put forward the idea that emphasizing a European identity is an effective tool in general for European states to overcoming resistance to globalization. The SPD does not talk directly about building a European identity or how such an identity would relate a German national identity, but there are plenty of instances throughout the party's election programs that communicate to voters the importance of the EU and present Europe as something with which voters can identify. The SPD feels that the European Union is the best guarantee for peace, security, and social stability (SPD, 1998, p. 72). In 1990 the SPD even warned that Germany's unification process must not lead to a situation where Germans lose sight of the long-term goal to building the United States of Europe (SPD, 1990, pp. 22-23). This constitutes the strongest endorsement of the European integration process by the SPD and was probably a step too in terms of surrendering national identity and autonomy to European institutions. The party did not mention the idea of a United States of Europe again in any of its subsequent programs, but the deep connection between Germany and Europe is frequently addressed. For example, the 2002 program states that we[2] belong to Europe and Europe belongs to us (SPD, 2002, p. 16). The Social Democrats also acknowledge that nation states will reach their limits in this new global century (SPD, 2009, p. 85) and the key for succeeding in a globalized world is the successful integration of Europe (SPD, 1998, p. 74).

The goal for the SPD with regard to Europe is to build a social Europe, a powerful

[2] Referring to Germany

actor for building social equality (SPD, 2013, p. 9) and a global force for peace (SPD, 2013, p. 107). Interestingly, the SPD recognizes the connection between overcoming national identities and being successful in a globalized world, stating that as globalization increases, the more necessary the European identity becomes (SPD, 2002, p. 11); and while the idea of a unified Europe has its own intrinsic value, it also remains the indispensable answer to globalization (SPD, 2002, p. 17). Besides its open support for the European integration process and a European identity, the SPD also actively tries to build a form of culture and identity in Germany that is not nationalistic, parochial, or exclusive (SPD, 1998, pp. 62-67). For example, when the Social Democrats talk about German culture in their election programs, they refer to it as an inclusive culture that is open to anyone who is not opposed to Germany's democratic and pluralistic values (SPD, 2013, pp. 58-65). The goal is to build a society where every citizen takes on personal responsibility for shaping a shared homeland, which is not linked to a particular nationality, culture, or religion; instead it ought to be a place of acceptance, inclusion, and belonging regardless of race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, age, or religious convictions (SPD, 2009, p. 13, p. 59). This type of culture generates cohesion and can create identity (SPD, 2009, pp. 76-77). It is interesting to note that this type of understanding is not related to concepts of nationality, but has a very broad humanistic conception, thus, potentially not appealing as directly to voters who have strong nationalistic/patriotic feelings about Germany, but allowing for a much more inclusive understanding of culture. The SPD also pursues a similar strategy when it comes to religion. The party expressly respects and values religious freedom (SPD, 2009, p. 48). It recognizes the value that churches and religious communities bring to Germany's society

(SPD, 2002, p. 47) and the vital role that they can play in solving its problems (SPD, 1994, p. 11). The one thing that the Social Democrats do not do is mention Christianity in any form, not once. This does not make the SPD popular with voters who are looking for a political party that reassures them that culture and identity in Germany is rooted in a Christian heritage and that this legacy will be actively perpetuated in the future. It does however foster a society that is not afraid of diversity. This generally open outlook that the SPD continuously communicates to voters in their election programs certainly is a building block for decreasing fear and acceptance of globalization, because the SPD does not talk about globalization as threatening to a particular national, religious, or cultural identity.

6.4 Conclusion of SPD Analysis

The SPD propagates a form of social state that can be defined as organized solidarity by people who support one another, and the more affluent ones help out those who are not as fortunate. The community helps those who are in need. The social state expands people's liberal basic rights to include social rights. Government support is not a handout, but a legal right based upon prior contributions (SPD, 2009, p. 49). This type of social state has the advantage that it can ameliorate fears of individual hardship caused by globalization. This sense of security is further increased by the SPD's struggle together with unions over the last century to prove that it is possible to civilize capitalism through collective bargaining and by allowing employees to have a say in the companies for which they work. This is achieved by creating employee rights, and by agreeing on social and ecological standards that create borders for markets and allow society as a whole to

participate in the gains of an increasingly prosperous society (SPD, 2009, pp. 85-88).

By looking specifically at the ways in which the SPD addresses issues of trade or globalization it becomes apparent that the party does not propagate a liberal global economic order, but it also does not have a protectionist agenda either. The SPD's general disposition towards outside influences is one that is predominantly open to a global world. This attitude is rooted in the fact that historically the Social Democrats had a very open and non-nationalistic mindset. The party took a highly positive stance from the beginning on international collaboration, as it viewed cooperation between the nations as a central issue in the tradition of the international workers' movement. This traditional openness and belief in cooperation means that the SPD is somewhat predisposed to embrace global openness and cooperation, as long as they do not infringe upon hard fought for social standards and workers' rights. In other words, unlike the CDU the SPD does not propagate a nationalistic identity that is threatened by a progressively globalized world. International cooperation and a certain degree of openness towards change are not anathema to the Social Democrats, but despite these general characteristics the SPD does not take a strong enough position in favor of trade. The following paragraph explains why.

The SPD assures voters that they live in a country with a very competitive economy that makes Germany strong. Germany is the strongest export nation in the world and the SPD takes great pride in that (SPD, 2005, p. 5; SPD, 2009, pp. 10-11). The SPD also claims that the reforms of the Schröder government have made Germany into a modern economy and one of the most successful countries in the world (SPD, 2013, p. 7). However, the strong country that the Social Democrats like to talk about depends on

imports and exports to a significant degree. In 2015 the foreign trade-to-GDP ratio for goods and services in Germany was 86%, in absolute terms. This amounts to imports of more than 949 billon Euro and to almost 1.2 trillion Euros worth of exports (see Appendix). Clearly, Germany's economy would look very different without the global liberal trading order and the economic union that it has actively shaped in Europe for more than 6 decades since the creation of the European Coal and Steal Community. The way the party communicates with voters does not reflect Germany's exceptional success which would not be possible without globalization.

A more congruent approach for the party would be to embrace globalization and to communicate to voters a commitment to openness, while at the same time to strongly advocate for ways to share benefits more evenly and to define how to better support globalization's losers. The SPD runs the potentially grave risk of painting an ambiguous picture or even slightly negative one of globalization, because if voters on the left of the political spectrum see globalization as a negative development or a threat to their social standing, then the SPD will lose those voters. As demonstrated in Chapter 9, there is a party to the left of the SPD, which is much better at using populism to convince voters of the need to stop and reverse globalization.



Figure 6.1 SPD Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms



Figure 6.2 SPD Globalization References Sorted by Their Normative Implication



Figure 6.3 Trade References SPD



Figure 6.4 Export References SPD



Figure 6.5 Globalization References SPD

CHAPTER 7

FDP

The core principle of the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) is liberalism rooted in the 18th-century Enlightenment (Aufklärung) movement. The party does like to refer to this tradition and views itself as a defender of liberalism in Germany (FDP, 1990, p. 11); the party refers to itself routinely as the Liberals, which is a widely accepted name for the FDP's members. The historic divide into a national liberal and a left liberal movement meant that the liberals where not much more than a marginal development in Germany for the first few decades of the 20th century. This changed after the Second World War in 1948 when the FDP was officially formed at the federal level and was able to combine both liberal wings into one party. While there were multiple parties represented in the German Bundestag after the first federal election in Germany 1949, by the end of the 1950s, all of these had dwindled away in competition between right leaning CDU and the left leaning SPD. The only exception was the FDP, which was continuously represented in the German Bundestag from 1949 until 2013 and took on the role of kingmaker in this mostly three-party system, which meant that from 1949 until 1998, the FDP was only excluded from the governing coalition two times. Initially the national liberal wing was more dominant and led to an alliance with the CDU, but in the late 1960s the social liberal wing of the party gained more dominance

and was able to cement its power in the first SPD and FDP coalition and the national liberal wing left the party. This did not mean that the FDP was now a strongly unified party, because the nationalists within the party were replaced by market liberalists (Oppelland, 2017). This group increasingly gained power so that the FDP often acted within the governing coalition as a counterbalance to the Social Democrats' economic and social policies. This was especially true for economic policies, because the Liberals believed that they had to prevent the SPD's socialist experiments (Vorländer, 2013, p. 498). The party began slowly to align on economic issues with the CDU/CSU and formed a coalition in 1983 that started the Kohl era. At that point, the market liberal forces within the party were so dominant that the social liberal wing left the party.

The party slowly lost its kingmaker monopoly in the mid-1980s when the Green Party entered the Bundestag for the first time. Since then, one can observe a form of programmatic alignment: on the one hand between the FDP and CDU/CSU and the between the SPD and the Greens, on the other. This new alignment was the reason that when the SPD once again gained supremacy in 1998, it did not choose the Liberals as their coalition partner (for the first time). Instead, the SPD opted for the Greens. This led to the FDP's longest spell in opposition, until the party joined the CDU/CSU in a coalition government in 2005 when the FDP achieved it strongest result ever netting almost 15% of votes. Back in government, the FDP made a few high profile blunders at the start of the legislative period, which resulted in the German public perceiving the Liberals as untrustworthy. In addition, the party's chairman Guido Westerwelle was unable to use the high profile of his position as foreign minister to the party's advantage (Decker, 2014, pp. 31-32). As a result, the FDP received historically low electoral

support and did not clear the 5% threshold to receive any seats in parliament; for the first time since their inception, there are no Liberals in the Bundestag.

The FDP perceives itself as based on its liberal tradition both in a political as well as in a societal sense as a party of the center, meaning central to the two major parties, CDU and SPD. Due to its strong promotion of market liberalism, the FDP is more closely aligned with the CDU on issues that affect the economy. When it comes to the separation of state and church, or issues like national identity, gender roles, or family policies, the Liberals are better suited to cooperate with the Social Democrats. This is why the party has traditionally been able to appeal to a broad variety of people and not just a particular subsegment of German society. However, the share of self-employed and small business owners who vote FDP is much higher than the overall FDP vote share. By contrast the share of workers who vote FDP is always lower than the FDP overall share. Other specific elements that are overrepresented among FDP voters are academic degrees and the male gender (Oppelland, 2017). The challenge going forward for the FDP will be to make themselves recognizable to voters as more than a one-issue tax cut party, as well as to become attractive to the SPD again so that the FDP's success of getting into government is not inextricably linked to the performance of the CDU/CSU. While the days of being kingmaker are certainly over, the FDP could still expand its options by being programmatically more viable to enter a coalition with the SPD and the Greens.

7.1 FDP Election Programs

This section summarizes the most important points from each election program as they relate to globalization. The goal is to identify the core message that the FDP

communicates to voters for the examined 23-year time span in federal elections. The primary focus will be on globalization, trade and other economic issues, but the intent is also to look broadly at the overall message of the election programs. This will be important for addressing the broad questions previously outlined in Chapter 3.

7.1.1 The 1990 Election

The FDP attempts to attract voters by somewhat embellishing the party's history. By linking and mixing its own history with the efforts of others that pursued liberal ideas, like efforts in the 19th century largely by students at the Hambach Festival to unify Germany and to advocate for freedom and democracy at a time of censorship and repression, the FDP has created a narrative of itself that appeals to an intellectual segment of the population. The party takes credit for influencing and shaping Germany's Weimar constitution and especially the liberal elements of the 1949 Constitution. The FDP also links itself to what it refers to as the liberals in the other part of Germany and their efforts at building a free and liberal society (see FDP, 1990, p. 11). Thus, the party is able to call upon a 150-year-long tradition of liberal values, which still needs to be defended. While the open suppression of freedom has been brought to a halt, the creeping threat to freedom still continues. This is why citizens must be vigilant and guard against panaceas from the right and left, bureaucracy and government paternalism, nationalism, fears of social exclusion, environmental destruction, and the ever- increasing call for simple answers to complex issues (FDP, 1990, p. 12). Thus, when it comes to Germany's three core principles of freedom, equality and justice, the FDP regards the freedom of the individual as the paramount principle, because only policies that guarantee freedom of

the individual ensure the freedom of everyone (FDP, 1990, p. 12). In essence, for the FDP there exists an inexorable link between individual freedom and economic freedom and government intervention in both spheres must be limited. This belief leads to the party's consistent clarion call for more freedom and less government (FDP, 1990, p. 13).

In terms of policies this means that the FDP pushes for market based solutions and the freedom for individuals to self-determination, because bureaucracy stifles creativity and innovation, according to the FDP. Furthermore, the party asserts that market based solutions and privatization are the best option for environmental protection, because competition and innovation are most likely to lead to new solutions that are more environmentally friendly and that create more sustainable jobs in the future (FDP, 1990, pp. 16-17). Environmental policies are mentioned in more detail towards the end of the FDP's 1990 election program and primarily focus on the reduction of energy consumption, reducing pollution, and fostering international efforts towards increased global environmental protection (FDP, 1990, pp. 84-86).

Regarding international security and the role of a unified Germany in international relations, the FDP regularly refers to the Helsinki Accords as a road map for Germany's future international engagement. The Helsinki Accords (1975) were designed to improve relations between the West and the Communist bloc. The FDP communicates to voters that their goal in this context is to continue the dialogue and the cooperation between old rivals and to reduce Germany's military forces as well as to significantly reduce spending for future military procurement (FDP, 1990, pp. 25-29). The goal is to cooperate with the Soviet Union and to include it in the development of Eastern Europe. The opening of Eastern Europe entails the opportunity to overcome the continent's

prosperity gap. Closing this gap has to be of paramount concern in order to alleviate political and social tensions. A key component for overcoming this gap is the freedom of cross border movement of people, goods, and services, which is why the FDP pushes for a more integrated European Union. A key element for European integration is the establishment of a central European bank that can create stability (FDP, 1990, pp. 23-24).

The FDP also desires the European Community to actively shape a free global market economy. Protectionism, as a tool of European economic policy, is not acceptable and must be avoided (FDP, 1990, pp. 22-24). Private efforts, in combination with a generous government support program, are the best solution for giving people in Central and Eastern Europe a prospect for the future (FDP, 1990, p. 25). The goal for developing countries is to help them align their economies with the successful principles of the social market economy. The FDP commits 0.7% of Germany's GDP to development help. These funds should be awarded in a manner that leaves more room for local authorities to adapt to the specific needs of the recipient country. The goal must always be to create a better framework for economic progress and more private efforts, but also to improve the wellbeing of the poorest, by increasing the social safety net (FDP, 1990, p. 32). The global reduction of trade barriers and competition distorting regulations are an important goal of Liberal policies. In this context, the GATT must be applied not just for industrial products, but also to agricultural ones. Environmental standards matter too, when it comes to development assistance, which is why only sustainable and environmentally friendly projects should receive funding (FDP, 1990, p. 32). The FDP also promises the elimination of government subsidies for agricultural products (FDP, 1990, p. 93).

The FDP’s economic policies are best characterized by a strong belief in

competition and the unrestrained exchange of goods and services both domestically and internally. Trade restrictions and government protection for specific industries must be removed and in general more markets and less government are the keys to success (FDP, 1990, pp. 34-35). These principles have to be applied especially to the states in East Germany, although a transitionary period might be warranted. Overall, the goal is to significantly reduce regulation to allow for more flexibility and individual creativity. With regards to East Germany, there is also an added emphasis on privatization and access to markets (FDP, 1990, pp. 35-37). When it comes to the labor market, the FDP advocates for more market elements and fewer restrictions, so that supply and demand for employment can more quickly find an equilibrium. The FDP recognizes labor unions and collective bargaining; it even suggests that Germany's model of codetermination could be a good example for the rest of Europe. The FDP does assert that collective bargaining and unionized employment contracts create entry barriers for long-term unemployed, which is why the FDP aims to create exceptions for people who have been excluded from the labor market for an extended period of time (FDP, 1990, pp. 38-40). This trend of calling for liberalization of markets and privatization is also manifest in the FDP's policies on creating apartments and houses in order to combat a domestic shortage of housing. The FDP primarily seeks to deregulate and to abolish rent ceilings in order to create an incentive for investment into new housing space. However, the party does acknowledge that there is a need to improve housing assistance for low income families through the structural improvement of housing assistance payments (FDP, 1990, pp. 42-43). When it comes to tax policies, the FPD views taxation as an essential element of Germany's economic vitality, which is why the party rejects tax increases in order to finance

Germany's reunification. Additionally, the party asserts that the rate of taxation is a significant factor that affects companies' relocation plans, especially in the future common European market. This is why it is vital for Germany to reduce corporate taxes; the FPD also includes a few specific tax cuts for corporations in its election program, but also pledges to increase tax cuts for children (FDP, 1990, pp. 44-46).

In terms of social policy, the FPD only propagates more flexibility when it comes to the transition from workforce into retirement, that raising children needs to generate a positive effect for the calculation of retirement benefits, and that more options for long term care of the elderly must be created (FDP, 1990, pp. 57-62). There is no talk of welfare benefits, unemployment benefits, or any other form of transfer payments. There is some mention of gender equality and better protection of gay rights (FDP, 1990, p. 52, pp. 69-71). In terms of immigration, the FDP does not have specific proimmigration policies which it promotes, but it does acknowledge the contribution that immigrants make to society. The FDP also wants to grant them the right to vote in local elections and to obtain German citizenship without having to renounce their citizenship of origin (FDP, 1990, p. 53). The FDP also espouses some ideas regarding culture, which are intended to foster the unity of the German culture nation. It is not clear what this means other than that the FDP wants to emphasize the plurality of cultures and provide added financial support for cultural projects (FDP, 1990, p. 77).

7.1.2 The 1994 Election

The FDP starts its 1994 election program by communicating to voters the party's guiding principles, which are an orientation towards increased performance, more global

openness, and added tolerance. Markets play a central role in the FDP's answers to common problems. The FDP rejects what it refers to as the redistribution politics of the SPD and the Greens, and instead calls for marked based solutions, regardless of who opposes such an approach or which powerful interests might object. The approach of the past, which attempted to insure everyone against any possible negative externalities, is no longer affordable. Government must, instead, promote flexibility and empower the middle class to help itself. The FPD also unequivocally objects to what it perceives as discriminatory behavior by the SPD and the Greens of society's high achievers. High performance must be rewarded and not shamed or stifled, which is why people should vote for the FDP. After all, it is the only party that will promote liberal values and prevent a tax and fee government that the parties to its left on the political spectrum would instigate (FDP, 1994, pp. 5-8).

The FPD promotes policies that are intended to overcome inflexibility and a sense of entitlement. One central element for achieving these goals is to curtail government involvement in the economy, by regulating less and privatizing more. A comprehensive approach to lowering taxes is also necessary, according to the FDP, so that mature citizens have more freedom. This tax reform is also intended to address ecological elements to foster more competition and to reward environmentally friendly behavior as well as to create an energy consumption tax (FDP, 1994, pp. 21-23, pp. 34-35). One of the FDP's core goals of the 1994 election program is to create more jobs. In order to achieve this goal the party calls for a two-pronged approach. The first step is to deregulate the labor market. The FDP clearly views the agreements between employers' associations and trade unions as a significant entry barrier for the long-term unemployed.

More flexibility in general on the labor market and specific exceptions from collective bargaining agreements for those people who have not worked in a while will make them more attractive on the labor market and allow them to find a way back into the work force (FDP, 1994, pp. 18-20). The second element of the FDP employment strategy focuses on restructuring the social safety net. The current system of government support is spread over many different agencies with different rules and regulations. According to the FDP, the answer is to streamline the process and to drastically reduce the number of involved government entities. As a result, the process will have more transparency and equality among applicants, as well as prevent abuse. Combined with an expectation for more individual responsibility and less government support, more people will have incentive to work, because often times the amount of government support makes finding employment less attractive (FDP, 1994, pp. 81-83). Additionally, the ability of unemployed people to reject work that does not fit with their previous career and to retain full benefits needs to be significantly curtailed (FDP, 1994, p. 20) The FDP also emphasizes the need to reduce indirect labor costs. The FDP plans to decrease these costs, and thus make labor more productive and more attractive for employers, by reducing unemployment insurance payments and by breaking the link between health insurance payments and income. Instead, everyone ought to pay a set rate for the type of coverage one desires and potential shortfalls within unemployment insurance need to be paid for by the federal government's budget. Low income households will receive subsidies to ensure that they can afford health insurance contributions (FDP, 1994, pp. 84-87).

The FDP promulgates an active form of government planning and involvement in

the housing market, with the intent to build new, modern, and energy efficient homes and apartments, by keeping the housing market an attractive investment opportunity. This will provide ample housing in order to prevent rent explosions and increased opportunities for generating wealth. Again, one of the primary goals is less regulation, in order to make more land available and to simplify the building process. The FDP also professes its commitment to rent subsidies for people with low income, especially for families with children (FDP, 1994, pp. 77-79).

Other policy areas that the FDP addresses in its program are gender equality, with a particular emphasis on providing more support for balancing career and family needs, as well as protecting women from violence (FDP, 1994, pp. 99-101). The family must be awarded special protections, as it is the core unit of society. It is very important for the FDP to stress that the term family is not linked to a specific form, but rather that all children must receive special protection and support regardless of their parents' living arrangements. (FDP, 1994, p. 61). The party also reiterates its intent to allow foreigners to vote in local elections and to allow dual citizenship in some instances, although they also clearly state that Germany is not an immigrant nation (FDP, 1994, p. 53). In terms of culture and identity the FDP pursues so-called liberal culture policies, which are designed to support the unity of the German culture nation (FDP, 1994, p. 116). It is not really clear what this means other than that culture and artistic freedom must not be burdened by bureaucratic regulation. There must be an element of stronger private involvement, and strong support for the cultural infrastructure in the new federal states, which has been threatened by a reduction of government support since reunification. Additionally, the FDP is interested in a stronger effort to promote German culture abroad (FDP, 1994, p.

116). This idea of promoting a national culture is also viewed as an important element in boosting Germany's reputation abroad and, as such, is a tool for successful diplomacy. To this end, the FDP emphasizes the need for actively promoting a view of Germany as a culture nation (FDP, 1994, p. 125).

In terms of the role that a unified Germany should play in international relations, the FDP suggests a country that is more involved in international institutions and that is strongly committed to NATO and the UN. The guiding principle for Germany's foreign interactions is peace politics, which is best achieved at a global level with a strengthened UN. For Europe, the emphasis is more on the Helsinki Accords and cooperation with Russia to reduce arms, especially nuclear, and to overcome nationalistic developments such as those which exist in the former Yugoslavia (FDP, 1994, pp. 117-225). Trade policies are an important element for the FDP's overall foreign policies. The party views open global markets as a vital element for strength and prosperity. Protectionism is not an option for Germany to solve its problems (FDP, 1994, p. 31), which is why the FDP welcomes the completion of the Uruguay Round as part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They see increased trade as greater opportunity for growth and development especially for developing countries. The significant reduction of agricultural tariffs means that developing countries, for the first time, have the opportunity to access rich countries' markets. In addition to market access and direct financial support, developing countries need help that is designed to change structures and systems. This is the best way for developing countries to help themselves (FDP, 1994, pp. 134-135).

7.1.3 The 1998 Election

In 1998 the FDP starts with a preamble that reiterates the party's core goals of reducing government, lowering taxes, and restructuring the welfare state. Interestingly enough, these goals are seen as a necessary response to a new age of globalization, a time to prepare to face new challenges (FDP, 1998, p. 5). This is the first instance in which the FDP mentions globalization in the election programs that are examined in this study.

The first concrete problem that the FDP addresses in its last program of the 19th century is the need for more employment opportunities. Unemployment is a very difficult challenge and the most socially beneficial policies are those that generate jobs. The FDP calls for a renewal of Germany's market economy, a stark contrast to the current collective bargaining process, which creates too much rigidity and too many privileges. Germany needs flexibility and opportunities, which are best achieved through deregulation as well as lower and fairer taxes. To this end, the FDP calls for very comprehensive tax cuts, in order to benefit all, by simplifying the tax code, reducing income taxes, increasing tax credits for children, a larger tax free base income, and reducing of the wealth tax, just to name the most important ones (FDP, 1998, pp. 6-10). A further boost to employment would come from cutting subsidies, especially for the domestic production of coal, more privatization and deregulation (FDP, 1998, pp. 12-15). The FDP also reiterates its call for a reduction of indirect labor cost by reducing contributions to unemployment insurance, health insurance, and retirement benefits. This also means that the government will only provide more basic services for its citizens; rather, people are encouraged to find individual ways to protect themselves against individual risks (FDP, 1998, p. 18).

According to the FDP, education is the ethical foundation of the civil society and it creates jobs. In other words, it is unethical to support a system which does not offer equal educational opportunities to all its residents. Education is the new social question of the 21st century, because under globalization success is increasingly determined by individual qualifications. This is why schools and universities need to create equal opportunities for all students; outcomes are negligible if the opportunities are fair. More government funds need to be spent on education and the responsibility for education needs to be redistributed, so that more decisions can be determined locally. More competition is necessary for the best education concepts and independent assessment regarding the quality of institutions that provide education. Additionally, some of the tasks of educating people for a globalized world need to be taken over by private entities whenever it is sensible to do so (FDP, 1998, pp. 25-31). Schools and universities must also prepare the next generation for the ongoing globalization process by reducing the time it takes to graduate or to obtain a degree (FDP, 1998, p. 20). Government and private efforts need to provide more opportunities for continuous and on the job learning, so that all people have the opportunities to broaden their skillset or to specialize and deepen existing skills (FDP, 1998, pp. 28-33).

Restructuring the agricultural sector is also an important economic topic for the FDP. The key is to allow the agricultural sector more freedom to develop and to improve, by fostering an entrepreneurial mindset among farmers through more deregulation and an added emphasis on individual responsibility. At the same time, export subsidies for agricultural products must be reduced on a global level and government meddling in markets must also be reduced, or ideally eliminated. Overall, the goal for the agricultural

sector must be to facilitate competition and targeted structural development for rural areas that revitalizes those regions and thus creates new employment opportunities. It is important to note that this does not warrant lower environmental standards or less protection of animals. In fact, future development must be environmentally friendly and sustainable according to the FDP (FDP, 1998, pp. 20-23, pp. 99-100).

The FDP illustrates its social policies under the heading *liberal is social*, claiming that the most social policies are those that create work. Germany needs a fundamental reform of its social net, because a state economy with the best social intentions is inferior to a market economy which secures the best social results. At the core of the market economy is flexibility, transparency, deregulation, competition, and lower payments into the welfare system (FDP, 1998, p. 37). The FDP further calls for more private responsibility in securing financial means for retirement, more flexibility for the healthcare sector with different payment and service structures based upon individual preference, a more restrictive approach towards welfare payments, education for youth that teaches self-reliance, equal opportunities for men and women, flexible work arrangements to get back into the work force, and special protection for the family as society's core unit. Family in this context has a broad definition to be very inclusive in order to protect children regardless of their living situation (FDP, 1998, pp. 38-46), as mentioned above.

With regards to explicit trade and economic policies, the FDP considers globalization a challenge and a tremendous opportunity for Germany's economy, which makes it vital not to overregulate the economy so as to adversely affect Germany's competitiveness (FDP, 1998, p. 61). The ability to compete globally will determine

Germany's strength and its ability to effect change in the future. Internationally, the FDP is committed to working with its partners, especially in NATO, the OECD, and Europe, for peace and stability, as well as greater respect for human rights. The party also promises to continue the enlargement of the EU as a tool for peace and prosperity, as well as to build a strategic partnership with Russia and the Ukraine. Additionally, the FDP's foreign policy must always include the goal to secure global free trade and to strengthen the WTO. Globalization is an opportunity for more competition and open markets, which strengthen peace and prosperity. An important opportunity that globalization grants is the ability for developing countries to better and more quickly obtain access to the markets of rich industrial states through a reduction of trade barriers (FDP, 1998, pp. 90-95). International development and global economic activity must not lead to environmental harm, which is why there should be internationally agreed upon and binding environmental standards (FDP, 1998, pp. 92-93). The introduction of the Euro as legal tender for the members of the European monetary union is viewed by the FDP as the strategic answer to the challenges of globalization, because it strengthens both Germany's competitive position within Europe and at the same time increases Europe's global competitiveness (FDP, 1998, p. 20, p. 97).

The issue of culture is briefly addressed, and the FDP professes its support for culture and the arts. They suggest better cooperation between the state and private initiatives when it comes to supporting all sorts of artistic expressions. Support does not mean influencing, which is why cultural policies must always be liberal in nature and not restrictive. Even in times of tight budgets, the government should support cultural projects, because Germany needs to meet its responsibilities as a culture nation (FDP,

1998, p. 35), although it is unclear what this actually means. In terms of identity and immigrants, the FDP states that integration is crucial. Immigrants must not be excluded or experience any form of segregation; this is especially true for child immigrants. It would be wrong to let them grow up with a foreign consciousness. Allowing them to reach maturity with a domestic identity is ideal (FDP, 1998, pp. 56-57). The FDP accepts the principle of immigration, but it must be limited, actively controlled, and a preference must be placed on individuals who speak German. Foreigners should receive the right to vote in local elections and the children of foreigners who are born in Germany should receive conditional citizenship until they are 25 years old, at which point they must choose between German citizenship or retaining their parents' nationality (FDP, 1998, pp. 56-58).

7.1.4 The 2002 Election

As part of a larger global process Germany is undergoing a transition from an industrial society to an information society according to the FDP. Capital, labor, and information are becoming increasingly mobile, national borders lose their relevance, and the state is losing control. The other parties misunderstand the role of the state as a paternalistic guardian over its citizens. The FDP claims that the other parties promote a state that is ever increasing its involvement in society but at the same time becomes less able to have control over developments within society. The FDP believes in mature citizens who can decide what is or what is not in their own best interest. Citizens need to be proactively involved in society and have the freedom to solve their own problems, without having to run to the state for help on every little issue (FDP, 2002, p. 1).

An important component of the FDP's 2002 program is the criticism of the current SPD and Green government, whose economic policies have failed. They have proven to be interventionist, short sighted, unsystematic, and contradictory and the current government's call for a "new" social market economy is unnecessary, because Germany only needs to return to the principles of the social market economy (FDP, 2002, p. 3). The elements of this social market economy that the FDP likes to highlight are comprehensive tax cuts, more flexibility on the labor market, a reform of the social net, plus more individual responsibility and choice when it comes to preparing for retirement. With regards to flexibility in the labor market, the FDP wants to see additional private entities that help in the process of finding new employment, restricting unemployment benefits to 12 months, and eliminating industry wide wage agreements. All of these efforts are designed to lower labor cost or to increase consumption, which is the only way to maintain global competitiveness (FDP, 2002, pp. 3-8). Globalization and technological advances have significant effects upon the German labor market, devaluing unskilled labor and increasing the need for a highly trained and skilled workforce. This requires more flexibility and effort from society. The principle of quid pro quo must dominate the welfare state; in this context Germany must move away from the principle of collective responsibility and embrace the idea of individual responsibility. Only a strong personal effort warrants later intervention of the state on one's behalf (FDP, 2002, pp. 8-10). Another way to reduce indirect labor costs must include a more flexible and economic health care sector. The core principle of health care is individual choice when it comes to premiums and services; a one size fits all approach is not economical. There must be more choice for individuals between government mandated health care insurance and

private alternatives. The principle of increased individual responsibility also guides the FDP's retirement policies: There has to be more private retirement investment. On the one hand more individual responsibility and choice and on the other, more private options and less government involvement best define FDP policies (FDP, 2002, pp. 10-16).

According to the FDP education is the most neglected element of German politics and it is time for liberal policies to guide education. After all, education is a right of every citizen and the right education system creates people with solid general knowledge and the necessary technical skills for their field along with the required social competency to perform in the job market. Germany's international competitiveness primarily depends on how well people are prepared for the job market and their ability to adapt to future challenges (FDP, 2002, p. 29). Private organized forms of education are a welcome alternative to the government centric approach and are to receive the same kind of financial support as public entities would. Children are to be assessed and receive targeted lesson plans that help them to overcome specific weaknesses that they might have. This is especially important for immigrant children who learn German as a second language. In general, there should be more competition between different schools and universities as well as more flexibility for choosing specialized education and to approaches to schooling. It is the FDP's goal to ensure equal opportunities for all children in Germany, but it rejects the expectation of equal outcomes (FDP, 2002, pp. 30-37). In terms of postsecondary education, the FDP calls for improved vocational training that conveys more internationally transferable skills and more individuality for universities. Universities must compete for the best talent domestically, but also internationally. Germany's reputation for research and development must be increased internationally. In

order to achieve these goals the FDP promotes more flexibility and autonomy for universities (FDP, 2002, pp. 38-41).

Other important issues in this campaign are families, immigration and culture. Families are the heart of a society, where family is defined as a living arrangement that involves children. The FDP's stance is that families need more financial and structural support, which is why the party suggests things like additional tax relief or more flexible child care and education offers for families (FDP, 2002, pp. 47-49). Immigration is also addressed by the FDP with the goal to actively steer immigration so as to influence who comes into the country, and who does not. Language skills are a key determinant for eligibility and new immigrants must participate in mandatory language classes if they lack sufficient proficiency, because the ability to communicate with others is vital for effective integration. Furthermore, integration has to be improved so that immigrants can be productive and contributing members of society. Interestingly enough, the FDP specifically states that integration does not mean assimilation, which fits with the party's overall pluralistic world view (FDP, 2002, pp. 61-64). In terms of culture the FDP only expresses great appreciation for culture and states that is valuable for a free and liberal society. A new point in this context, for the 2002 platform, is the call for preserving Germany's historic legacy, which includes the German language, music, fine arts, as well as architecture (FDP, 2002, p. 68).

When it comes to Germany's security and role in a global world, the FDP builds upon trusted organizations such as NATO, the UN and the EU. A special focus is placed on advocating within the UN for human rights, especially gender quality, and better environmental protection. A particularly important point in this context of the EU is its

enlargement in Eastern Europe, because it will increase stability and prosperity. The enlarged common market is a tremendous opportunity for Germany's economy and the best answer to a globalized world. This is why the shared currency is vital, because it reduces the cost of transnational transactions and thereby increases competitiveness (FDP, 2002, pp. 78-84, p. 87). In terms of trade the FDP promotes the notion that trade is good for all states, and better access to markets for developing countries is key to improving their position. Free trade is the foundation for prosperity; it is the solution and not the problem according to the FDP. The WTO is a vital organization for improving market entry especially for poor countries who need better access to the rich world's agricultural markets. Additionally, the WTO must continue its quest for abolishing trade barriers, which in combination with technological progress, deregulation, and standardized regulations will increase global prosperity, especially in the developing world (FDP, 2002, p. 81, pp. 85-86).

7.1.5 The 2005 Election

For this early election, the FDP starts by summarizing the recent public debate about the challenges and opportunities of globalization, the risks and costs of an overextended social state, and the need for society to adapt to an increasingly aging population. The best solution to these issues is individual freedom, because the individual pursuit of happiness is what will guarantee the best collective outcome. The FDP presents a complete concept that is designed to realize this freedom through a market based economic renewal. At its core this renewal will focus on creating jobs through education and research in a liberal social state (FDP, 2005, p. 1). As the party states, this is not an

easy undertaking, because many people view freedom as insecure, individual responsibility as a breeding ground for selfishness, increasing local responsibility as weakening of the federal government, and assertions by the FDP for solidarity are regarded as hollow verbal commitments (FDP, 2005, p. 2).

The party sticks with its traditional recipe for growth and prosperity. The FDP's most important goal is to create an environment that generates more employment opportunities. The primary path for getting there is through drastic simplification of the tax code and significant reduction of taxes in general. Combined with decreasing the indirect labor cost, by for example switching to private health care options or new retirement options with generally later retirement, this will lead to more jobs which in turn means less government spending on various types of support plus more contributions to the welfare system through gainful employment. As a result, government budget's will not be strained anymore and lost revenue from tax cuts will be offset (FDP, 2005, pp. 4-12). Additionally, the introduction of a citizen payment is supposed to bundle all existing forms of government support under one administrative scheme. Thus, complexity will be reduced and transparency increased, and administrative cost for the government will be significantly reduced by administering all forms of payment through the finance ministry as a form of tax rebate (FDP, 2005, pp. 7-10). Dissolving the government agency for labor (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) as well will save additional administrative cost and allow for private entities to take over some of the agency's function, especially the job and placing services (FDP, 2005, pp. 14-15). The goal of all labor market and welfare policies must be a situation in which it is always more profitable for people to work than to receive government support. Otherwise a structural incentive to *not* work exists, which

cannot be in the best interest of a society (FDP, 2005, p. 8).

Additional ways of increasing employment for the FDP include more competition, which means getting rid of monopolies especially government ones as well as increasing flexibility on the job market. As the export world champion who profits from open markets, it is important for Germany to make adjustments to retain that position. One important way of doing this is by avoiding any form of minimum wage, because it only aggravates problems in the labor market. In fact, the job market has come back to being an actual market, which requires flexible company specific solutions and not industry wide collective wage agreements. Instead, companies need better work councils that give employees a stake and a say in their firms. Companies also need more flexibility to respond to markets which necessitates contracts that make it easier to fire people in times of a downturn (FDP, 2005, pp. 12-14).

Education must be restructured in Germany to allow every child equal opportunities in life. This must especially include preschool tests that assess the ability of each student to succeed in school. Here, a special focus must be placed on language capabilities and if necessary extra learning opportunities must be made available to ensure that all students are on an equal footing by the time they enter first grade so that they all can follow and comprehend what is being taught. According to the FDP, there need to be more options for all-day schools and a school system that is designed for 12 years and not the traditional 13. When it comes to tertiary education the FDP calls for more competition and excellence of German universities and generally more freedom, which includes the right to charge tuition. This is a reversal from previous positions (FDP, 2005, pp. 22-24)

Other issues that the FDP addresses in 2005 are environmental standards, gender equality, and culture. In terms of environmental policies, the FDP suggests shared binding European standards that increase protection but are, at the same time, not bureaucratic. They pursue a primarily market based approached that incentivizes environmentally friendly behavior because of cost savings, such as the reduction of energy costs or the implementation of an emissions trading scheme. In this way, modern market driven methods and environmental protection can be brought into harmony. This process will be become faster in the future as research and development increases and becomes less bureaucratic (FDP, 2005, p. 18, pp. 25-27). With regards to gender equality, besides the FDP's general support for the issue, this time the party presents a new idea, which is to get rid of the income tax rule that allows couples to have one income taxed at a lower rate at the expense of the other income, which gets taxed at a higher rate. This exponentially reduces the net contribution of the lower income and reduces the incentive to work for the spouse who gets paid less due to the lower rate of return. It is usually men who earn more money and then in turn are placed in more favorable tax class at the expense of their spouse. This sends the wrong signal because it undervalues the performance of women and discourages them from contributing to the labor force. The state needs to additionally contribute strongly to the expansion of child care facilities to allow families more flexibility and to allow both parents to work or to make it easier for single parents to earn a living (FDP, 2005, p. 34). Art and culture is an important field that has significant value for society and that requires more government and private support. The goal of state support for art and culture must be the preservation and further development of the cultural legacy including the German language. As with the 1998

platform, it is not really clear what this cultural legacy is, but in contrast to the CDU it is not defined as specifically German.

In the final chapter of the 2005 program the FDP lays out its plan for more international cooperation. The chapter begins by describing the success story of the EU and by highlighting the peaceful cooperation among the people of Europe as the foundation of this achievement. According to the FDP the EU must be a dynamic economy in a globalized world and a drive for performance, high educational standards, and open markets will lead to further economic success. This is why strengthening the EU has to remain a focal point of German foreign policy. The following are especially important in this context: enforcement of the subsidiarity principle, the reduction of subsidies, more investment in education, the ratification of a European constitution, and giving more power to the European Parliament. The FDP wants to cooperate more with the UN, NATO, the USA, China and Russia. They also emphasize more collaboration with Asia and the Middle East (FDP, 2005, pp. 44-48). Globalization is an opportunity for growth and prosperity from the FDP's point of view. Isolation and the erection of barriers only cause a significant loss of wealth and would harm Germany, because it has especially profited from globalization. The export dependence of Germany's economy means that there are few states that profit as much from open markets as Germany. Mass unemployment and loss of social cohesion are not caused by globalization but by a lack of domestic reforms. Globalization cannot be stopped, but one can decide to profit from globalization. Accordingly, the FDP supports the creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area and free trade between rich and developing countries, which in combination with a strengthened WTO is the only way to overcome the prosperity gap. Direct development

aid is also helpful, but here, the guiding principle must be quality over quantity. Additionally, aid must be used to build up liberty, the rule of law, and market economies (FDP, 2005, pp. 49-50).

7.1.6 The 2009 Election

The Liberals start their 2009 program with the basic premise that all political actions must be guided by prioritizing some principles over others. These principles are: freedom over equality, production over redistribution, private over state, personal responsibility over faith in government, and equal opportunities instead of attempting to equalize outcomes. Those who want more freedom and equal opportunities in Germany need to vote for the FDP, because it is the only party that will promote more freedom and responsibility and less government paternalism (FDP, 2009, p. 2). Germany must prepare itself for the future and this is best achieved by allowing people to develop without restrictions. Responsible citizens know that the government does not take care of all their problems, but they must also be able to trust that the state will not create new burdens for them (FDP, 2009, p. 2). Besides the goal to increase freedom and individual responsibility they also promote the successful social market economy because it generates wealth. For the FDP, a core element of the social market economy is a government that creates a framework for individuals and markets, but one that does not seek to interfere with them (FDP, 2009, p. 3). In essence, the state creates an equal playing field and provides basic rules and regulations that are primarily designed to produce fair chances for everyone, but the state does not care how the game is played or the outcome of the game. The social market economy can unleash its full potential (FDP,

2009, p. 5).

One important element for achieving this vision is fairer, lower, and simpler taxes. This is why the FDP wants to introduce a tax exemption of 8000 Euros for every family member and a maximum income tax rate of 35% percent. In order to create more equality between multiple people with income in one household, the FDP will rescind the opportunity to tax one income lower at the expense of the other. Another important reform in regard to taxation is a restructuring of corporate taxes with the intent to lower them and to make German companies more competitive (FDP, 2009, pp. 6-7). These tax cuts will be made possible by more budget discipline from the government at all levels as well as through the introduction of a citizen payment. This will be more cost effective, because it bundles all forms of government support and transfer schemes under the finance ministry, thus reducing complexity and increasing transparency, while at the same time cutting the state's administrative costs for these programs (FDP, 2009, pp. 8-9). In the wake of the financial crisis, the FDP also addresses the need for better financial regulation and supervision. However, it is also important to note that the crisis is not an indication of market failure, but of government failure. The solution is better regulation and more company internal supervision and review (FDP, 2009, pp. 9-10). The Liberals also foster more environmental protection, especially in the form of reducing energy consumption, for which the signing of a global energy reduction agreement would be vital. The FDP wants to invest more into new technologies, in particular into renewable energy sources, to reduce the consumption of coal, oil, and gas. Emissions trading is also a helpful tool to reduce pollution, but this must also include all forms of transportation. The Liberals also emphasize protecting biodiversity and using natural resources,

including fish, in a more sustainable manner (FDP, 2009, pp. 52-64).

A flexible labor market is essential for a dynamic, prosperous and free society as well, which is why the Liberals reject industry wide collective bargaining or any form of minimum wage, because that only destroys jobs. Wage negotiations must take place in a decentralized atmosphere and be based upon the needs and opportunities of each company. The cost for work councils must also be reduced, by reducing the number of legally required members of a company that have to be on such a council (FDP, 2009, pp. 11-15). There is further potential for job creation if the indirect labor cost can be reduced. One option for achieving this is to cut company subsidized health spending for government health care options, or the lack thereof. Cost can be cut by allowing for more choice and private alternatives that offer different rates and services. Another way of reducing cost is by allowing new ways of paying for retirement, for example instead of increasing retirement contributions, employees should have options to save according to their own preferences and to rely more heavily on private saving. A fixed retirement age is also anachronistic in the 21st century. Older people still want to contribute and use their skills. This is why flexible options, including part-time work, are much more sensible. Long term care must be organized based upon individual choice, with the state bearing the responsibility to provide a basic framework of care, but the details must be flexible and individually adjustable (FDP, 2009, pp. 16-21).

In the 2009 election program, for the first time, the FDP takes the position that Germany is an immigration country which needs to actively steer immigration so as to influence who comes to Germany based on a point system, where desirable skills and qualifications guarantee additional points. Lack of language skills still means that such

immigrants have to take mandatory language classes. In general, the FDP views immigrants and their respective cultures as an opportunity and a benefit to Germany's society. The party also regards dual citizenship as a tool for increasing identification for immigrants with their new nation (FDP, 2009, pp. 36-37). In terms of culture, the FDP only expresses great appreciation for culture, because it is the foundation of society and it deserves more government and private support. The goal of the FDP in this regard is to include everyone in the shaping and production of culture (FDP, 2009, p. 37). The FDP views the promotion of German culture and language abroad as a tool for increasing German influence, but also as a means for fostering cooperation and understanding, which is increasingly important in times of globalization (FDP, 2009, p. 69).

Again, education takes on a crucial role for the FDP, because it is the key to freedom, to social participation, and personal happiness and prosperity. Education can overcome any socio-economic, cultural, or religious background so that everyone can determine their own destiny regardless of their parents' position within society. Education is the essential social question within society, according to the FDP, which is why they commit 7% percent of Germany's GDP to education and another 3% of GDP to research and development. Besides less bureaucracy, more decentralized decisions, and more competition between alternative forms of primary and secondary education, the party's most novel element is the voucher system that parents can use for their children once they reach 1 year of age. These vouchers will allow them to use various forms of free offers for their children, like arts and crafts programs, music, physical activities, or early education. Language proficiency is also very important to the Liberals, which is why they want to introduce mandatory tests for all children once they turn 4 years old to

assess their language abilities and to provide special support where necessary, so that all children can fully participate once they reach elementary school. Furthermore, continuing education is becoming increasingly important in a globalized world, which is why the FDP is calling for more cooperation between schools, universities and other forms of adult learning to improve the quality and opportunities for continuous learning in order to improve the skills and abilities of Germany's work force. Universities are to compete more directly with one another and have more flexibility regarding the degrees they offer. Better education is allowed to cost more, which is why the FDP continues to support university tuition (FDP, 2009, pp. 42-47).

The FDP's international policies are designed to promote rule of law, democracy, and the social market economy, because these principles are the best guarantee for peace, freedom, and prosperity, which are the ultimate goals of the FDP's foreign policy. These goals are best achieved through cooperation with allies and through international organizations. Besides promoting prosperity, the Liberals also call for widespread disarmament and comprehensive arms controls (FDP, 2009, pp. 66-67). The EU is also a vital issue for the FDP, because the EU is Germany's answer to globalization and the means through which globalization's potential can be best harnessed. It is through the EU's common market that Germany can fully unfold its strengths, because it allows for unimpeded competition, which is the best engine for growth and prosperity. Additionally, the EU provides a unified voice and the ability to shape international outcomes much more effectively than individual states could and the Euro provides stability against financial shocks and lowers transaction cost which, again, increases competitiveness (FDP, 2009, pp. 70-71). The Liberals also object to any form of protectionism when it

comes to international trade. This includes calls from national leaders to buy national brands or any form of competition distorting subsidies. Markets must be open and concluding the ongoing Doha Round would be the best defense against protectionism (FDP, 2009, p. 72).

7.1.7 The 2013 Election

The beginning of the FDP's 2013 program focuses on growth, because growth enables everyone to rise. The goal is that everyone in Germany has the opportunity to improve their social standing through their individual effort. The most important factor for enabling such a rise is the social market economy, because it is the foundation for prosperity, progress, and growth in Germany (FDP, 2013, pp. 7-8). Policies for which the FDP advocates in order to facilitate this goal are a stable currency, national responsibility for national debt within the European monetary union, simpler and lower taxes, less bureaucracy, more deregulation, competitive energy markets, and financial rules that are both leaner and more effective (FDP, 2013, pp. 8-22). This first chapter unusually entails a section about globalization, which is traditionally addressed by the FDP in their last chapter. Here, the FDP points out the enormous opportunities that globalization and more international cooperation can bring. It is only necessary to remove obstacles that prevent cooperation and create more freedom for individuals. As an export nation, Germany requires free trade and not export restrictions, even as a tool to reduce a trade surplus. Germany will only succeed under future competition with states like China, Brazil, and India when Europe comes together and becomes stronger, not by becoming weaker (FDP, 2013, pp. 22-23). Free trade also helps in the global fight against poverty, which is why

the FDP consistently fights for reduction of trade obstacles and trade liberalization. Open markets generate increased utility for everyone as they create progress, growth, and new jobs. Through trade, states with a low natural resource endowment can peacefully secure scarce resources they would otherwise be lacking. Trade also creates new markets and interaction between nations which ultimately leads to understanding and peace (FDP, 2013, p. 23).

Education is an important component for the FDP, because it creates opportunities and allows for a self-determined life. This is why education must become more comprehensive and develop into a lifelog endeavor. Education must be more accessible for children who do not come from an affluent or highly educated home and it must be more targeted at the specific needs of children. This is best achieved through policies and lesson plans that are locally determined. Additionally, education must not create path dependencies, but rather allow for second chances (FDP, 2013, pp. 25-28). Reforming the social safety net remains an important issue for the FDP in 2013 as well, because it creates more equality and lowers indirect labor cost which is vital for job creation. One thing the party is particularly proud of is the reduction of government interventions in the economy during the last legislative period, so as to keep the labor market open and flexible. One big obstacle to market entry according to the FDP, is a minimum wage or industry wide collective bargaining, which is why the party consistently objects to those issues. Instead, it is more effective to reduce costs, by increasing equality and transparency through the citizens' payment, more flexible retirement regulations, and a health care system that accommodates individual needs and preferences (FDP, 2013, pp. 30-37).

The FDP also communicates its usual views about families, homosexuality, gender equality, immigration, and culture. It is interesting to note that the FDP's goal of building an inclusive, multicultural society with equality for everyone is justified and even considered essential in order for Germany to persist in a globalized world, because there is a great need for diversity and flexibility in the 21st century (FDP, 2013, pp. 39-48)

7.2 Initial Election Program Analysis

The following section is a basic analysis of the five key terms as they appear in all seven FDP election programs. A detailed explanation of how the programs were analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regards to the key terms can be found in Chapter 4.3. Figure 7.1 illustrates all direct references regarding globalization sorted according to the five key terms. The FDP started using the term globalization, out of the seven programs analyzed by this study, in 1998. Of the five analyzed terms, it is also the one that is most often used by the FDP, which is unusual, when compared to the other major German parties. While the overall number of mentions of globalization, trade, and exports are largely even throughout the seven programs, if one takes out the two early elections when the FDP did not refer to globalization at all, the picture becomes different. Since 1998 there are almost as many globalization references as there are combined trade and export ones. This demonstrates the party's relative ease and comfort in using the term globalization within its election programs, which is a good deal higher, with 39 references, than most other major German parties, [1] except for the Greens who use the

[1] Globalization references by the other major German parties: CDU 20, SPD 29, Greens 60, and The Left 13

term 60 times, but the Greens also have the longest combined page count for all seven programs with over 1000 pages. The FDP only makes it to slightly above 600 pages, meaning that the saliency of globalization is higher in FDP programs than it is in those of the Green party. A similar observation can be made in regard to free trade, to which the FDP refers in all of its programs, except in the 1990 program. None of the references mention free trade in a negative context and the total of 13 references is also much higher than the average references of Germany's other parties of only four.[2] In contrast, the issue of imports is hardly discussed at all by the FDP, except for the five instances in the party's 2009 program, which addressed imports of biomass and electrical energy. It is interesting that even the party that is so overtly in favor of trade and globalization does not address imports with the relevance that the issue has for Germany's economy. The Federal Republic's manufacturing sector, which imports goods from all over the world, could not be the self-proclaimed export world champion (FDP, 2005, p. 12) without the intricate network of global suppliers that manufacture subcomponents for Germany's exports. This fact finds no mention in the FDP election programs; instead the issue is only mentioned in regard to relatively marginal issues of biomass and electricity imports.

By looking at the normative meaning that goes along with any of the globalization key terms as highlighted by Figure 7.2, one can easily see that the FDP refers to the five key terms more often in a positive context than in a negative one, which is not surprising since it is congruent with the party's general positive disposition when it comes to issues of trade and competition. It is very interesting that almost all references that emphasized the potential risks or negative outcomes appear almost exclusively prior to the 2002

[2] Free trade references by the other major German parties: CDU 4, SPD 1, Greens 3, and The Left 8

election. At the same time, most references about the opportunities and potential benefits that can result from increased trade and globalization occur in the same time frame. Starting with the 2002 election, comments about the five key terms that relate to dangers or risks as well as opportunities sharply declined, whereas the references that relate the crucial terms with positive outcomes have markedly increased. This suggests that the FDP abandoned its mixed opinions about globalization and economic interdependence at the start of the 21st century, in favor of an almost unequivocal commitment to globalization and trade.

While Figure 7.2 shows an aggregate summary for all key terms, it falls short of identifying how the FDP regards each of the individual terms. This is why the following paragraphs look at each key term individually, starting with trade, which is undoubtedly the issue that the FDP refers to most often as leading to desirable outcomes. Approximately 25% deal with trade in a neutral manner or highlight its potential benefits. Only 8% of all trade references in FDP election programs have some form of negative context. Additionally, the instances that fall in this category are either critical of trading certain small subsegments of the overall traded share of goods (FDP, 2009, p. 62), or they simply state that a particular element of trade creates challenges that need to be addressed and overcome (FDP, 2002, p. 77), but nothing that could be qualified as a critique of the principle of trade itself (see Figure 7.3). The same is even more true for the expression *free trade* which is used 12 times in a positive context and only once in a neutral one (see Figure 7.4). This fits perfectly with the Liberal's strong belief that competition without obstacles leads to more jobs, more prosperity, more freedom, and more innovation. References to globalization are relatively numerous and close to a third of them highlight

the positive effects of the phenomenon, especially to new opportunities that it can bring to Germany's society and economy.

A little bit less than half of all globalization statements are neutral in nature (see Figure 7.5). This ratio is largely due to the party's 1998 program, which mentions the issue 11 times. Many of them are simply used as a backdrop to justify some policy, for example, because we live in a globalized world we need a particular education policy (FDP, 1998, p. 25). These statements are not intended to say anything about globalization itself; instead the term is more used as a rhetoric tool in that particular election campaign. The 25% of negative references, simply express that globalization creates challenges (for example FDP, 1998, p. 5 or FDP, 2002, p. 84).

When it comes to exports and imports the picture is more mixed. The largest single group of references to exports in the seven examined FDP election programs mentions the issue in a negative context. The remaining references to exports are almost evenly split between neutral and positive ones (see Figure 7.6). The negative references are predominantly from the first three election programs and relate to arms or waste exports. One additional negative export reference points out the dependence of Germany's economy on exports in the 2005 election (FDP, 2005, p. 49). Overall, one can say that the FDP does not view exports in a negative light, especially over the last decade.

With regards to imports there are only eight instances where they mention the issue, which surely is not much. Twice, the party mentions electricity imports as a good means for increasing competition in the energy market and to lower cost for consumers (FDP, 2009, pp. 53-54). The remaining mentioning of imports is either neutral or negative (see Figure 7.7). The negative references are negligible as they focus on

marginal issues such as imports of small arms or standards for biomass imports. The one really interesting reference is from 1994, in which the party highlights the export opportunities and the import pressures for the German economy (FDP, 1994, p. 31).

7.3 Comparing Election Programs to Globalization and Political Parties

The following section addresses the questions and hypothesis that are outlined in Table 2.1 at the end of Chapter 2 and Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Brawly's (1997) argument about the need to look at the issue of partial factor mobility is not addressed by the FDP. It is most likely not feasible for a party to address partial factor mobility in an election campaign, due to the topic's complexity and the party's desire to make broad statements that attract as many voters as possible. This also explains why Midford's (1993) question about how parties address labor subgroups can be easily answered: they do not distinguish between subgroups. The question of volatility as defined by Woodruff (2005) as fluctuating between economic growth and recession is only marginally addressed by the FDP. The issue of reunification and its economic impact are rather less important to the FDP and likewise the issue of the global financial crisis barely registered in the party's 2009 election program. Since the FDP was the junior partner to a CDU-led government prior to four out of the seven examined federal elections, the FDP had an incentive more often than not to be associated with a Germany that experienced stability and not one that was engulfed in turmoil. For the three elections during which the FDP campaigned as an opposition party, the Liberals spent way more attention on blaming Germany's social and economic problems on an attitude of entitlements and government

handouts, which is perpetuated by SPD governments. This is much easier to communicate to voters than to explain to voters the consequences that economic cycles have on trade and consequently also on employment.

The issue of labor unions and their role in a globalized world is addressed by Garst (1998), wherein he asserts that it is important to ask what kind of positions parties take on the issue of labor unions. This is relevant as parties can be a vital instrument for promoting globalization due to their ability to organize support for trade liberalization and to help distribute the gains from trade more equitably. The FDP does not spend much time on trade unions. The message that they communicate about unions is that their influence must be curbed and instead that works councils should gain in influence (FDP, 1990, p. 39). Additionally, the special privileges that unions enjoy within works councils is supposed to be tossed as well (FDP, 2005, p. 14). The advantage that works councils present for the FDP over labor unions is that collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer representatives are often negotiated for whole industries, whereas the agreements between works councils and companies are very specific. This means that these negotiations can much better meet the specific needs of employees and the company (FDP, 2002, p. 7). According to the FDP this creates flexibility, adaptability, and innovation which are drivers for growth and new employment opportunities. Agreements between employers' associations and trade unions are, according to the Liberals, a significant entry barrier for the unemployed, especially those who are long-term unemployed. More flexibility and specific exceptions from collective bargaining agreements for the unemployed will create more opportunities for them (FDP, 1994, p. 19). It is only in the 2013 election that the FDP speaks out in favor of trade unions and

collective bargaining for individual industries, but this appears to be motivated less by a genuine belief in trade unions and labor unions, but as a means to suppress calls for a national minimum wage (FDP, 2013, pp. 30-31). In other words, unions are not a viable partner for the FDP when it comes to building a prosperous German economy that shares its gains equitably.

Caproso (1997) addressed the idea that parties regularly use globalization as a subject to deflect attention from other issues, instead of presenting meaningful policy suggestions that actually deal with globalization. The FDP certainly does not use the issue of globalization for scapegoating. The party views the changes that go along with a globalized world as a challenge (FDP, 1998, p. 5) that no longer allows for global compartmentalizing. Most problems in the 21st century are of a global nature and as such, affect Germany too. An attitude of "that is someone else's problem" is not productive; instead obstacles need to be addressed and overcome (FDP, 2013, p. 91). The FDP is quite optimistic that Germany can master those challenges by deregulating and decentralizing to unleash individual ambition and creativity, because it is not the government but rather the efforts of individuals who will help to harness the full potential of globalization. When it comes to presenting meaningful policies with regards to globalization, the FDP has two primary issues for which it advocates, besides deregulation and the reduction of direct and indirect trade barriers. One is more decentralization of the education system and a special emphasis on preparing students for the globalized world (FDP, 1994, p. 20). The other is to emphasize the need for Europe to act in a more unified manner, to speak and act with one voice (FDP, 2009, p. 70). The FPD also believes that globalization creates much more awareness for human rights

issues from all over the world and in turn more willingness and resources to improve human rights problems (FDP, 2009, p. 76). The best way to sum up the message that the Liberals are communicating with regard to globalization is probably from the 1998 election program. Here, the party asserts that globalization is a chance for growth, open markets, promoting peace, and increasing prosperity, through an international division of labor und the free exchange of ideas, services, goods, and capital (FDP, 1998, p. 91).

Regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement can be important issues for voters and can affect support for or opposition to globalization (Ranjan & Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000), which is why it is relevant to look at how the FDP addresses this issue in their election campaigns. In 1994, the Liberals asserted that Germany must be actively involved in setting and determining global standards (FDP, 1994, p. 32). The remainder of that year's election program entails various specific examples of areas in which the German government should be actively involved. These areas include traffic policies that need to be coordinated and harmonized across Europe, due to increasing cross-border traffic (FDP, 1994, p. 75). Other issues that allegedly need a unified approach are the harmonization of asylum policies (FDP, 1994, p. 129), Europe-wide environmental standards (FDP, 1994, p. 128), and of course harmonized tax policies (FDP, 1994, p. 15). Other FDP election programs are not as prolific with calls for regulatory harmonization; nevertheless, there are some instances particularly when it comes to tax laws. More important is the observation that harmonization for the FDP does not mean that others need to adopt German standards, but rather to look for and adopt the best regulation. For the FDP, this usually means a solution that requires less regulation and government involvement. For example, in 2002 the party specifically states that there is no need for

special German regulations that do not exist in other countries (FDP, 2002, p. 23) and that all such existing regulations that exceed EU requirements will have to undergo a rigorous necessity test (FDP, 2005, p. 20). In 2009, they warn that additional domestic regulations for the agricultural sector will cause production to go abroad (FDP, 2009, p. 23). Contract enforcement does not feature too prominently in FDP election programs, but there are occasional instances such as the call for the WTO to be more actively involved in the defense of intellectual property rights (FDP, 1998, p. 71), the demand to uphold European competition laws (FDP, 1994, p. 32), or the request for the ECB not to deviate from its mandate not to use monetary measures to solve government finances issues of individual members' states (FDP, 2013, p. 83). However, the most prominent call by the FDP for contract enforcement is one is from 1994, when the party called for the establishment of a European law academy, which would ensure a unified understanding and implementation of laws across Europe. The target group of this academy would not only be judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, but also economic experts and government employees (FDP, 1994, p. 60). The way the FDP addresses contract enforcement and regulatory harmonization is closely aligned with the Liberals' core principles of less red tape and more individual freedom. In that regard, this message should fit well with the FDP's core constituency, but it might deter those who are afraid of a deterioration of German standards through increased global involvement.

Martin (2000) and Hays (2009) addressed the point that it is important for political parties to communicate their goals with respect to international agreements to voters and to examine if they offer voters clear choices. In terms of the FDP, the answer is relatively straightforward: The party is pretty consistent and clear in its approach to

international agreements. This means, in particular, working through international institutions. For example, when it comes to security and stability, the FDP is clearly committed to NATO and seeks to strengthen the role of the organization beyond the Cold War, by using it to promote nuclear disarmament (FDP, 1998, pp. 94-95; FDP, 2002, p. 88; FDP, 2005, p. 51). Another important policy goal that the FDP pursues in regard to international organizations is the general support and strengthening of the UN, but also reform of the organization so that it better reflects the political and economic realities of the 21st century, which of course, among other things, means more influence and power for Germany (FDP, 2005, p. 67). The FDP also claims that more human rights issues must be addressed and solved within the framework of the UN (FDP, 2013, p. 90)

As a key element for economic growth, peace and stability, as well as to ensure that Germany's interest are represented at the international stage, the FDP has always pushed for freedom of cross border movement of people, goods, and services. The necessary freedom and cooperation is best achieved through a process of institutionalization, which is why the FDP pushes for a European union (FDP, 1990, pp. 23-24). The Liberals certainly see European integration as a tool for stability and peace in its own right, but the greatest potential for Germany is derived from the common market and the best answer to a globalized world (FDP, 2002, p. 80). Trade liberalization is one of the FDP's primary foreign policy objectives. This is why the party welcomes the completion of the Uruguay Round (FDP, 1994, p. 135), and demands the finalization of the Doha Round (FDP, 2009, p. 72). The Liberals send a very clear message to voters that they support the efforts of the WTO to reduce trade obstructions and to provide more opportunities for increased market access. Additional goals include ensuring that the

WTO makes a larger effort to increase competition through mutually respected rules, in order to build global competition rules (FDP, 2002, p. 85). This is the best approach for Germany's future because, as a nation that has a highly export oriented economy, is it essential to secure open, free, and fair markets. In order to combat economic nationalism FDP continues to support the WTO and call for the completion of the Doha round (FDP, 3005, p. 15).

Another previously identified topic in the literature on globalization is the domestic response of political elites to the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). This is crucial because it is an indispensable factor for alleviating fears of social instability and a loss of prosperity through globalization. The FDP pursues an assertive market liberalization strategy and communicates this to voters. An integral part of the FDP's campaign programs is also a smaller and less involved government in general, but also one that provides less support to those who depend on various forms of social services. There is no mention in the FDP's campaign programs that there is a tradeoff between openness and increased need for support. The simple answer by the Liberals is that free trade helps fight poverty, or in other words, more free trade means less poverty. The simplicity of this logic will do little to persuade anyone to embrace more openness if they feel they are threatened under an increasingly competitive global economic order. The consistent undercurrent that competition and competitiveness is essential, is what the FDP communicates to voters with their more than 560 references throughout the seven election programs. Strongly increasing competition and a slim state create a potent combination that certainly creates a measure of anxiety for people who feel threatened by such developments, which is naturally a most distressing concern for

those individuals who are less educated or lack marketable and specialized skills. If the FDP would find a way to call for trade liberalization, more competition and less government intervention on markets without reducing the social safety net that government traditionally provides, the FDP would have more success persuading Germans of the merits that follow globalization. Currently, the FDP's globalization message should only appeal to those who are economically better off and are highly skilled, because they need to worry much less than the average citizen about becoming marginalized.

The final relevant theoretical argument that must be addressed is the issue of identity. Emphasizing a European identity is generally a useful tool for most European countries to decrease nationalistic attitudes that are opposed to globalization (Anderson, 2003; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Rankin, 2004). Careful examination of FDP election programs does not show an active promotion of a European identity. There are only a few references about identity that refer to culture as an important part of forming and solidifying identities (FDP, 2013, p. 49). Culture is also the source of identity and an engine for creativity and innovation (FDP, 2005, p. 39). The type of culture that the FDP describes is not based on any nationalistic criteria and everyone is invited to join the process of creating art and shaping culture. The only exception to this general rule is the German language which is clearly defined as an element of the culture that must be protected and further developed. While the party has a very positive outlook on the idea of Europe, this is all on a natural matter-of-fact basis, without any underlying emotional attachment that would resemble an identity, with one exception. In the most recent election, the FDP states that European student exchanges help foster friendship and

cooperation, and thereby strengthen European identity (FDP, 2013, p. 81). In a nutshell, the FDP does not play with nationalistic rhetoric in their election campaign and thereby does not impede potential developments of a European identity for voters, but the party also does not really do anything to nurture an emotional attachment to and identification with the European institutions that are largely key for Germany's economic success within the common market.

7.4 Conclusion of FDP Analysis

The FDP is the only German party that is strongly in favor of economic trade and that wants to strengthen the institutions that promote more open trade and increased access to markets. Voters cannot walk away from a Liberal election program and wonder about the FDP's advocacy for economic globalization: It's very clearly laid out. However, the German electorate will certainly wonder if they should vote for a party that is promoting globalization in order to increase competition and individual freedom/responsibility. A lot of the FDP's policy proposals focus on reducing government involvement in favor of individual choice or the reduction of regulations and protections so that German competitiveness is increased. The problem for voters will be that in many instances replacing a standardized government service with a catalogue of options that people can choose from only means more choice if the various options are affordable. If one cannot afford to choose anything but the cheapest option, there is no increased freedom. If people link globalization with a need to increase competitiveness by creating choices between alternative options of government services than a more open world will deter those people who are afraid that they will be forced into buying the

cheapest government services that are inferior to premium options that the better-off can afford. If the FDP is serious about promoting globalization among a broad spectrum of voters then it must address the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra; 2002). Otherwise it is unlikely that most Germans will accept globalization if it means both increased competition and less government support for those who do not perform at the highest level.

Another dilemma is the FDP's communication with voters over imports. The biggest problem with globalization is if people think of it as a zero-sum game, because then globalization must always produce winners and losers. While trade liberalization certainly does create individual losers, it normally does not create economies that win and ones that lose. Trade generally creates competition, which leads to more specialization, higher productivity, more variety, more growth, and increased prosperity (see Chapter 2 for details), which in turn can be used to compensate those who lose from trade. However, the FDP, which is otherwise staunchly in favor of trade liberalization and competition, also indirectly communicates to voters the message the trade is a zero-sum game. This becomes apparent in the way the party talks about imports and exports. The FDP brags that Germany is the world's export champion (FDP, 2005, p. 12), but almost completely omits imports. The reason is that imports are seen as bad or losing and exporting goods and services is a sign of strength or winning. This type of zero-sum thinking leads to protectionism and oversimplifications, because any kind of economic downturn can easily be blamed on too many imports or a negative current account balance. It would be much to better communicate both sides of the same coin as positive things. Germany cannot be the self-proclaimed export world champion without imports.

Germany benefits hugely from the vast amount of goods that it imports, but these are benefits that are never articulated by the FDP. The FDP's goal should be to articulate an unequivocal message regarding the benefits of trade, because otherwise voters might conclude that protectionism is a viable solution during the next economic downturn.



Figure 7.1 FDP Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms



Figure 7.2 FDP Globalization References Sorted by their Normative Implication



Figure 7.3 FDP Trade References FDP



Figure 7.4 FDP Trade References



Figure 7.5 FDP Globalization References



Figure 7.6 FDP Export References



Figure 7.7 FDP Import References

CHAPTER 8

ALLIANCE ‘90/THE GREENS

Alliance '90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), usually simply referred to as Greens (Grüne), is a combination of a West German protest party and an East German civil liberties party. In its founding phase in the late 1970s, the Greens were a union of likeminded people rooted in the student protest movement of the 1960s. This movement viewed itself as an extra-parliamentary opposition to the established parties and the parliamentary system as a whole. At the time, a broad spectrum of the movement’s supporters were left-leaning radicals who rejected the idea of conceding government authority to conservatives. Its supporters were primarily motivated by environmental, antinuclear power, antiwar, and gender equality issues. In 1979, the first Green parties were formed at the state level (Landesverbände) and in January 1980, the party was formed at the federal level. Originally, the Greens were very heterogeneous, which led to a lot of conflict initially and groups that would soon leave the party. The first group to break with the Greens were the conservatives within the movement. This was a relatively painless separation. It was much more difficult for the left leaning radicals to leave as they considered it a betrayal of their principles when the Greens joined the SPD at the state level in a coalition to govern the state of Hesse. The party became divided into principalists, who oppose the political system and its inherent compromise in order to

generate majorities, and the realists who viewed participation in governments unavoidable if one wants to change society (Decker, 2016). The party was able to garner more than 5% of votes for the first time at the federal level in 1984, a feat the party has been able to replicate ever since, except in 1990 when they failed to adequately address the tremendous change that a unified Germany would experience.

In 1989, when the regime of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany began to crumble, various East German civil rights movements merged under the banner Alliance ‘90, including the East German Green party. Unlike the western Greens who failed to enter parliament, the Alliance ‘90 was able to enter the Bundestag with eight seats, due to the special provision of the 1990 election that allowed parties secure seats if they won 5% of votes in either West or East Germany. Later in 1993, the Alliance ’90 merged with the West German Greens into Alliance '90/The Greens. The members of the former civil rights movement felt marginalized within the new party. The fact that the Greens were unable to initially incorporate the ideas and values of its East German wing was also apparent in elections in the new states (Poguntke, 1998). The Greens were only able to improve this at the start of the new century by presenting a program that also appealed to citizens of the former German Democratic Republic by talking increasingly about questions of social equality. While the party was able to establish itself as the fourth politically relevant party since the mid-1980s, it was only able to form a governing coalition at the federal level in 1998 and 2002. The Greens have traditionally linked themselves to the SPD, but the Social Democrats have lost a significant share of the vote since 2005. Subsequently, the Greens opened themselves up to coalitions with the CDU, or CDU and FDP. While this worked at the state level, it was harder to find common

ground at the national. The Greens programs are traditionally characterized by a strong emphasis on environmental policies and the desire to achieve ecological, economical, and social sustainability.

A programmatic challenge for the future will be to continuously meet the demands of its voters. On the one hand, the Greens rely on the traditional voters who have supported the party from its beginning, due to its espoused values. On the other hand, many new supporters are economically privileged (Patton, 2014, p. 37), meaning the party has limited programmatic options, as social and economic policies that are too left will deter the Greens' new clientele. New opportunities arise for the party from its disproportional backing among young voters and its traditional strong female support (Decker, 2016).

8.1 Green Party Election Programs

This section summarizes the most important points from each election program as they relate to globalization. The goal is to identify the core message that the Alliance '90/The Greens communicates to voters for the examined 23-year time span in federal elections. The primary focus will be on globalization, trade and other economic issues, but the intent is also to look broadly at the message that is being communicated. This will be central for addressing the broad questions previously outlined in Chapter 3.

8.1.1 The 1990 Election

The Greens election program in 1990 is built upon the idea that Germany requires a new, complete rethink. The model of a society where the individual pursuit of one's

own interest would also be beneficial for society as a whole has failed. What is left is unjustifiable material and social injustice that that covers whole continents with poverty and leaves people destitute, but even in Germany, the self-centered model of society creates poverty and dependence. The way that humans currently ransack the environment will leave nothing but a poisonous planet behind. This is especially true if the wasteful industrial model of the rich states is expanded and forced upon the rest of the world. This is why a radical change of direction is necessary to build a sustainable economy that operates in harmony with the environment and not at its expense. It is necessary to implement a way of living that protects the diversity of plants and species, one which does not diminish them. The collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe must not be used as a justification to implement the destructive Western model of capitalism in that region. This is why the Greens offer an alternative model of society and for the economy (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 4-5).

Environmental protection is a core element of the Greens' platform and the party insists on the strong reduction of greenhouse gases and of carbon dioxide, because global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer are severe threats for humans and the environment. Economic growth and expansion must not be the goal of Germany's economic policies, but rather less waste and consumption. Energy efficient technologies must be especially supported. However, as the destruction of the environment is not solely a national problem it is essential that leading industrial states set common climate goals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 50% within 20 years, to globally share technologies that reduce energy consumption, and to abandon fossil fuel entirely by 2100. Additional goals include banning of chlorofluorocarbon, prohibiting genetically modified

crops, and restricting airline travel. For Germany, in particular, this means heavy taxes on fossil fuels, a mobility strategy that reduces the importance of the automobile in favor of public transportation, and by requiring that new cars only be outfitted with small, efficient, and environmentally friendly engines (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 8-12). The Greens also present a comprehensive program to protect the environment through more ecologically friendly production and consumption, as well as drastically improved recycling efforts. Special emphasis is also placed on changing the agricultural sector into an ecologically friendly and sustainable part of the economy.

Since the Cold War came to a peaceful end there is no need for Germany to be in any military alliance, including NATO, and a complete demilitarization of Germany is justified. This is why the party calls for a ban of all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons on German soil, the dissolving of Germany’s armed forces (the Bundeswehr), the removal of all foreign troops currently stationed in Germany, and banning any form of arms exports. This type of one-sided disarmament will send a strong signal to Germany’s partners and will become a vital element of Europe’s peaceful new order (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 18-20). The Greens also have a list of policies that they promise to implement once in power that will generate social rights and allow for more flexibility in the way that people organize their work life balance. The Greens promise that ecological necessities do not lead to more social injustice. The additional cost for building a sustainable economy will largely be paid for by those who command more resources. In order to protect anyone from being socially excluded from society, the Greens suggest a basic payment for those who fall below a minimum monthly income. Their social policies are clearly aimed at strengthening unions in their negotiations with

employers. The party also calls for abolishing contract labor and establishing equal benefits for part and full-time labor. In order to better manage work-life balance, the Greens call for an immediate, 35-hour work week and a gradual transformation to a 30-week. The party promises to implement a 50% quota for all new jobs which must be offered to women (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 22-25). They also take strong positions on health and housing policies. The Greens are squarely opposed to genetic research. They demand a system which eliminates co-payments for doctor visits or treatment, and better service offers for long-term care. This will be financed by those who possess an abundance of financial means. In terms of housing, the shortage of affordable living arrangements must be addressed by the state through government housing projects, but future projects need to focus on environmentally low-impact housing (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 25-28). The Greens also present various policies to increase gender equality within Germany’s society, and especially to grant more legal rights for women who are physically or sexually assaulted by men (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 29-34). The Greens call for more transparency of the state and less surveillance of its citizens and a state that promotes an open society with equal rights regardless of a resident’s nationality. A German nationalist identity must not be permitted and foreigners must be able to obtain German citizenship without abdicating their previous citizenship (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 36-38).

The Greens' foreign policy proposals are based upon the assumption that rich industrial countries have systematically exploited third world countries for centuries. This must change, through generating more support for the United Nations, and demanding that all states be regarded as equal within the UN framework. The UN must also pursue

an agenda that is more focused on protecting human rights. The GATT must be placed under UN control, while the World Bank must be dissolved and replaced by regional development funds. A comprehensive debt forgiveness program must be enacted to end the dependence of poor states. Additionally, foreign aid must stop financing corrupt officials and instead support efforts that aim at helping the general population in developing states. Rich countries must also pay 1% of their GDP into an environmental fund that is designed to counter the resource exploitation and the environmental impact of the economic activities of multinational corporations. With regard to trade, the Greens insist that future trade deals with poor countries be designed to pay more for resources that are exported from developing countries, and that the European community cease its protections of the agricultural sector (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 42).

8.1.2 The 1994 Election

The Greens' 1994 program begins with a preamble that outlines the society which the Greens envision for Germany. This ideal is based upon a social, ecological and democratic society that is multicultural and open, as well as peaceful and emancipated (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 4-6). These ideals are represented throughout the election program. For example, the idea of an open society is reaffirmed by the Greens’ rejection of any form of national ideology, as it leads to racism and discrimination. Instead, the party calls for a multicultural and multiethnic society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 43). This is also reflected in the immigration and refugee politics that the Greens promote, which are intended to foster an open society that provides refuge for those in need and allows everyone to participate and contribute. This is also why the

Greens call for the right of all permanent residents to become German citizens. This liberal and open understanding of society is also the goal that the Greens pursue with regard to Europe, which is why the party is fundamentally opposed to the idea of an EU that attempts to insulate itself from people who are in need (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 46-49). The Greens emphasize that this culture of openness and inclusiveness must extend towards people with physical or mental handicaps and homosexuals (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 50-51). Education policies are only mentioned briefly without any distinctive elements. Another topic that is very important for the Greens is gender equality. Policies proposed in this regard include equal pay, more career opportunities for women, abolishing structures that favor or strengthen the dominance of men, prosecuting violence against women more rigorously, and guaranteeing the right for women to exercise self-determination over their bodies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 63-67).

The Greens assert that the ongoing global recession reveals the dual structural flaws of a society that is organized by the principles of a capitalist market economy. On the one hand, there is an ecological crisis, because Germany’s economy produces the wrong kind of products with the wrong production processes. On the other hand, since labor and income are incorrectly distributed Germany also suffers from a social crisis. Nowhere does this become more apparent than in East Germany. This is why the Greens call for an ecological offensive, which will create new jobs through innovative and energy saving products. Germany in general, and the new states especially, need new investments and green technologies like decentralized energy production and supply, recycling, and an agricultural sector that dispenses with chemicals, a ban on nuclear

energy, and sustainable production and consumption (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 8-11). A key element of this ecological offensive is the introduction of an ecological tax. Often the production cost that companies pay does not reflect the true ecological cost of a product. This can be changed by taxing energy consumption more heavily. This will make it more profitable for companies to invest in energy saving technologies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 13-14). An ecological tax will also be the first step towards a social world economy, because it is unjustifiable that so few people in the world consume energy at such a disproportionate rate (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 15). These same points are reiterated within the 1994 election program in more detail, but the overall message to voters remains unchanged. A few additional details include a rejection of subsidies for fossil and nuclear energy and a strong commitment for renewable energy. Other points include an innovative mobility concept that moves away from individual transportation (e.g., cars) by introducing sizable annual tax increases on gasoline and diesel, and greater investments in public transportation as well as more bike lanes and more walkways for pedestrians. Agricultural reform and waste reduction / recycling are also a big issue for the Greens, here the goal is to reduce waste and to stop its export to poor countries. The way that our food is produced must become much more environmentally friendly, genetic modification must be avoided at all costs, and the reduction of chemical use is a top priority. The reduction of agricultural and export subsidies must be a paramount goal of the GATT negotiations, as well (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 29-39).

The issue of high unemployment rates is an unacceptable development for the Greens and they essentially present three solutions to the problem. One is the investment

into new green technologies, which will create new and sustainable jobs. Another step is to reduce the number of hours worked each week to an absolute maximum of 42 hours and to introduce a greater number of positions connected to 30-hour weeks, this way the necessary labor needs can be spread among more individuals. Step three is that the state will invest more money in creating jobs instead of paying unemployment benefits, and these types of jobs must be more than just busy work. They can be important steps for society's ecological and social transformation (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 18-20).

The social safety net is also a central concern for the Greens, who view the government's social reforms as temporary saving measures with grave long-term consequences and huge risks for society. The Greens propagate a care package that covers the basic needs for all those who legally live in Germany and cannot sufficiently provide for themselves. Another important element of the social safety net is better care for people who require long-term care. In this instance, the state must invest in better concepts that allow for more self-determination of people in need of care, a better network of services, as well as a better distribution of the risk and cost that go along with long-term care in order to reduce cost and to guarantee accessibility for everyone (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 22-25). The Greens clearly favor socialized medicine over profit maximizing health care, in order to prevent a two-class system. The party is also in favor of a more holistic care approach that focuses on the overall health of an individual and includes first class preventative care, instead of what the Greens refer to as high-tech repair medicine that only treats individual symptoms (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 25-26). The final building block of the Greens' social safety net is

government support for affordable housing, which is especially relevant for people living in East Germany where government run housing is rapidly replaced by for profit models that lead, in some cases, to large rent increases. In order to combat this trend the state must guarantee affordable housing by introducing rent caps in areas where there is a high demand for apartments and houses as well as a general regulation that rent must be in line with local rent averages (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 27-29).

The Greens are very critical of the current international system and Germany’s aspirations within this system. Instead of the current unjust world order that leaves millions in poverty and creates instability through military conflicts, the Greens call for a social and ecological global system. This is based on demilitarization. Since the dismantling of the USSR there is no more need for NATO and a sizable reduction of Germany’s armed forces is in order. Instead of indulging great power aspirations the Federal Republic should increase its efforts to promote a peaceful global order, one that promotes inalienable human rights for everyone. The best framework to achieve this goal globally is the UN. However, the UN must pay more attention to demilitarization and conflict resolution to better promote human rights. In order to overcome the global injustice between the rich north and the poor south, the GATT must be integrated into the UN framework and there needs to be a greater focus on building a strong ecological and social global economy. One way to achieve this is for rich states to buy products from developing countries for fair prices, to remove import restrictions, and to stop export subsidies. On a smaller level, the EU is ideally placed to achieve the same goals within Europe. However, Europe is under threat from nationalism, which is Europe’s greatest challenge and necessitates a conscientious effort to combat it, by furthering integration,

openness, and to increase democratic legitimacy within the EU. Another challenge for the EU is accomplishing the ecological and social transformation of its economy, which in the wake of the internationalization of its economies has often resulted in a disregard for the environment in order to maximize profits (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 70-77).

8.1.3 The 1998 Election

The 1998 election program is a strong critique of the Kohl government, in particular of the social divide within Germany’s society. According to the Greens, social insecurity is now something that affects society in general, not just a small subsegment of society. Never before have there been as many people who depend on welfare payments, and the divide between rich and poor continually increases. Globalization has been used as a reason to cut back on the welfare state, in order to cut indirect labor cost for the sake of maintaining global competitiveness. While the Greens claim that Germany did in fact profit economically from globalization by becoming a formidable export champion, this achievement came at a high price, because now growth and employment are decoupled. This growth is also fueled by a disregard for the environment which is exemplified by high carbon dioxide emissions and a reliance on nuclear power. Additionally, Germany did not use the end of the Cold War to significantly reduce its military forces and its economy still profits from highly lucrative arms sales. Germany’s society is losing its cohesion and the current government only exacerbates the problem, pitting various groups in society against each other. In this atmosphere, hatred and racism grows, especially against the weaker segments of society, for example unemployed youth or immigrants (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 5-7). The Greens promise change with

new and better ecological policies, which not only protects the future existence of mankind, but also builds a sustainable and strong economy. The Greens will promote social justice instead of inequality and exclusion. Their goal is it to build a democracy where opportunities and success are open to anyone regardless of money, nationality, age, gender, or sexual orientation (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 9-11).

At the core of this plan for change is an ecologically based economy that protects the environment and the individual in times when, as the Greens claim, the quality of life appears to be losing out in the global fight over material prosperity. The Greens want to counter such developments with a 10-year plan that is based on the introduction of a specific energy tax and higher gasoline taxes. These taxes are designed to curb energy consumption and to promote investment in energy saving technologies, which lead to innovations and investments that will grow the economy and create new jobs. The higher tax income of the state and the abolition of subsidies on environmentally damaging products (including products whose production is environmentally damaging) will generate enough funds to successively lower the indirect labor cost in a budget neutral manner so that companies will employ more people (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 13-15). Recipients of government help can also expect more money from the state in the future especially for housing assistance and welfare spending, which will be based upon real individual needs and not outdated standardized payment formulas (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 72-73). The Greens also advocate for a stringent reduction of overtime and the general introduction of a 35-hour work week, which will lead to more people being hired to get the work done. Lower incomes due to less time worked can be relieved by increasing the amount of the tax free base income and by increasing tax credits for

children (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 45-47). Another measure of how the Greens would increase employment, especially for the long-term unemployed, is employment opportunities created by the state to allow people a way back into the labor force (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 48). Other goals include ensuring the autonomy of all negotiations for labor agreements, with its vital element of comprehensive industry wide compensation standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 54), and to strengthen the state’s social infrastructure, by centralizing services under fewer organizations and to streamline them so that they can provide better services for Germany’s residents (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 71-72). A comprehensive tax reform will also be part of a Green policy catalogue whose key elements are a higher tax-exempt base income, a minimum tax rate of 18.5% and a top rate of 45% percent (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 65). Health care costs are to be transformed to the point that patients do not have to make additional payments or pay fees to ensure access to care beyond the monthly insurance payments (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 80).

A future Green government will also work more effectively with Germany’s partners in the EU to secure common standards for the common market so as to prevent social and environmental dumping in an effort to be more competitive than other economies. This also applies to the need for a harmonized tax code across the EU and a collective stop on subventions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 42, p. 67). The concept of increasing employment levels through a shorter work week is also supposed to be spread across Europe to ensure further harmonization of economies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 50). The shared currency is another key element of a unified and harmonized Europe that allows for easier trade of goods and capital flows (Alliance

‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 67).

Environmental policies move away from fossil fuels to renewable energy and a complete ban on nuclear energy. Combined with a discontinuation of subsidies for environmentally harmful energy resources like domestic coal production and higher taxes on energy consumption, the state will have more resources to support research and development of new technologies, and the breakup of monopolies on the energy market will create competition and increased efficiency (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 23-25). Waste reduction and waste recycling measures will further reduce Germany’s impact on the environment. For the Greens, sustainable living also includes higher standards for the agriculture sector, in particular food production. This includes a strict ban of genetically modified food (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 26-28). Additionally, the protection of the environment and human life as well as to secure sufficient nutrition for all humans is vital. This is why the WTO and GATT must focus on and promote agricultural policies that create a framework for trade of agricultural products, which helps to reach these goals. A primary step to this end is a ban on agricultural subsidies in rich countries. Prices must reflect the true economic and ecological cost of a product (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 26-27).

With regard to immigration the Greens support an open society that helps refugees and that allows wide participation for all foreigners who permanently reside in Germany. This includes full access to government services and the right to vote in local elections after 3 years of residency within Germany. After 5 years, immigrants should get the right to choose if they want to become citizens. In general, the Greens advocate a move away from a citizenship definition that is based on ancestry to one that is based

upon territory (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 120-121).

The last chapter of the 1998 program deals with foreign policy and how Germany should take on responsibility for a global society that protects natural resources and the environment as well as human rights. For the Greens, globalization is a big challenge, as it increases the already present gulfs in the world, highlighting inequality. Globalization changes the framework of how nation states can act and react to the global production chains. States must regain their control over unrestrained economies and redefine the relationship between trade, environment, security, and human rights. The world community must take responsibility for global developments. Profit maximization must be replaced with a globalization of social solidarity. We must enact structural changes to stop national power politics, which is why Germany’s government must pursue a foreign policy that promotes peace and is free from national interests. It must propagate demilitarization, an ecological and social world economic order, and the universal acceptance of human rights (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 133-135). In terms of international institutions this means that the Greens strongly support the UN as the primary conflict resolution and development organization. In order to strengthen its role, the Green’s call for increased funding of the UN, a more binding character of its resolutions, and more democratic structures that are more apt to represent the poor states of the world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 135-140). Overall, the guiding principle of the UN must be the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe, and in particular, the rights of women. When it comes to NATO, the Greens clearly envision a reduced role for the organization and its eventual dissolvement, in favor of a nonmilitary peace and security organization (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 142-143).

8.1.4 The 2002 Election

The first chapter in the 2002 election program deals with ecological modernization and outlines the party's general goals of protecting the environment, safeguarding the diversity of species, and improving food quality. Some specific goals are the ban of nuclear technology and the gradual reduction of fossil fuels in favor of alternative energy, or new traffic models that foster more public transportation and cut cost for public mobility by reducing taxes for these types of transportation, or higher taxes for all forms of natural resources in order to reduce consumption and to increase recycling (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 12-19). Environmental standards are also an important issue when it comes to the enlargement of the EU. New member states must not become ecological dumping regions for environmental standards, which is why Europe needs shared standards that must be enforced during the process of extending membership to new states.

The Greens like to be recognized as a party of social justice and economic renewal, and they actively support this image by backing policies that increase employment. These include, among others, wage subsidies for companies that hire the long-term unemployed in the low-income sector, government work creation schemes, a tax code that places a larger burden on the wealthy and one that is harmonized across Europe, a needs-based, individual basic social care, more financial support for children and more offers for child care (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 29-47). Another economic goal is to overcome the social gap between East and West, by promoting the new states and fostering increased economic development in the former East German region. An important step is for unions and employers to make a stronger effort to bring

wages in East Germany in line with wages in the West (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 52). They also want to improve the health care system and provide better care for the elderly by emphasizing the need for a more social nature in health care and more support for people to determine who they are being cared for once they require assistance. One thing the Greens categorically object to is genetic medical research and treatment (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 33-43). In terms of education the Greens assert that it must be part of the state’s educational goals to raise environmental consciousness in students. A special effort needs to be made to better include the children of immigrants in schools so that they perform just as well as other kids in terms of academic achievement. An important element for the Greens in this respect is also to overcome society's thinking in terms of foreigners and domestically born individuals. This is just an obstruction to the successful integration of all people who live in the German society. The Greens are also unequivocal in their statement that Germany is an immigrant nation. Immigration is indispensable for Germany due to economic as well as demographic reasons and it enriches society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 49-51, p. 62). The party takes a very inclusive approach to involve all groups in society in the creation of culture and art. In this context, it is also important to remember the Nazi terror regime and to develop a culture of remembrance and learning from the past. The same is true for the regime of the German Democratic Republic. (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 55-56). Gender equality is also a very dominant theme: Issues that the Greens address in this regard are equal opportunities and pay for women in their careers, the right to have an abortion, and better protection against violence. Foreign policy must also make human rights and especially the human rights of women a central focus of all efforts, including economic

policies and cooperation. In an age of globalization foreign aid and development assistance must be linked to a good human rights record and the equal treatment of women (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 71-75).

The Greens’ final chapter in the 2002 election campaign addresses fair globalization. They assert that voters have the choice between global justice that promotes universal and indivisible human rights or the electorate can choose one of the other parties which will promote either a renationalization of foreign policy or allow globalization without restraint. Globalization can be beneficial for everyone, but currently the majority of people do not profit from it, because a form of economic globalization that is based upon growth and profit will largely only benefit multinational corporations. Those who are the winners of globalization are increasingly the rich and those who lose are the poor; according to the Greens this is true for states and regions, but also for the different opportunities of men and women. While globalization is not responsible for every negative development, if it is not ecological and socially responsible, then it becomes an important factor that leads to increased hunger, environmental destruction, racism, violence, repression of women, and exploitation of children (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79).

However, globalization has opportunities that can be harnessed if corporations are faced with restrictions and rules. The pursuit of financial gain must not supersede the human right to have access to food, water, and an intact environment, and women must not be marginalized in the pursuit of financial gain. Environmental politics must spend much more time analyzing the impact that globalization has on the environment. The WTO must promote environmental and consumer protection as well as access to food.

Two other important elements for achieving more global justice are debt relief for the poorest countries and the abolition of subsidies for agricultural products, which prevent developing states from access to the markets of industrial nations (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 80-82). It must be mentioned that earlier in the program the Greens stated that subsidies are an effective tool for protecting German farmers and for securing food production standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 27). The Greens clearly promote a strong UN and EU that help to actively shape globalization in a way that is environmentally friendly (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 83-86).

8.1.5 The 2005 Election

The 2005 election program is the only Green program in which ecological policies are not the first chapter. In this program, the Greens address their labor and economic policies first. The approach of demanding more for the unemployed in return for better support has failed: In general, the increased demands work well, but the added support is mostly missing. Social exclusion is a serious problem which must be combatted (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 15-16), otherwise there cannot be freedom. Without justice, there can only be the freedom of the few. This is why unrestrained globalization and capitalism must be kept in check. A confident and powerful state, and the EU, are important elements in correcting the negative developments of capitalism and market liberalism. The 2005 program is designed to address these issues and to define a social state that is a strong response to globalization and able to shape it (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 21-22). The guiding principles that the Greens define in this regard are to create a low impact economy, one that rewards

creativity and innovation where ecological and economical principles are mutually reinforcing each other, and where creativity is not stifled by bureaucracy. In order to create more jobs, the Greens want to subsidize indirect labor costs for the low-income sector to allow more people to join the labor market and create a binding national minimum wage. Additionally, the state must provide a better form of basic social care, one that does not leave recipients in poverty, but also one that has incentives for finding employment. Active government involvement in work schemes is also an important tool for getting the long-term unemployed back into the work force. (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 23-34). Other goals include a stronger civil society that is heavily involved in the community and a simpler tax code that does away with loopholes and places more demands upon the wealthy with a top income tax rate of 45% (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 42-48).

With regard to ecological policies the Greens reiterate their demands to use fewer natural resources and cause less pollution. It is their goal to have 25% of energy consumption supplied by renewable sources by 2010 and to cut Germany’s carbon emissions by 80% by 2050. Additionally, the party reaffirms its commitment to a nuclear energy free Germany and to promote green and efficient technologies, because they are good for the environment and they create new jobs. Better regulation for environmental protection and more funds for public transportation are also important strategies for reducing human impact on the environment and for increasing quality of life (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 52-62). The Greens also promote better consumer protection laws, especially for agricultural products and a complete ban on genetically modified food. Agricultural goods production must be guided by the principle of sustainability and

subsidies must be reduced in order to make the sector more competitive for the future (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 63-65). All of Greens’ ecological policies are intended to address the issue of justice, because without the conservation of nature there can be no freedom and perspective for life (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 51).

Education policies are an important topic in the 2005 program as well, as education is vital for the success of a resource poor country like Germany. However, nowhere else in Europe is academic and economic success as closely tied to social upbringing and ethnicity as it is in Germany. This is why the education system must be thoroughly reformed by giving schools and universities more freedom to allow various educational models to compete for the best results. The concept of preschool child care must also be reformed to be more academically focused and the last year before school must be free of charge to better prepare all children for school. Additionally, there must be more investment in university students to increase their numbers by providing more scholarships and a simpler and more comprehensive student aid process (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 70-74). Concerning gender equality, the Greens present multiple policies that strengthen the rights of women, such as calling for active measures to improve the quota of women in leadership positions, guaranteeing women reproductive self-determination, or by supporting them in their challenge to balance career and family goals. Another good example is the ability to enact a legal claim for parents towards the state for childcare spots, which are commonly too few in Germany (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 82-86). The Greens also assert that politics must pay more attention to preventing and fighting discrimination. It is unacceptable for an individual in Germany to be discriminated against due to their gender, ethnic background, religion, sexual identity,

or age. The pluralistic society model is vital for Germany and no one must be hindered from participating within that society. This is also true for immigrants who must be better integrated and Germany must recognize that it is an immigrant nation that needs to actively direct immigration, such as with a point-based immigration system (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 88-90).

The Greens pledge to actively engage with globalization, to shape it in a more just manner. There are 10 such references within the 2005 program. While the Greens affirm that they view globalization as an opportunity, they are more concerned with emphasizing its dangers. In order to stop globalization from being a process without economic restraint or any ecological guidelines, it is important to build up supranational institutions. These institutions can help foster multiculturalism and cooperation across borders and ensure that human rights are respected and protected, this is especially important when considering the nations of the southern hemisphere whose values and ideas must be equally important in a globalized world. Globalization necessitates reformed institutions like the UN, the WTO, and the IMF that help to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. They advocate for more transparency within the UN and stronger involvement in social and environmental issues. The WTO must more vigorously pursue the abolition of agricultural subsidies and to allow developing countries more access to the markets of the rich world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 106-108).

The Greens legitimize their support for the deployment of German military forces to Afghanistan, which is a huge step for the Green party to take, while in government. Nonetheless, they do call for a smaller German military and a ban of weapons exports

(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 111-113). Finally, the Greens also express their support for the EU and emphasize that Europe is more than just the shared internal market. It is also a standard for ecological, social, and tax policies with shared standards that create fair competition. One way in which the party wants to combat wage competition towards the bottom across Europe, is by introducing minimum wage standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 118-119).

8.1.6 The 2009 Election

In the wake of the 2007/2008 financial recession, the Greens try to package their program as the 21st-century version of Roosevelt’s New Deal, which was also the answer to a great depression that followed a financial crisis. Whereas Roosevelt’s program focused on economic and social issues, the Greens add the ecological component to their economic revitalization program; they refer to it as the Green New Deal. The financial crisis must not be an excuse to postpone nuclear power phase-out, or disregard ecological standards, or to not invest in sustainable technologies. Especially now, it is paramount to continue with the goal of building a green and sustainable society. This Green New Deal constitutes a new societal contract that, unlike the old one, does not provide social services that go beyond the state’s budget, at the expense of future generations. This new contract will create sustainability, a better environment, and social safety by aligning all state activity with the principles of climate protection, justice, and freedom. That way development and peace are maintainable in a globalized world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 12-17).

Instead of the government’s short-sighted response to the crisis, like the cash for

clunkers program, the Greens promote a coordinated 4-year plan that will create 1 million new jobs. Instead of neo-liberal deregulation, the Greens plan to give markets ecological and social limits, as well as to introduce a binding minimum wage. Additionally, markets must be organized in a manner that rewards ecological and social actions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 29-32). Specifically formulated goals include a more effectively regulated financial sector and better checks and balances in government actions. The party states that casino-capitalism has failed, because it rewards a select few while it places the risk and potential burden upon society as a whole. One way to achieve this is through better international cooperation of government financial regulators, by increasing the ratio of banks between lows and equity (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 38-45). Additionally, the state must operate differently, for example by having a limit for new government debt, providing tax rewards for environmentally friendly behavior, and awarding government contracts not by price alone, but also by how environmentally friendly or socially responsible a company operates (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 46-58).

With regard to ecological policies the Greens again assert their commitment to abandon nuclear power and to heavily reduce the share of fossil fuels for transportation and heating. Additionally, the party wants to support and incentivize energy saving for new housing developments and for remodeling old homes to reduce their energy consumption. The Greens also want to promote new environmentally friendly vehicles and strict speed limits to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 62-75). The social impasse must be overcome as well, as it is not justifiable that millions of people are unable to access the increased wealth that Germany’s rich

economy creates. Social programs must be more inclusive and ensure that everyone receives the support that they need to succeed in life. This must include better basic social care that allows everyone to participate in society and is not exclusionary. Likewise, a more just health care system, where the quality of treatment is not linked to income, must be part of this new societal contract (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 77-93).

The Green New Deal also includes provisions for better education; Germany unacceptably spends less than the OECD average on education. Higher spending needs to be initiated to ensure that all children receive an excellent primary education and not just those with affluent parents. Additionally, there must be more support for students to find positions in technical fields, apprentice positions. These are essential qualifications for all nonacademic tracks. However, too many companies do not participate in this system to train qualified employees and, thus, the Greens want to subsidize the training cost for industries in which there are especially few of these positions. The Greens demand more independence for universities and better financial support for students through an increase in available scholarships and simpler and better student loans (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 99-107).

The Greens also call for more and better integration of immigrants. They must become an integral part of German society and dual citizenship must be accepted. Families that are separated by national borders should have support from the government in reuniting their families and not be hindered by restrictive immigration laws. The party also explicitly states that Islam must be treated equally with the Christian majority. Refugees must have better options to seek help and shelter than risking their lives on inadequate boats in the Mediterranean Sea, which is why the EU must not shut its borders

to refugees (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 147-153). When it comes to culture, the Greens seek to involve all groups in society in the creation of culture and to use government institutions abroad to promote German culture internationally. They also are adamant about fostering a culture of remembering the crimes of the Nazi regime, in order to learn from history (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 190-192).

The party emphasizes that rich states must stop living at the expense of the poor, who are especially exposed to the negative consequences of climate change and resource exploitation. The new societal contract must be a global one; it must be a dialogue and a balancing of interests between rich and poor states, between north and south. In order to create fair globalization, the world needs more cooperation, civil engagement and exchange, as well as better ecological and economic rules. However, justice can only be achieved if the prosperous are willing to change their lifestyles and if the new societal contract entails a sustainable lifestyle, more environmental protection, and more self-determination for all people. This type of multiculturalism necessitates a strong institutional framework which, for the Greens, starts with the EU, but also entails a stronger UN that is more democratic. The agenda of the WTO must address more than trade liberalization. It must promote environmental, social, and labor standards. The WTO should also fight against stringent intellectual property laws for medical treatments that are currently more aimed at securing profit of multinational pharmaceutical companies than to increase health and save lives. Agricultural policies must finally address the imbalances between developing richer countries and get rid of agricultural subsidies, especially the export subsidies of rich countries, which leads to a flooding of markets in developing countries so that producers in poor countries cannot compete.

Here, the EU is an especially severe transgressor and must immediately reform its agricultural practices (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 202-208). The Greens re-declare their commitment to having German troops in Afghanistan, but they clearly assert that there must be a larger effort to find a political solution to the conflict, as military force alone will not suffice (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 214-216).

8.1.7 The 2013 Election

The 2013 election program is a comprehensive critique of Germany’s, Europe’s, and the world’s economic and social systems. The Greens claim that Germany’s so-called export success is only a disguise for an unsustainable system. Germany’s production processes destroy the environment and the massive export surplus creates vast imbalances across Europe. The singular focus of economic policies on GDP growth do not reflect equality, which is not only shrinking across Europe but within Germany as well. They advocate policies that focus on a form of prosperity that takes social and ecological dimensions into account (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 9-13). These imbalances are also reflected in the Euro crisis, which is, in fact, not a monetary crisis, but a manifestation of a flawed economic system. The balance of payments is colossally different across the EU, and states such as Germany only exacerbate the problem with their export dependent economies. The federal government in Germany would do much better if it would boost domestic demand (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 55-56). Additionally, the financial sector needs more regulation, because it threatens to grow too big, to the point that it is decoupled from the real economy (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 59). The Greens also focus on the EU for their energy policies, in order to

protect the environment on a larger scale. Europe must cut its emissions by 45% and obtain 45% of its energy from renewable sources by the year 2030. The protection of the environment is a moral obligation for the Green party, because those who suffer the most from environmental pollution are also those who pollute the least (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 40-41).

In terms of domestic policies, the Greens call for a tax reform that ensures that prices reflect not only the production and logistics cost of a product, but also its ecological cost. Germany’s tax code must also become fairer, meaning that those who have more means at their disposal also pay higher taxes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 2013, 77). Tax loopholes must be closed and taxes in general require better harmonization across Europe (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 2013, 81). The party also promises that low-income households will receive better support under a Green government due to the introduction of a minimum wage of 8.50 Euros, plus extended benefits for people who do not have full-time work or are in a contractor relationship (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 90-92). The Greens want to build up a social labor market in order to better support the long-term unemployed, although it is not really clear what this means specifically (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 102). Education policies are based upon the principles of early support and more inclusiveness. This translates into a comprehensive program to include all children in early childhood education through a kindergarten concept that starts at 3 years of age and is intended to prepare children for school especially by achieving sufficient language capabilities. While this system already exists, it is not available to all children due to capacity issues and often it is the children of immigrants who miss out, which only aggravates the language problem. Schools need

to be reformed to provide learning concepts that extend into the late afternoon. Schools also must foster more combined learning between strong and weaker students instead of segregating children (often as early as the fifth grade) based upon skill and aptitude into various educational tracks (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 105-108). When it comes to higher education, the Greens promise more investment to create more spots for students at universities and to reform scientific research to foster more interdisciplinary projects and to support research that takes into consideration the ecological effects of innovations and helps to build a more sustainable society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 111-114). Other social policies that are mentioned in the 2013 election program include a strong commitment to a robust universal health care system that is affordable for everyone and to prevent the development of a two-class system (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 123-125). Welfare spending should be increased (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 137), as well as government spending for social housing projects to create affordable housing in a way that prevents the formation of ghettos (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 268).

The Greens also address the need for better environmental protection and increased quality of food (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 153), increased consumer protection which includes fair energy prices, more transparency and a ban on genetically modified agricultural products (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 179-184). The argument is also made for a comprehensive mobility system that is based on new concepts like government supported car sharing and bike sharing, but also includes a greater emphasis towards green mobility through cars without combustion engines (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 169-173). In terms of culture, the Greens again

outline their traditional, open multicultural approach that is welcoming of outsiders. This is manifested by the willingness to grant citizenship much more liberally to foreigners who permanently reside in Germany than is currently possible (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 231). It is also manifested by the lack of a national identity that might be promoted within election programs. In fact, the Greens criticize the promotion of the nationalist agenda and mindset of the current CDU/CSU and FDP government (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 11). The multicultural openness of the Greens is also reaffirmed by its unequivocal support for Turkey to enter accession talks with the EU (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 285).

The Greens view the world as deeply unjust, because resources are largely consumed by a small minority of rich industrial states at the expense of others. Climate disasters and violent political conflicts primarily affect the world’s poorest nations and particularly the women in those nations. The destruction of the environment must be stopped, violent conflict has to be prevented or resolved, and prosperity must be globally shared. These are the Green’s foreign policy goals, to motivate citizens to think globally when they make local decisions and to be active in their communities and to find ways to build partnerships between northern and southern hemispheres. Their goal is a great transformation, to bring economic and ecological goals into balance, to find an equitable distribution of resources and to make better progress to protect human rights, in particular those of women (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 296-298).

One way this can be achieved is by placing the long term equitable creation of a globalized economic order above German interests. Globalization must be shaped to benefit all people and not just narrow special interests or highly privileged individuals. In

fact, it must not be guided by economic interest, but by political, ecological, and social ones. Future trade agreements must promote environmentally friendly behavior and social standards. Trade policies must be used to actively promote human rights and labor standards. Additionally, export subsidies within the EU must be immediately eradicated, because they destroy economic growth in countries that need it the most (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299). Germany must also be more actively engaged in using development aid and trade agreements to increase climate protection, to improve the rights of women, to eliminate child labor, and to promote human rights as a whole (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 302-305). The goal must be to use economic aid to increase the political participation of the citizens in benefactor states (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 303). Additionally, the Greens express clear support for the UN to remain the premier international organization for peace and cooperation, but the party acknowledges that this requires a reformation of the existing structure, especially the current setup of the Security Council and the veto rights of its five permanent members. The Greens advocate for a Security Council that is more representative of all UN members and more transparent. Moreover, NATO should realign its mission, since the confrontation between the East and West does not exist anymore. Instead, NATO should be a primary force for disarmament. A way for achieving this would be by reducing U.S. nuclear and conventional forces (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 312-314).

8.2 Initial Election Program Analysis

This section will outline a basic analysis of the five key terms as they appear in all seven Green party election programs since 1990. An in-depth explanation of how the

programs were analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regard to the key terms can be found in Section 4.3. When looking at all the direct references of the five key terms (see Figure 8.1), the first thing one notices that there are a lot references, altogether 226. This is a huge number compared to the mentions by other parties. The next closest party is the FDP with 122 references.[1] The most frequently used term is exports with almost 90 mentions, the term trade is used about a third less often, but both terms are regularly mentioned in all seven programs. The term globalization is used slightly more often than that of trade, but only starts to become relevant in the 1998 program. Since 2002 globalization was mentioned quite frequently with most references in 2005, for a total of 17. This is almost as many as the CDU's 20 references over seven programs. Imports are never mentioned in 2002 and otherwise only between one and three times, except for the 2013 election, which refers to imports 11 times in a negative fashion. The Greens critical import comments largely focus on imports of energy (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2013, p. 12) and genetically modified food (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2013, p. 161). The references on free trade are negligible, since the concept is only mentioned twice.

Looking at Figure 8.2, which shows the normative meaning that goes along with any of the five globalization key terms, it becomes quickly apparent that the Greens view of the current international economic system and globalization is very critical. The Greens refer to the key terms to emphasize the negative consequences or future risks more than 100 times. Another 25 references, most of which occurred after 2002, point to the unfair nature of global trade and globalization. By contrast, there are only six instances that mention positive outcomes with regard to the key terms. These are all in

[1] Total count of all five key terms for each party: CDU 78, SPD 88, FDP 133, The Greens 226, The Left 89.

the 2005 and the 2013 election programs and largely relate to the positive effects of emissions trading (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 53, 2013, p. 173, p. 289) and the positive effects of fair trade products (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 180, p. 277). While the Greens are clearly very critical of the way that trade is organized at the international level, they do believe that with the right type of ecological and social policy changes, trade can be improved and shaped into a sustainable (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 53) process that also benefits people in developing countries (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 42). The same is true for globalization, here the Greens also see potential to actively shape it into an environmentally sustainable and fair development (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 7, 2013, p. 298).

Figure 8.2 does to allow for inferences regarding how the Greens feel about each of the individual terms. In order to allow for an assessment on each key term the following paragraphs address each individually. Starting with export references (see Figure 8.3), which is the key term that gets mentioned most often with 88 instances, one can see that two thirds of the references express the risks and negative outcomes that the Greens feel are associated with trade. Roughly a quarter of all trade references are neutral in character, which only leaves 10% of references falling into the other three categories. Two percent talk about the unjust consequences of trade, while 7% and 1%, respectively, address opportunities from exports and positive outcomes. The topic of imports is mentioned 20 times by the Greens (see Figure 8.4), with a little more than half of these references made in the 2013 election program. There are no positive statements about imports at all; there are two neutral instance and one refers to the unjust nature of imports. The remaining references all stress the negative consequences of imports; these

focus on the import of energy, genetically modified food, and feed for livestock (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, p. 139, 2013, p. 12, p. 72).

Figure 8.5 shows how the Greens referred to trade throughout their election programs. It is interesting to note that even though references to exports and imports have been vastly negative the same is not true for the more overarching term of trade. There are fewer mentions of trade (a count of 56) than there are of exports. Approximately a quarter of them are neutral, while another fourth points to the risks and dangers of trade. Five percent of all trade references point out the unjust character of trade and another 9% relate the positive results of trade. The largest share (36%) goes to the opportunities of trade. It appears that while the specific instances of exports and imports are just viewed highly negative by Greens, they do see the potential to salvage the idea of international trade by introducing social and ecological standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 152, 2013, p. 299) and to institutionalize such development through international organizations like the WTO (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 28). However, the majority of trade references do focus on the exchange of emissions certificates for pollutants as a form of creating incentives for achieving lower emissions levels of pollutants (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 23, 2009, p. 73, p. 205). The expression *free trade* does not appear to be particularly popular with the Greens since the expression is only used twice. One mention expresses the imbalanced nature of free trade agreements and that these treaties may be forced upon developing countries (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, p. 208), but the 2013 program points out that free trade agreements can potentially strengthen human rights, if trade agreements are negotiated in a way that they foster developments among all trade parties that promote better protection of human

rights (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299).

Globalization is mentioned relatively frequently with a count of 60, of which 45% are neutral (see Figure 8.6). The second largest group is comments on how unjust globalization is, because it promotes the exploitation of humans as well as of the environment, while increasing the chasm between rich and poor world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 152). Especially the 2005 election program reiterates 10 times that globalization is not fair and must be changed to be more beneficial and inclusive for all states. The next group of references makes up a quarter of all mentions and highlights the negative effects of globalization, like that it increases insecurity and instability (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 40, 2013, p. 281). The final quarter of statements address the potential of globalization. While the Greens cannot see any benefits of an increasingly globalized world so far, they do assert from 2002 onward that globalization can be shaped to be fair and to protect the environment (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 7, 2009, p. 16). The 2013 program also claims that globalization can be formed to allow all states to profit from it, if it is actively politically, ecologically, and socially molded (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 298).

8.3 Comparing Election Programs to Globalization and Political Parties

This section addresses the theoretical concepts and questions outlined in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.1) and Chapter 3 (see Table 3.1). As with other German parties studied here, the Greens do not address the issue of partial factor mobility as put forward by Brawly (1997). It seems that partial factor mobility is too complex an issue to address in

election programs, even for a smaller niche party that produces very lengthy party platform programs and that appeals to a more educated segment of the population. The matter of volatility, defined by Woodruff (2005) as fluctuating between economic busts and booms, is only a marginal topic for the Greens. While the issue of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis does emerge in the party's 2009 campaign, it is only presented as a subsegment of a much broader issue. The financial crisis is simply part of a broad structural crisis in which Germany's economy, as well as the global economy, is gripped. The constant challenge is to move away from structures that are built upon exploitation and destruction, and instead to move to production methods and consumption patterns that are innovative and sustainable, while protecting the environment and promoting human rights (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2002, p. 29, p. 202).

The question of what role the Greens envision for labor unions in a globalized world must be addressed as well. As outlined by Garst (1998), this is relevant as unions can have a key role for promoting globalization due to their ability to unite people behind the concept of trade liberalization. Labor unions can credibly promise to help distribute the gains from trade, more equitably. While the Greens support the role of unions as an important element within German society (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1998, p. 69), references about unions are few and far between. There could be more emphasis on unions and their role within society, but there are a few clear statements with regard to the role of unions in promoting workers' rights and in establishing a minimum wage in Germany (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 89-90). Voters probably do take away a notion of a tacit support for unions by the Greens. Since the Greens are generally politically aligned with the SPD, especially at the federal level, it appears that there is a

certain division of labor between the two parties, with the SPD more prominently championing the role of unions and the Greens focusing more on environmental issues. Voters can have confidence that unions are an important element in defending their interests in a globalizing world, but there is no bigger vision for unions or their role for the future in more globalized world.

Caproso (1997) points out that it is not necessarily a simple matter for voters to understand the consequences of globalization and how they are personally affected by globalization. This brings up the need to examine whether or not political parties present meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or do they merely use the issue for scapegoating? The Greens present a rather critical view of globalization, emphasizing how unjust it is and that it primarily serves the interest of multinational corporations (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79), and is exploitative by nature (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 152). The party also admits that globalization is not to be blamed for every negative development, but asserts that the current version contributes significantly to the increase of hunger, environmental destruction, racism, violence, the subjugation of women, and exploitation of children. This is why resistance to globalization is correct and necessary (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79). The 2013 program also endorses globalization critical movements (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 63-64) and warns that globalization takes place at the expense of the poor (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 25). While the Greens are largely very critical of globalization they promote the idea that globalization can be transformed into a sustainable, fair, and peaceful process (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 16, 2013, p. 24).

Regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement as outlined by Rodrik (2000),

as well as Ranjan and Lee (2007), are important topics for shoring up support for globalization and trade liberalization, because they foster the idea of a level playing field. Acceptance drops significantly if citizens feel that they compete unfairly with foreign companies or states that do not play by the same rules. Similarly, communicating party goals with respect to international agreements and to offer voters clear choices is important in order to generate support (Hays, 2009; Martin, 2000). The creation and promotion of standards is pivotal to election programs of the Green party. These include general environmental standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 9), but also specific EU environmental standards for clean air and water (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 23), Europe-wide standards for food quality (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 27), and even trade agreements must promote environmentally friendly behavior and standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299). Additionally, the party asserts that Germany has to work better with its partners in the EU to secure shared standards for the common market in order to prevent social and environmental dumping in an effort to be more competitive than other economies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 42). Human rights and labor standards must also be unified across the globe by introducing a realignment of international trade standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299). Particularly within the framework of the EU, the Greens have various ideas for standardizing and unifying policies and regulation. This includes a general call for a harmonized tax code across the EU, a collective stop on subventions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 67), and the closure of tax loopholes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 2013, p. 81), but also a specific demand for harmonized income tax rates and a unified path towards the calculating of corporate taxes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 44). The Euro is another step towards

a unified and harmonized Europe (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 67). The concept of increasing employment levels through a shorter work week is also supposed to be spread across Europe to ensure further harmonization of economies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 50) and another step towards combatting dumping wages across Europe is the introduction of a shared minimum wage standard (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 119). With regard to international organizations, there is a consistent message, though their earlier programs are more radical and ambiguous. In 1990 the goal is to place responsibility for the GATT under the auspices of the UN, to ensure that the IMF gets back to fulfilling its original mission, and to dissolve the World Bank in favor of regional development funds (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 42). In 1994 the idea is still to democratize the GATT by placing it under control of the UN (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 79), but also to more specifically use GATT negotiations to completely banish subsidies for agricultural products (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 1994, 39). With regard to the GATT’s successor, the Greens state that the WTO must use more of its resources and influence to focus on overcoming starvation (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 26). In more recent years, a big emphasis has been placed on assuring better representation of developing countries within trade/economic organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO. The programs that the IMF promotes must focus more on crisis prevention and be self-reflective in order to assess the ecological and social consequences of the programs it promotes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 81-82). Additionally, these three organizations must be reformed institutions to better assist with achieving the UN’s Millennium Development Goals and the WTO in particular must more vigorously pursue the abolition of agricultural subsidies and allow developing countries more access to the

markets of the rich world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 107). Concerning NATO, the Greens formerly argued that since the Cold War came to a peaceful end there would be no more need for Germany to be in any military alliance and Germany should completely demilitarize (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 18). This message was more or less repeated in 1994 and 1998, when the Greens once more called for dissolving NATO and replacing it with a peace pact (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 74, 1998, p. 143). However, by 2002 the message had changed and the Greens started to acknowledge the relevance of NATO as a vital security organization, but added that it should get transformed into a more cooperative security organization (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 211).

While they do outline policies regarding regulatory harmonization and international organizations, these proposals are usually very ambiguous. For example, the proposal to shape NATO into a more cooperative security organization is not accompanied by any clear definition of what a more cooperative security organization looks like. Similarly, the claim that the IMF should get back to pursuing its originally designated mission is extremely vague. All that voters can take away from a statement such as this is that the IMF is doing something wrong and that it should do something better in the future. This is also true to some extent of the calls for better environmental standards, more consumer protection rights, or better treatment of animals. Voters do get a general idea, but specificity would often be helpful. One thing that is interesting and positive about the 2013 Green election campaign is that they acknowledge the need for Germany to change as well. Sometimes parties have the tendency to only focus on the policy upload and how other states or organizations have to change to meet German

standards, but the Greens clearly assert that Europe does not need to become more German, but that Germany needs to become more European (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 293). While it is only a single instance, it is still an important acknowledgment. One way to make this goal even more meaningful would be to offer specifics as to which practices work well in Europe that Germany should adopt domestically.

An important element for analyzing the domestic response to globalization, according to the literature, is the need for political elites to discuss the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). This is necessary because if political parties honestly debate the pros and cons of an issue, such as globalization, and outline how to address and alleviate its negative consequences, then parties can build support for an issue. The Greens do not address the globalization dilemma directly and it is not clear that they are actually interested in gathering support for the issue. As previously outlined, they are primarily focused on highlighting the unfair distribution of the gains from globalization and its harmful effects on the environment. Nevertheless, this does reduce, to some extent, resistance to globalization due to the fact that the party addresses social exclusion as a serious problem within Germany’s society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 7). Unfortunately, the Greens’ devices are not specific and it is not clear that the plans to reduce unemployment by reducing weekly hours worked, and hence weekly pay, will create much of a sense of stability. One important fear that is often associated with globalization is dumping wages. The call for the introduction of a minimum wage has great potential of reducing resistance towards globalization. The Greens promote a minimum wage in four different election programs (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 22, 2005, p. 16, 2009, p. 16, 2013, p. 28) and in 2013 the party even

commits to a minimum wage of 8.50 Euro (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 90). Overall though, it is reasonable to suspect that the constant emphasis on introducing new environmental standards and to reduce energy consumption does mean that some voters will question that a government with Green party participation will truly be able to build up a social safety net that can protect the individual from the potential pressures of a liberal trading order. Voters recognize that the ecological transformation of the economy will be quite costly, at least initially, for both the government and private entities. For a government with finite funds, this means that whatever resources the government spends on environmental issues will decrease the resources left to allocate among other areas, including welfare spending. While all parties have to make such allocation decisions, based upon its rhetoric, the Greens will spend the most government resources on the environment and not on social issues.

The final theoretical building block which requires examination is that of identity. Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004) all focus on the idea that emphasizing a European identity is an effective tool for most European states to decrease negative attitudes about globalization. The Greens do not promote any form of national identity. In fact, they refer to identity twice in a gender context (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 29, 2013, p. 133) and very consistently when referring to sexual identity (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 32, 1994, p. 48, 1998, p. 119; 2002, p. 63; 2005, p. 89, 2009, p. 144, 2013, p. 16). This lack of a national identity makes it also very easy to accept other people with different backgrounds and to make them an integral part of German society, which is nicely reflected in the party’s call for the acceptance of dual citizenship (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 62, 2009, p. 148). With regard to Europe,

the Greens welcome the idea of a unified continent that creates stability, peace, and cooperation across Europe. An open Europe that embraces the world and fights for human rights and environmental protection is indispensable (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, p. 203). The EU is also one of the reasons that the party objects to any form of nationalism, because it destroys Europe (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 77). Another instance that exemplifies the general openness and multiculturalism of the Greens’ is the party’s support for Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, to enter ascension talks with the EU (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 285). For some, this clashes with Germany and Europe’s Christian identity and Europe simply lacks the ability to integrate Turkey (CDU, 2005, p. 36). In other words, there is nothing in the seven election programs of the Green party that would create a sense within voters that globalization would, in any way, infringe on their identity.

8.4 Conclusion of Green Party Analysis

The Greens are a somewhat curious case, because the party promotes a very open multicultural society that is firmly placed in Europe and that appears postnational in its election programs. The party talks frequently about international institutions and how they should play a role for good. This is outlined, for some institutions, in the analysis of the last section, but not for the UN which, according to the Greens, should play a strong international role by becoming an increasingly democratically legitimized actor that promotes human rights, global equality, and overcomes poverty. (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 40, 1994, p. 78, 1998, p. 134, 2002, p. 86, 2005, p. 107, 2009, p. 202, 2013, p. 297). The party also expresses its desire to shape globalization in a way that

protects the environment (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 07, 2009, p. 16). This constitutes ideal conditions for a society to embrace globalization and then to make the best out of it, so that it truly becomes the figurative wave that is able to lift all boats without damaging the shore, and while providing plenty of lifejackets for those who might need one. However, the party’s constant criticism of globalization, especially regarding trade, causes one to wonder whether globalization will be beneficial at all. Sure, the Greens promise to make globalization sustainable and fair, but the party fails to make a convincing argument for why participating in globalization is necessary at all. Instead of concluding that it is beneficial for Germany’s society to be exposed to a globalized world, voters might just as well conclude that they are better off without it. After all, the party makes it very clear what the consequences of failed globalization are, so why bother with globalization when its benefits are ambiguous at best? This question is especially relevant with regard to international trade. It is certainly important to address the negative consequences of export subsidies and import barriers for developing countries, but it is not clear why the Greens do not present a more differentiated view on trade. The German economy is built upon the ability to import and export goods and services from around the world, but especially from within Europe. Therefore, it would be more honest and beneficial for the German economy to recognize the value that imports and exports bring to the table. The kind of progressive and sustainable society for which the Greens call is impossible to achieve without sophisticated and efficient supply chains, global movement of people, international technology transfer, and complex global financial markets. Otherwise, green technologies will only remain an option for the more affluent segment of society that can afford expensive niche products that are

environmentally friendly.

In essence, the oft justified critique of globalization and the open liberal trading order must be complemented by a stronger emphasis on the positive aspects of global trade. Well defined and specific policies as to how globalization can be improved and what the resulting benefits will be important as well. In the 21st century, in a trade dependent country like Germany, a party with such a strong environmental and human rights agenda should move away from its tacit or at best timid message that globalization can be widely beneficial, if it is actively politically, ecologically, and socially molded (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 298). Instead this message should be front and center in any election program, highlighting how a Green party in government will shape globalization, so that it will make environmentally sustainable economies possible and better promote human rights.



Figure 8.1 Green Party Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms



Figure 8.2 Green Party Globalization References Sorted by Their Normative Implication



Figure 8.3 Green Party Export References



Figure 8.4 Green Party Import References



Figure 8.5 Green Party Trade References



Figure 8.6 Globalization References Green Party

CHAPTER 9

THE LEFT

The Left with its roots in the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus), which is usually just referred to as PDS, is a socialist party with radical democratic and anticapitalist positions (PDS, 1994, p. 4). It is the successor of the German Democratic Republic's Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which dissolved after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The new party broke with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, but could not take on the role of a typical European socialist party, since that position was already taken by a well-established party. The PDS had to position itself to the left of the SPD, with a focus on criticizing the capitalist system of the Federal Republic and on developing into a protest party that represented an alternative to the existing parties (Decker, 2017b). In its early days, the party faced a lot of critique. To some, the party's existence was simply untenable since it was so closely linked to the SED regime, which for many represents essentially injustice and repression. Even those who did not feel that the party's sheer existence was an insult, nevertheless were critical, suggesting that the PDS inadequately dealt with its past (Patton, 2012). Initially, the party was just a regional phenomenon. In 1990, it received 11% of the votes in eastern Germany, but only 2.4% in the west. Due to a one-time provision in the 1990 election, a party only needed to cross the 5% threshold in

either the east or the west, which meant that the PDS was represented in the 1990 federal legislature. The party was able to build upon the image of a protest party and give a voice to all those who were disappointed and felt left out by the reunification process. In 1994, the PDS received almost 20% of votes in former East Germany, and nationally they received 4.4%. Fortunately for the PDS the party received a majority of the votes in four electoral districts, which granted it an exception from the 5% threshold rule. The result of the 1998 election, with the PDS's success of garnering almost 22% of votes in eastern Germany, demonstrates that by the end of the 1990s, people in the eastern Germany did recognize that the PDS was ultimately the party that represented them against the other major parties, for whom they would always rank second to western constituents (Patton, 2012, p. 12). Nationally, the party got 5.1%, but by 2002 the party fell under the 5% threshold and was only able to send two representatives who had obtained a majority of votes in their respective electoral districts to the legislature.

The party drew its support mostly from citizens in the new reunified German states. One reason why they were so successful was the economic disparity between eastern and western Germany, which was most sharply demonstrated by high unemployment rates in the east (Hough, 2002, p. 91). The PDS's role as a regional party did not change until after the Schröder government implemented its Agenda 2010 reform program, starting in 2003. The new government course was very controversial and led to a great deal of critique within the SPD's base, causing some members to leave the party. Critique also grew within labor unions, and some union members joined forces with former SPD members to form a new political party: Labor and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative, or simply

WASG). The WASG was formed to have a party again that represented social values after the SPD had adopted liberal market policies that were, for many, simply associated with a downward social spiral and poverty (Öchsner, 2013). The newly formed party's acceptance sharply increased in the old West German states once a former SPD chancellor candidate and finance minister joined to lead the party. Both WASG and PDS quickly realized that they shared important political views and both parties' acceptance was largely regionally based, which is why the two parties joined forces 3 months prior to the 2005 federal elections. While the party did not formally merge at this time they only ran one campaign and the WASG added the names of its candidates for parliament to the PDS candidate list for the federal election. Both parties ran under the name Left Party.PDS (Linkspartei.PDS) and they were able to obtain 8.7% of votes. The party merged formally in 2007 under the name The Left (DIE LINKE) and ran successful campaigns in 2009 and 2013 garnering 11.9% and 8.6%, respectively. Since The Left is the party's current official name this study will always refer to The Left, unless a specific timeframe is referenced.

Today, the party appears to be solidly established within the political system, but it is not free from internal strife, which revolves around how much capitalism as a system must be abolished, how to better overcome the party's SED past, and to what degree the party's pacifist ideology should influence foreign policy. Due to the party's communist past and its, at times, extreme political positions, the other parties have categorically rejected the idea of forming a governing coalition with The Left at the federal level. This means that the party does not have to soften its positions during an election campaign in order to present itself as a viable partner for forming a government. Instead, it can

maintain its extreme and sometimes populist positions (Decker, 2017b).

9.1 The Left's Election Programs

This section will present a summary for each of the seven election programs as they relate to globalization. The objective is to outline the core message that The Left communicates to voters for each election. The emphasis of these abstracts is on globalization and other economic issues, but the intent is to take an overall look at the election programs and to highlight some of the major themes. This is very helpful for addressing the questions previously raised (see Chapter 3), as some of them necessitate a wider view: For example, to assess how Hooghe and Marks' (2004) assertion that building a European identity can overcome resistance to globalization requires a broader look at The Left's election programs. The summary of the election programs is followed by an analysis of what the PDS says about globalization and how their programs relate to the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter 3.

9.1.1 The 1990 Election

The PDS's 1990 program begins with a justification for the party's existence and to emphasize that this party is not to be mistaken for the repressive unity party SED that had ruled the GDR from 1949 to 1989. This particular form of socialism in East Germany had failed to promote either a peaceful and sustainable world, or to allow for individual self-determination/self-fulfillment. However, the system in West Germany is no better at fulfilling these goals. The current condition of the world, the lack of cooperation in Europe, and the demand of the German people cannot be adequately addressed by the

prevailing political system, which is irresponsible with its military, economically antisocial, and unfair from a societal perspective. The PDS has a new vision for Germany that is not just the continuation of the old Federal Republic, but one that is infused with socialism. The party rejects the conclusion that because of the human rights record of the socialist regime in East Germany was justifiably criticized, all forms of socialism must be wrong. The form of socialism that the PDS propagates focuses on demilitarization, social and ecological restructuring of the economy, the end of patriarchal dominance within society, equal treatment of minorities, and cultural wealth for all citizens (PDS, 1990, pp. 1-3).

The first major focus in the program is democratization of society, through an open multiculturalism that is inclusive and invites everyone to participate, for example by introducing the concept of regular plebiscites into the constitution. The desired openness of society is characterized by the inclusiveness of migrants, especially those who seek asylum, but also through the party's general call to include all minorities and to fight racism and other forms of hatred (PDS, 1990, pp. 4-6). The second issue that the party addresses is the opportunity and need to demilitarize international relations in the wake of the cold war. A unified Germany is no reason for Germany to play a bigger role internationally. Germany must press for security arrangements that include the Soviet Union and reduce Soviet military forces. Weapons exports must be completely stopped and no foreign soldiers should be stationed in Germany in the future. All German forces must return home, and within 10 years Germany should be completely demilitarized by disbanding its armed forces. Goals with regard to international relations include debt reduction for third world countries, building up a European environmental program, and

the peaceful coexistence of all peoples and cultures. This also entails the idea of restoring a balance between rich northern countries and poor developing states in the southern hemisphere. The international capitalist economic system degrades developing countries to resource and agricultural exporters for the rich industrial states. Due to unfair exchange conditions, the developing countries become poorer while rich states become even richer. The PDS believes this problem can be addressed by changing the system, so that more resources and technology flow from industrial states to developing ones, through better, more purposeful and independence supporting development policies, and the creation of a development fund (PDS, 1990, pp. 8-12).

The party also addresses its commitment to an antifascist and antiracist society (PDS, 1990, pp. 13-14), asserts its belief in an open society that accepts immigrants and especially refugees, while extending unto them full participation and even the right to vote (PDS, 1990, p. 15). The party emphasizes that need for society to let women more fully determine their own lives and to become better included on the labor market (PDS, 1990, p. 16, p. 29). It is only once the party is almost half way through its program that it addresses the German economy and the effects of reunification on the people of former East Germany. In essence, the PDS is highly critical of the monetary and economic incorporation of East Germany into the capitalist structures of the Federal Republic. West Germany is not interested in investing and building up the newly rejoined East German states. Instead the East is only viewed as a new market for selling more goods and services. Many people in East Germany are unable to identify with the social element of the so-called social market economy. Mass unemployment, environmental destruction, as well as regional decay can only be prevented by increasing democratic control over

capital by turning private property over to local government and works councils. This constitutes no endorsement of Stalinism or the socialist SED rule, rather a support of socialism embedded in a truly democratic context, because this ensures maximum welfare for society as a whole (PDS, 1990, pp. 18-19). A key component of any future economic policy must also include a fundamental rethink on the environment, rejecting nuclear energy, outlawing chlorofluorocarbon, stringent emissions reductions, and better public transportation combined with regional structural development. These are the best solutions for protecting the environment (PDS, 1990, pp. 20-22).

The PDS does present measures for fighting mass unemployment. This is best done through regional structural policies with direct public investment programs that focus on ecologically sound production methods and increase skill levels among employees. Publicly financed job creation is also an important step toward increasing the skills of the unemployed and providing them with a path back into the labor force. A reduction of hours worked each week down to 35 hours, without pay cuts, is another way to increase demand for labor. Labor unions are an important ally in the fight to increase wages, to reduce temporary contracts without benefits, and for making the economy more democratic. This includes efforts to equalize pay between East and West Germany. Women must receive equal access to every sector of the economy and receive equal pay for their labor. Additionally, employers must create more flexibility for families with children so that parents can better take care of their children and have greater job security (PDS, 1990, pp. 25-29).

Other policy proposals include increased government efforts to stabilize the housing market and rent controls in larger cities to ensure that housing remains affordable

for everyone. With regard to health care, the PDS promotes the ideas of equality and community over profit maximization. Overall, the goal must be to provide better care for people, especially in rural regions, and to have more staff on hand for quality long term care (PDS, 1990, p. 33). The PDS strongly objects to efforts toward discarding the cultural identity and experiences of the people who have lived in East Germany in an effort to only promote a West German culture and identity. The cultural achievements of 40+ years in the GDR must be recognized and protected. Culture needs to be affordable and become increasingly decentralized (PDS, 1990, pp. 37-38). Education policies are mentioned at the end of the 1990 program and the focus is on equal opportunities and access to education for everyone, regardless of age, gender, nationality, socio-economic background, sexual orientation, and political or religious identity. Education must start early with government provided child care programs and it must allow for flexibility and the option to personalize the education process based on individual skill and interest. An important element must also be the intercultural education and all students' right to their own language and culture. With regard to the reunification process, it is also very important to institute equal recognition of all degrees irrespective of where these degrees were obtained (PDS, 1990, pp. 39-41).

9.1.2 The 1994 Election

The 1994 PDS election campaign program is primarily based on a substantive critique of Germany's government, in particular, how it handled the reunification process over the preceding 4 years. The party recognizes the benefits of political rights and added consumption choices that had largely been previously denied to citizens of the GDR, but

the PDS criticizes that reunification was not the merger or a joining of two equal states, but rather a subjugation. Adaptation only took place in East Germany; the West remained unchanged. Additionally, citizens in the new states are treated as second class citizens, as they are not paid equal wages or government benefits compared to the citizens of the old states. A very sensitive topic is the misappropriation of land in East Germany by persons who now own land that had been stripped from owners of large estates in 1945, under the Soviet occupation. This was an issue of great contention for the PDS, since it solidified instability and created displacement, according to the party. In general, there is a strong critique of the Kohl government in the 1994 election program, because it had governed in a way that created unacceptable social injustice, discriminated against women, built an increasingly authoritarian government, attacked trade unions and their ability to engage in collective bargaining in an unprecedented manner, and fostered a dangerous form of new nationalism. This is why the party reaffirmed its identity as socialist party with radical democratic and anticapitalist positions in 1994 (PDS, 1994, p. 4).

The greatest challenge that the PDS identifies for Germany in 1994 is the increasing number of unemployed people. The idea that good wages and benefits create unemployment is preposterous they argue. The only entity which stands to gain from low wages and minimalist benefits are the corporations who can claim record profits, but do not create more jobs. This is unsocial and unjust, which is why the PDS outlines various employment creation measures. The most important ones are to shorten the number of hours worked each week to 35, and to cut overtime. This alone will create 2 million jobs. Incomes that fall below society's average income must receive government financial support. There needs to be a firm minimum quota of jobs that must be occupied by

women, and employees must receive better termination protection in their current contracts. The state should also create its own works programs for a publicly supported employment sector. This way, another million and a half individuals can find employment. This is especially important for the former East Germany in order to build up structures that attract further development. Additional measures that will strengthen employees and create more social justice are strong labor unions and codetermination within companies, something which is best achieved through works councils. This development must also be pursued internationally, especially within the EU, in order to strengthen employees as a collective. People without employment must not be pushed to the fringes of society. Instead there must be a needs-based social welfare system that provides for people in an adequate manner. This is especially important for women who are often in more precarious financial situations. An important building block to maintain quality of life and social equality is affordable housing, which is why the government must ensure that rents are fixed and the state takes the initiative to build high quality and reasonably priced housing. It is also paramount that people in the East do not lose their existing homes and land due to expropriation efforts for land that was redistributed after the Second World War. Another important issue is the commercialization of the health care sector, to which the PDS categorically objects. Health care services must be available for everyone and the burden of paying for the cost must be disproportionally paid by those who possess greater financial means. The state must also be more actively engaged in health care, especially when it comes to creating more jobs in hospitals or care facilities. Without the necessary personnel, adequate care is impossible and Germany already faces a shortage (PDS, 1994, pp. 6-11).

It is proposed that these measures be financed through higher employment rates, general economic growth, by reducing Germany's defense budget by 10% annually, through higher income taxes for high earning individuals and various other steps are designed to tax the more affluent segment of society. This also includes closing loopholes that benefit the rich. The tax system must be much simpler, so that all citizens are able to fill out their own tax declarations, and taxes must be used more as a tool, to influence behavior. The goal must be to promote economically favorable behavior that protects the environment and rewards sustainable decisions. This can be reinforced particularly by raising ecotaxes that make people pay for their impact on the environment, such as paying for the emission of harmful gases like carbon dioxide (PDS, 1994, pp. 12-19).

Other issues that the PDS addresses in it program are gender equality and better protection for people with disabilities, including a quota that demands that a company's workforce consist of at least 6% of people with disabilities (PDS, 1994, pp. 14-16). The party also calls for a much more concerted fight against racism and right-wing extremism, which is a new development that is primarily caused by the conservative-liberal government. What Germany needs instead is a society that is open to immigrants and extends the same civil rights to them that any other resident is afforded. Ultimately, the goal must be to guarantee every resident a path to citizenship, including dual citizenship, and the right to vote for foreigners who have already lived in Germany for a set amount of time. Foreigners also add to the cultural diversity in Germany and are an enrichment for society. The state must become better at supporting alternative forms of culture and lifestyles (PDS, 1994, pp. 20-24). In terms of education policies, the goal is to create equal opportunities for everyone regardless of their socioeconomic, racial, gender,

or nationality background, as well as for people with disabilities. Schools must be structured more democratically and allow parents, students, and local government a bigger say in schools. Schools that combine students of all skill levels must become the norm over schools that separate students based upon performance at an early age. Additionally, schooling must be free of cost including text books and school supplies (PDS, 1994, pp. 25-26).

When it comes to foreign policies the PDS has two goals. The first one is to promote a holistic approach that encompasses all policy fields when it comes to development policies. Comprehensive debt relief for developing countries is a vital element in this regard. Additionally 0.7% of Germany's GDP must be immediately used to foster development in poor countries, and in the long run this figure must even be increased. The primary aim of Germany's development aid must be to promote disarmament in return for funds and to promote a fair global economic order, where developing countries have full access to the Western markets (PDS, 1994, p. 19). The other foreign policy goal is to support global antiwar policies. Germany must stop building and developing weapons systems, and there must be a ban on all arms exports. Germany must promote peace and advocate for the dissolution of NATO, as it is a military alliance. Instead, the UN should gain in importance and become democratically reformed (PDS, 1994, p. 20).

9.1.3 The 1998 Election

The 1998 program aims at offering a new political direction to Germany's voters: an alternative that emphasizes social equality for a more just republic. Germany is

experiencing a lot of misery due to the neoliberal policies of the CDU/CSU and FDP, but the PDS has a plan to build a worthwhile future by introducing a social, ecological, and economic renewal of society. While the Kohl government has created policies that have led to increased productivity, this prosperity is only enjoyed by some. Instead of the tide lifting all boats, many people are faced with poverty, injustice, and mass unemployment. Unrestrained markets have created social coldness and ecological blindness. This is why Germany needs a protest and reform movement that the PDS wants to shape in large parts. The party also reiterates its position as Germany's socialist party that supports radically democratic and anticapitalist positions. Part of this stance is the opposition to the predominant rule of capital and the striving for profits, which are the leading cause of all societal and global problems. Germany's unique experience allows for many people to compare their personal experience of living in two very different political and economic systems. This experience makes people call for a democratic renewal and create a better society by learning from past mistakes (PDS, 1998, pp. 1-3).

The election programs' predominant theme is, again, social justice and employment, because that is what is most urgently missing in contemporary Germany according to the PDS. Interestingly, the PDS asserts that globalization is often incorrectly blamed for many woes in the world including unemployment and injustice. However, the cause for such developments is simply the neoliberal policies of the government, policies that even the SPD opposition has largely adopted. The neoliberal answers of the government and business organizations to the current economic and social challenges do nothing to protect people from the harsh competition of global markets. The PDS, by contrast, wants to counter such developments by creating a social and ecological

framework. In order to address the social imbalance within German society, the PDS calls for a redistribution from top to bottom, unlike the lately more persistent development of amassing more wealth at the top by exploiting the bottom. One important element in this development is employment opportunities that increase life quality, primarily through a humanization of work. This must happen under the leadership of trade unions and focus on gender equality, more flexibility for parents, rejection of employment without full benefits, or contracts that lie outside of collective bargaining contracts. The privatization of key sectors such as rail, telecommunications, or the postal system must be strongly rejected, because it leads to fewer jobs, less social justice, and more harm to the environment (PDS, 1998, pp. 5-10). Specific policies on how this can be achieved include a reduction of the hours worked each week to a maximum of 35, without a reduction in wages. Additionally, government contracts must be awarded by including considerations about the environment as well as gender equality and the state must build up a job sector that is financed by the government to give all people opportunity to find work. Indirect labor cost must be paid according to gross value added of a position and not its nominal wages. This way, jobs that produce fewer gross profits do not become economical unviable by adding high indirect labor cost, whereas jobs that create a lot of value for a company can be used to pay a larger share of society's indirect labor costs (PDS, 1998, pp. 11-13). Income tax must also be reformed to a 20% tax rate for low incomes and a maximum tax rate of 53% for high incomes. The tax code must also be changed with regards to married people, so that the higher income, which is usually the male income due to the inequality of pay between genders, does not receive a lower tax rate than the lower income (PDS, 1998, pp. 20-21).

The PDS also wants to increase retirement benefits in order to prevent the increasing trend towards poverty among seniors. This is especially true for women, who often suffer from antiquated models of calculating benefits that do not account for time spent raising children. Health care is another issue that is experiencing a tendency towards division between rich and poor, where treatment becomes increasingly dependent upon the financial means of an individual. The PDS vehemently objects to this commercialization of the health care sector, because medical treatment must be accessible to everyone; especially preventative and rehabilitative measures must receive more funding. Housing assistance must be increased to allow people with low incomes to afford an adequate place to live. Government housing projects are an important element in any strategy of providing affordable housing (PDS, 1998, pp. 14-17). An economy that is sustainable is also very important, but it requires a radical reduction of resource consumption and better environmental protection. Waste reduction and recycling are important steps in this regard (PDS, 1998, pp. 18-19).

Naturally, the PDS also emphasizes the need to focus on rebuilding the former East Germany, because economic growth is steadily declining and the unemployment rate has reached almost 30% in 1998, according the party's campaign program. The best way to revitalize this region is through a highly active government reindustrialization policy and funding that is designed to structurally improve the new states and to create employment opportunities. Labor unions and their collective bargaining also play an important role in revitalizing the region and to secure wages that allow for sustainable living (PDS, 1998, pp. 21-23). The party also reiterates its rejection of the expropriation of land in the new German states, because it only adds to the treatment of eastern

Germany's residents as second-class citizens (PDS, 1998, p. 31).

With regards to immigration the PDS reaffirms its commitment to an open society that helps people who are in need. German society must extend the same civil rights to immigrants that every other resident enjoys. All immigrants must also be guaranteed a path to citizenship, including dual citizenship, and foreigners who have lived in Germany for at least 5 years must also get the right to vote at all levels (PDS, 1998, p. 29, p. 35). In terms of culture, the party talks about the need to better finance museums, theaters, historic monuments, and libraries. This should become a key responsibility of local governments with financial support from the federal level. Culture is an important element for self-determination, which is why it must be broadly available and inclusive, though there is no talk of a specifically German form of culture (PDS, 1998, pp. 39-41). Education is a closely related topic for the PDS, an area of policy where the party calls for more financial support to better fund education, but also structural reforms to prioritize public elementary and comprehensive schools that foster cooperative learning across broad skill levels. Since education is a basic human right, according to the PDS, the individual right to education must be included in Germany's constitution. The broad goals of all education efforts must be to promote education policies that foster independence and oppose patriarchal or racist structures (PDS, 1998, pp. 42-44).

The party's foreign policies are intended to prevent an imminent global, ecological, and social catastrophe. The power hungry and market obsessed deregulation policies that are promoted by international corporations, the World Bank, and the IMF have the most devastating consequences in the southern hemisphere. The prevalent financial globalization policies with neoliberal character are generally opposed to

international democratization and humanization. Furthermore, the sovereign equality of all states and the self-determination of all peoples is undermined by the interest of global capitalism. It is therefore paramount to push back against nationalism and the neoconservative attacks against the fundamentals of the social state. Globalization necessitates a close look at the global ecological dangers that are present everywhere and require immediate attention. Interestingly enough, the party's wording does not indicate that globalization is the cause of the environmental problems, only that it makes it unavoidable to deal with the issue by introducing international and European social and ecological minimum standards. These standards must not be used to create barriers for developing countries to access global markets. In fact, all forms of tariffs and market entry barriers must be removed in rich countries. Germany must also do more to finance development efforts in poor countries and these efforts must no longer be based upon the criteria of capitalist organizations like WTO, World Bank, and IMF. Instead, they must be based upon social and ecological principles and they need to reflect local interests. The party also stresses the idea that globalization is best achieved through regionalization, which is an alternative to pure global market expansion efforts. Instead, concepts that promote regional and local economic structures are much better at combining citizens' involvement and social and environmental standards. This is important, because the environmentally destructive process of transporting goods around the globe is not sustainable (PDS, 1998, pp. 47-50). How this conforms to any traditional definition of globalization is not clear.

With regards to other international institutions the party again clearly rejects NATO and any other military alliance, because it does not fit with the party's pacifist

ideals (PDS, 1998, pp. 51-52). The EU is an important organization for the PDS, but it must become social, democratic, ecological, peace promoting, open minded, and create jobs (PDS, 1998, p. 6). The EU must also receive the support necessary to actively use regulatory measures to intervene in markets in order to create and promote binding social and environmental standards (PDS, 1998, pp. 53-54).

9.1.4 The 2002 Election

The primary focus of the 2002 program is, again, on creating jobs, and a significant reduction in the number of unemployed residents. This to be achieved by reducing the maximum work week, including overtime, to 40 hours a week. In the quest for more flexibility for employees to organize their work life balance, some people might opt for a shorter week. This will increase the demand for labor, thus creating more opportunities for people to find employment. Additionally, the state must build up a publicly funded or subsidized employment sector that can be primarily used to render social, cultural, or ecological services that are often not paid at all or receive only minimal compensation. Labor unions are also an important element in securing sustainable wages through collective bargaining, but it is also vital to overcome the erroneous idea that lower wages or tax cuts lead to more jobs. This idea is amply disproved by the high unemployment figures in eastern Germany. The PDS also asserts that prosperity only increases at the top and that despite the SPD government's promises to represent the interests of ordinary people, in reality, Schröder only represents the interests of companies. One way that the PDS wants to assure that economic growth benefits not only corporate profits is by introducing a binding minimum wage off of

which people can live. Additionally, there must be special emphasis for affirmative action with regards to gender. Women are routinely discriminated against in the job market, which is why women must receive preferential treatment under condition of equal qualifications. Other steps for promoting job growth include tax levels that a deduct a minimum material standard, one that closes tax loopholes, an energy tax that is primarily used to improve public transportation, and an introduction of a tax on financial transactions (PDS, 2002, pp. 3-7).

To be socially secure is another important issue, which according to the PDS, means to guarantee individual self-determination. An important element in this regard is the social safety net, whose funding has been questioned, because it necessitates a relatively high level of indirect labor cost. This is why the party, again, suggests paying indirect labor cost based upon the gross value added of a position and not its nominal wages. This way, job loss due to rationalization can be reduced. Additionally, individual contributions can be reduced if the group of contributors is widened by including the self-employed and government employees, who are currently largely exempt (PDS, 2002, p. 10). Additionally, there must be guaranteed provisions for everyone who cannot provide a basic level of prosperity. These basic provisions include financial means for anyone who has fewer funds available than 50% of Germany's average net income, housing grants to make housing more affordable for low-income families, and guaranteed access to free healthcare and long-term care. The party also outlines specific efforts to pay more financial support for children and to provide more public childcare, in order to allow parents additional flexibility and further opportunities to pursue a career for women in particular. Concerning health care, the aim is to guarantee equal treatment for all citizens

regardless of income. The party also rejects the idea of adding competition over healthy patients and the lowest rates, or increased individual insurance contributions. When it comes to retirement benefits, the PDS warns of low benefits that lead to poverty. This is often especially true for women who have not worked continuously. Here, the state needs to calculate retirement contributions differently so that caring for children or elder family members does not lead to low retirement benefits. The party also strongly objects to the idea of increasing the retirement age (PDS, 2002, pp. 11-14).

Naturally, the party also discusses education policies and emphasizes the need to allow all children an equal start in life. Education must foster the ability to grasp connections and pursue life-long learning, so as to obtain social and historic knowledge about one's own society, but also understand other cultures. This type of education must finally be disassociated with a particular socioeconomic background and, instead, must be open to all, including people with disabilities. This is best achieved by providing more funding for early childhood education, by hiring more teachers, by providing better and continuous training for teachers, and by better funding classroom equipment and books (PDS, 2002, pp. 14-15). The party also reiterates its commitment to an open society that helps refugees and provides them with opportunities to become a part of Germany's society. This includes illegal residents in Germany who must be afforded an opportunity to achieve legal status, so that they can fully participate in society and are not condemned to a life in the shadows, which is usually characterized by exploitation. The PDS also promotes efforts to harmonize asylum and migration policies across Europe based upon human rights (PDS, 2002, p. 20).

Again, the PDS pays special attention to the structural problems in eastern

Germany, which has been more severely affected by unemployment and slow economic growth than the rest of the country. This is why a new start is necessary. The expansion of the EU is an important factor in this regard, because it places Germany's new states very close to new states in the east and combined with structural support from the federal government, this can lead to a revitalization of the region by becoming a bridge between old and new regions within the EU. This entails great opportunities for economic exchange, but also for social and cultural exchanges which must be based upon mutual respect and understanding. This must be supported through exchanges and language projects. The equalization of wages between new and old states is still a very important topic for the PDS because the unequal treatment of citizens of the former GDR is unacceptable. This equalization must also include retirement benefits and better recognition of job qualifications that were acquired in the former German Democratic Republic, which are often viewed as inferior or not even accepted in western Germany (PDS, 2002, pp. 7-9).

In foreign policy, there are two very important issues for the PDS; the first one is to stop the unrestrained capitalist globalization from exacerbating global differences between rich and poor. The policies of large and powerful industrial nations are only focused on increasing power by promoting capitalism through globalization, the consequences of which are disastrous, such as increased instability, violence, and injustice. The PDS wants to build globalization around the ideals of a cooperative global economic order that is social, ecological, and democratic. Important specific steps that the party identifies in this regard are taxes on international financial transactions in order to prevent speculation, the implementation of binding social standards, and the release of

patents that are vital for providing basic human needs, like for expensive medication that could be made available via inexpensive generic alternatives. Developing countries must also receive better access to global markets, which necessitates that rich countries stop export subsidies (PDS, 2002, pp. 21-22). This alone is not enough though. A “Marshall Plan” for developing states is necessary and can be realized by increasing foreign aid and comprehensive debt reduction measures. This can easily be financed by a reduction of defense budgets which account for vast expenditures in the rich world. This ties in with PDS's second core principle of international relations: pacifism. This is expressed by a strong commitment to decrease Germany’s military and to solve conflicts peacefully. This includes the fight against terrorism, which is why the party strongly objects to the war in Afghanistan, but especially to the participation of German forces. The party also maintains its commitment to dissolving NATO and to stop weapons exports (PDS, 2002, pp. 23-24). With regard to other international organizations, the PDF briefly mentions the UN and emphasizes the need for this organization to better promote peace and to allow third world countries more influence within its halls. The EU receives more attention in the 2002 program and the PDS asserts that the monetary and economic union must be complemented by a social and environmental union, because environmental and social standards must not be determined by international trade organizations like the WTO (PDS, 2002, p. 3). The EU must become more democratic and transparent (PDS, 2002, p. 18) and Germany ought to use its membership to push for more social and ecological policies from Brussels (PDS, 2002, p. 21). The goal of the EU must be to foster cooperation and not competition among its members for the most favorable corporate investment environment. Its member states must focus on their domestic economies and

the necessary industrial, labor, and environmental policies to support it, instead of promoting international competition that only leads to social dumping. This must also include EU wide tax harmonization in order to create quality (PDS, 2002, p. 25).

9.1.5 The 2005 Election

The 2005 program represents the first election after the merger of the PDS and WSAG into The Left Party/PDS. Therefore, the following analysis will simply refer to the party as The Left Party, whose program begins with the assertion that new political direction is necessary for Germany, one that leads to new social and democratic alternatives. This refers especially to the policies of the Agenda 2010, which the party detests, because longer work hours, reduction of wages and retirement benefits, and higher health insurance contributions are all consequences of the new political course. Especially critical in the eyes of The Left Party is the monetary and temporal reduction of unemployment benefits. The whole agenda constitutes the erosion of solidarity which used to be an important pillar of German society. The policies of the SPD/Green coalition only continue the disastrous redistribution of wealth from bottom to top that the Kohl-era started. Democratic socialism compels The Left Party into action for a better society that is more inclusive and just (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 5-6).

Job creation and social rights are the most important topics for the party in 2005. The guiding principle for all economic activities of the state must be to increase domestic demand. The increased demand for goods and services will create new and sustainable jobs that are much better than jobs that are dependent on exports, because export jobs rely on the whims of the international economy. In order to increase domestic demand, people

must have more purchasing power. This is why low wage strategies do not create jobs. Likewise, lower social benefits only lead to less domestic demand and fewer jobs. One step towards increasing domestic demand is the creation of a publicly financed labor sector that focuses on jobs that the private economy disregards as not profitable such as community, charitable, and nonprofit work. These jobs will not be in competition with the private sector and will be coordinated together with labor unions and employer associations. Other steps to increase demand include better qualifying workers through continuous training, a minimum wage of 8.50 Euros, to limit the work week to a maximum of 40 hours, and to promote better investments into sustainable technologies and better infrastructure for constant economic growth (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 7-10).

To be socially secure in order to live a self-determined life is vital for The Left Party, which is why the party demands that no one in Germany should live with fewer financial means than 60% of Germany's average net income. All government programs must work together to ensure that this minimum is met. With regard to retirement policies, the goal is still to reject lower benefits, because this often leads to poverty, especially for women. This is why the state must begin to calculate retirement contributions differently so as to include time spent caring for children and/or providing long term care for other family members. Health care must continuously be provided on the basis of a social system that provides equal care for everyone. The party also reiterates its demand that indirect labor costs for companies must be calculated based upon the gross value add of a position and not its nominal wage (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 11-12). Wealth redistribution is also needed to create equality and to allow everyone the opportunity to participate in society. The idea is that wealth must be distributed from

the top down, which can largely be accomplished by tax reforms. Three important elements in this context are to better tax international corporations and to close loopholes so that they cannot redistribute profits among countries to avoid paying taxes. Another, is to reform income taxes and to allow for 12,000 Euro worth of tax free income. Everything above that will be taxed with a 15% tax, which will gradually increase to a maximum of 50% for incomes over 60,000 Euro annually. The third important reform is to get rid of joint tax filing for couples, which allows for an unequal taxation of incomes from both partners, which predominantly leads to higher taxes for women.

Education takes a more prominent role in this election program compared to previous PDS programs. The party states that education is essential for the development of society and the individual, but educational achievement is disproportionally dependent on one's background. Only a minority of children and youth experience great education: That must stop immediately. This is achieved through individual support and a school system that is inclusive, which means that all children attend the same type of school instead of being separated based on early childhood selection processes. Schools will also provide more academic and social opportunities for children by offering a full day program. Early childhood development opportunities must start before school which is why all parents must have access to free preschool/childcare for their children. A particular focus of this offer is the integration of immigrant children and to impart the necessary language skills so that all children can succeed once they start school. When it comes to tertiary education, The Left Party only states that there must be no tuition fees for students. The party insists on more cooperation between the individual states and more involvement of state legislatures in order to create uniform standards. All of these

goals will be financed by an immediate increase of education funding to 5% of GDP and a long term commitment to spend 6% annually of Germany's GDP on education (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 14-16).

Environmental protection is an important issue, as well, in this election program. The way to achieve this is by bringing economic, social, and ecological goals in harmony with one another. In concrete terms, this means drastically reducing emissions by 90% based upon 1990 emission levels. This has to be largely achieved by relying on renewable energy, but also by a significant reduction of energy consumption. This can be done through taxes that encourage frugal behavior, building upon a European emissions trading system, and by breaking up energy monopolies. The production of nuclear energy must be stopped since it is too dangerous and the long-term storage of nuclear waste is harmful to the environment. The usage of chemicals must also be curbed due to the many negative side effects for humans, animals, and the environment (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 20-21).

Other issues that The Left Party addresses include the rebuilding of eastern Germany, although the emphasis is less pronounced than in earlier programs, and there is an added emphasis on improving all structurally weak regions within Germany (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 17-18). The party promotes the regular use of plebiscites for a more direct form of democracy and to extend the right to vote to all permanent residents and not just citizens (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 22). Additionally, citizenship must be awarded to anyone who is born in Germany and dual citizenship will be acceptable too. Germany is an immigrant country and it is time that policies reflect that. This includes refugees who must be welcomed and there must be a way for all immigrants to obtain legal

residency status. Immigration and asylum policies must be standardized across Europe (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 24-25). There is also a strong commitment to oppose any kind of discrimination including gender, race, age, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. The party also warns against right wing extremism and calls for a more persistent fight against racism, nationalism, and antisemitism (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 23-24).

When it comes to Germany's global role, The Left Party has a clear position. It must work with Europe to become a counterweight to America's goal of global dominance, by promoting peaceful conflict resolution. German soldiers must not be stationed abroad and its armed forces need to be heavily reduced. Europe must also become free of nuclear weapons, NATO should be dissolved, and there must be an export stop on weapons systems. There is brief mention of the EU in the 2005 program, primarily focused on emphasizing the party's commitment to Europe, but rejecting Brussels' focus on markets and monetary stability. Instead, the EU must focus on creating jobs and providing a social safety net (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 29-31). Globalization is addressed on the very last page, expressing the party's objection to the neoliberal form of globalization. Social and ecological standards are indispensable to guarantee a fair economic relationship between rich northern and poor southern countries. This necessitates that Germany meet its target of spending 0.7% of its GDP on foreign aid and to engage in debt relief for developing countries. Additionally, a comprehensive democratization process is necessary for international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Otherwise a social society with humane living standards is not possible and the overwhelming power of capital will not be restrained.

9.1.6 The 2009 Election

The 2009 program begins with a comprehensive critique of the global economic order. People are afraid of losing their livelihoods, having to live on lower retirement benefits, or losing the government support on which they rely. The financial crisis exposes the weakness of the international system and proves that global capitalism is not capable of guaranteeing reasonably tolerable and humane living standards. The system has also created global imbalances that become more and more apparent, which lead to the destruction of production and productivity of jobs and prosperity globally. The Left's goal is to outline a program that presents an alternative to the economic order that is only driven by profit, and they insist that governments stop their subservience to capitalism (The Left, 2009, pp. 1-2). Key steps in this regard are massive investments by the state at all levels to the tune of 100 million Euro annually, which is intended to boost the economy in a socially and ecologically sustainable direction. Privatization must be stopped and in important cases even reversed. A national minimum wage of 10 Euro must be introduced along with benefits in all employment contracts, and the maximum work week cannot exceed 40 hours, with a regular week of 35 hours, without reduction of wages. Additionally, families will get more support under a Left government to make it easier to combine children and work, which is especially important for women, who need more support. One way to do that is to introduce a binding employment quota for companies to fill at least 50% of their positions at all levels with female employees (The Left, 2009, pp. 4-6).

Creating guarantees against sliding down the socio-economic ladder is still an important issue for The Left. The Agenda 2010 policies of the previous government and

the financial crisis created a tremendous amount of fear for people, and this has greatly served companies who can use that fear to suppress wages and in turn increase their profit margin. The social safety net is essential for society, which is why the program spends a good amount of content explaining the party's position on various social pillars. The first one is the current threat to reducing retirement benefits, which The Left vehemently objects too. Living standards for seniors must be protected not discarded. This includes a return to the previous retirement age of 65 years and better recognition of the nonworkforce contributions of women to ensure that they are not faced with poverty once they retire. Health care is important, because it unavoidably affects everyone in a significant way. It is a basic human right to receive medical care regardless of one's economic background, which is why the trend to commercialize healthcare in the interests of big pharmaceutical companies must be fought. Effective and quality treatment must not be subjugated to economic constraints. In the end, the determining characteristic of Germany's medical system is the social component. One way to reduce the impact of medical care is to reduce sales taxes on medication as well as low binding prices (The Left, 2009, pp. 13-14). The Left also presents various policies that are aimed at increasing security for workers, like making it harder for companies to fire people, increasing unemployment benefits, allowing the unemployed to be selective in finding a new job without losing benefits, and better supporting labor unions in their fight for higher wages. Low income families pay disproportionally for housing, which is why the state must introduce rent ceilings, invest in more public housing, and subsidize rent payments (The Left, 2009, pp. 15-16). Besides these general factors that can lead to social exclusion, there is a continuous threat that especially women, immigrants, disabled individuals, and

homosexuals are more often excluded. There must be a concerted effort to stop this. More resources need to be dedicated to supporting people who are more likely to become victims of social exclusion (The Left, 2009, p. 17). The 2009 election program does contain a special emphasis on developing eastern Germany's structurally weak regions. The objective is to develop them in their own right and not to attempt to copy western German models. A vital step towards this goal is adopting equal pay and government benefits with people living in the West. Additionally, there must be an emphasis on new ecological and efficient technologies, and a heavy focus on building strong regional economies with strong domestic demand (The Left, 2009, p. 12).

Plans to pay for these policy changes and investment plans include the introduction of an annual 5% millionaire's tax, a financial transaction tax, higher corporate taxes, and the personal income tax that should be as high as 53% percent for people who make more than 65,000 Euro annually. Additionally, the party proposes nationalizing the entire banking industry and putting the remaining financial sector under public control (The Left, 2009, p. 4, p. 7, p. 18).

Environmental protection is an important issue in this election program as well. To achieve this, economic, social, and ecological goals must be brought into harmony with one another. The party restates its environmental core goals to reduce emissions by 90% based upon 1990 emission levels, by extensively relying on renewable energy and reduced energy consumption. Another essential goal is a complete ban on nuclear energy. An issue that first crops up in this election program is mobility. Transportation still adds increasing amounts of emissions annually. This must stop, by heavily expanding public transportation. This will both decrease the environmental impact of transportation and, at

the same time, increase mobility for a large swath of people who rely on public transportation (The Left, 2009, pp. 8-9). Just as important as ecological issues is the education system, which is currently unable to overcome social differences among students, where achievement depends largely on a student's background. Germany must develop a school system that creates equal opportunities, through better and more comprehensive free early-childhood education, integrative school structures, better integration for immigrants (including language support), better financial aid for college students, no tuition for college education, and legislating companies to create more vocational training positions (The Left, 2009, pp. 21-22). Research and development must become increasingly focused on creating technologies that foster a social society and sustainability, for example, by paying more attention to global issues such as inequality, climate change, clean energy, and more affordable medication (The Left, 2009, pp. 22-23).

The Left warns that cultural engagement is essential for a society in order to reflect and improve, which is why the state must be more actively engaged in protecting and supporting theaters, libraries, archives, and orchestras. Culture must also be inclusive, something to which everyone can contribute and minorities are included and protected; this includes foreigners, especially (The Left, 2009, pp. 24-25). The party's asylum policies reflect this cultural openness as well, which is characterized by the idea that our shared humanity demands that anyone who has to flee their home due to persecution can find refuge in Germany. This is an issue that requires better coordination at the European level (The Left, 2009, pp. 29-30).

In terms of foreign policy, The Left calls for a fundamental reorientation of the

relationship between Germany and countries of the southern hemisphere. Development aid is still focused on promoting the interests of donor countries. The aim should be to develop local markets that can become an opposing pole to global trade policies. This can lead to more employment and fair prices for developing countries. Other important steps include debt relief, striking export subsidies, and a focus of development aid on achieving human rights and gender equality (The Left. 2009, pp. 32-33). The UN must take on a vital role in achieving a peaceful global order, reducing global emissions, promoting human rights, and ending hunger. The general assembly needs more power within the UN framework to counterbalance the disproportionately controlling veto powers. The UN must become the central organization to organize global affairs. Other international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank must be placed under control of the UN. Germany must do its own part in reducing conflicts around the world, by starting to completely withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, radically reducing military spending, and reducing the influence of NATO (The Left, 2009, pp. 32-35).

9.1.7 The 2013 Election

The Left's 2013 program stresses the importance of overcoming poverty, which is why the party wants to redistribute wealth, promote social basic rights, good jobs, and free education. No one should have to face poverty due to age, unemployment, physical or mental incapacities, chronic illness, or poor parents. The necessary steps for overcoming poverty are more power for labor unions and a binding collective bargaining process. It also entails limiting the power of banks and big companies, and stopping the system that is only focused on short term profit maximization, especially on the financial

market. This has devastating consequences for people, and it is time to free citizens from this choke hold. Freedom for individuals is something different from the freedom of markets or free competition. The Left is the socialist civil rights party in Germany and as such will no longer tolerate a system where the poorest individuals are reviled and immigrants are treated as criminals. Social injustice is continually increasing; it is time to do something against this development. The remainder of the election program does exactly that, present a way out of the crisis towards universal prosperity (The Left, 2013, pp. 6-9).

The first and largest share of the program focuses on good jobs and social justice. A good job is one that provides enough income to meet monthly expenditures and to allow for a self-determined life. This is why incomes must grow faster than prices, which is why collective bargaining, with its wage agreements, is indispensable. Politics must ensure that sector-wide wage agreements are binding and implemented. This must include all employees and not just the ones with permanent full time contracts. Contractors, nonpermanent contracts, and the abuse of free internships must all come to an end. All employment must be permanent and receive full benefits, with an immediate minimum wage of 10 Euros. In the long run, the minimum wage will be at least 60% of the average hourly national wage, which as of 2013, would result in a minimum wage of 12 Euros. The Left also calls for maximum income for managers, which should not exceed the lowest incomes by more than 40 times (The Left, 2013, pp. 11-14). The average number of hours worked each week will be limited to 40, under a Left coalition government, with a standard work week of 35 and a long-term goal of only 30 hours per week. Additionally, companies must practice more codetermination and they must

become more democratic, by giving employees a direct say within their companies. In order to create more jobs, the state must operate through a publicly subsidized job sector. One provision of the Agenda 2010, with which The Left vehemently disagrees, is the loss of benefits for individuals who do not accept work which is not in alignment with their qualifications, a statute which they would strike (The Left, 2013, pp. 15-18, pp. 63-64). Mass lay-offs are a popular tool for companies in their effort to maximize profits and to restructure their businesses, with tremendous negative regional consequences, which is why legislation must be enacted to abolish the practice (The Left, 2013, p. 59).

Social justice also means that everyone deserves a retirement which does not exclude them from participating in society, one which does not force an individual to confront poverty. The absolute minimum monthly retirement payment must exceed 1000 Euro (The Left, 2013, p. 19). The health care sector is in need of a social overhauls too; the two-class system is unacceptable. We cannot allow poverty to make individuals sick and cause them to die early. All medically necessary treatments must be covered by insurance companies. Health care must be about providing optimal treatments and not about maximizing profit. The same is true of long-term care, especially for the elderly. Good care is essential and must be available to everyone. The state will provide more support options to individuals who care for loved ones within the home, by providing more training to caregivers and by implementing better mobile support. There is also a shortage of nurses and caregivers due to cost-saving measures that repeatedly cut healthcare positions. This must be immediately addressed by the government through the creation of new public jobs in healthcare (The Left, 2013, pp. 20-23).

Affordable housing is also an issue in 2013, and The Left party largely trusts that

affordable housing is best ensured by limiting rent increases and safeguarding that no one has to leave their apartment, just because the ownership of the real estate changed. Government regulation must be enacted which prevents real estate purchases for speculative purposes. Additional housing can be provided by the government through investment in ecological and affordable housing. The overall goal of these efforts is to ensure that no one pays more than 30% of their income for housing and utilities (The Left, 2013, pp. 29-32).

These measures will be financed through a top to bottom redistribution of wealth. Inheritance taxes will be increased to meet the European average, the corporate tax rate will be increased to 25%, a financial transaction tax of 0.1% will have to be levied, and tax exemptions will be cut. Income taxes will also be reformed so that individuals with lower incomes pay less taxes and incomes over 65,000 Euro pay taxes at a rate of 53%. A 75% tax rate applies for all income earned above 1 million Euro. The government must also stop the privatization of government services in the name of raising funds for government budgets. Public services are essential and must be available for everyone; government debt is not bad if it is used for the social, cultural, and democratic development of society (The Left, 2013, pp. 24-28). However, Germany's society needs a complete realignment of its focus. The current emphasis on profit maximization must be replaced by a focus on human needs and desires. The economy has to be restructured so as to provide sustainable employment that allows for a life without poverty. Additionally, the economy must also become much greener. Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by 90% before 2050, based upon 1990 levels, is top priority (The Left, 2013, p. 60).

The Left criticizes the current educational system, because it reinforces privilege

and social exclusion. Education reform is urgently needed, in which we move away from the system that separates students at an early age and creates path dependencies that are hard to overcome. Every child must have access to early childhood education so that language competencies are established early on and full participation in school life is possible. Learning together, and from one another, enables all students to achieve better results and opens a path for higher education that would otherwise remain closed. Government and private companies must do more to ensure ample vocational training opportunities after school to allow for a successful start in a career. Higher education must remain free of charge and be open to more students. The EU reform process for the harmonization of university degrees is to be rejected, because it introduces a strict regulated framework that creates pressures and is counterproductive to a free development of self-determination, intellectual development, and critical thinking. Admittance to programs needs to be determined by students, and not universities which implement rigorous selection processes (The Left, 2013, pp. 33-36).

Other policy issues include gender equality, with a strong emphasis on stopping all forms of violence against women, but also an effort to end the routine discrimination against women in the labor market. Here, the government can take on an important role by ensuring that 50% of all public job postings are filled by women (The Left, 2013, pp. 39-41), which is why women must receive preferential treatment under condition of equal qualifications. With regards to culture The Left points out that culture must be accessible for everyone and that it is vital for everyone to have cultural space for individual development. The party also asserts its support of cultural diversity and the need to build an open inclusive society that integrates everyone. Minorities need to fully participate at

all levels and the state must build up institutions that foster diversity including minority languages and cultures (The Left, 2013, pp. 43-44). A special emphasis on protecting and integrating immigrants is also necessary, as they are more often confronted with unemployment and poverty (The Left, 2013, p. 77).

The global economy and its continuous crisis since 2007 illustrates the inability of capitalism to solve problems. It is designed to repress wages and to allow the rich to circumvent financing public goods. A key factor for the crisis, according to The Left party, is trade imbalance. Extreme export surpluses by some states leads to large debt for countries that import the lion's share of their GDP. Solving the crisis must begin by reducing imbalances, increasing wages, as well as implementing a socially and ecologically sound government investment program. Thus, domestic demand can be increased and if this is paired with more comprehensive regulation of the financial sector and more taxes for the rich, then the crisis can be overcome (The Left, 2013, p. 46). Especially within Europe, the focus must shift from the free movement of capital and increasing competitiveness, to strengthening labor unions and collective bargaining. Wage dumping must be abolished through harmonized standards for wages, taxes, and social policies across the EU. The German government especially favors markets over the interest of EU citizens, and this must stop immediately. A free trade zone between the EU and the USA are only counterproductive in this regard and must be rejected (The Left, 2013, pp. 49-51). Social justice is a global goal, which is why development strategies must be changed to better reflect the needs of the developing states and not be aligned with the interests of the rich industrial states. Increased funds for development are one important element in this regard, but different trade practices must be implemented as

well. Imports must only be allowed when products are fair trade products that have been produced under conditions that are both sustainable and in alignment with EU consumer protection regulation. This requires establishing a certification and control process (The Left, 2013, p. 54).

Another important foreign policy issue for The Left is that war must never be used as a tool in achieving political goals. This is why Germany's military must be withdrawn from all foreign engagements. Instead, Germany should focus on supporting the UN and its efforts to promote human rights. Germany must also ban arms sales even to allies. In fact, producers of military equipment must transition into other industries that are not related to fostering violent conflict (The Left, 2013, pp. 52-55).

9.2 Initial Election Program Analysis

This paragraph examines the five key terms as they appear in all seven party election programs of The Left/The PDS, since 1990. A detailed explanation of how the programs are analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded, with regards to the key terms, can be found in Section 4.3. Figure 9.1 shows all direct references with regards to the five key terms; one can pick out phases within the election programs. The first two elections hardly mention the key terms at all. There are absolutely no references to any of the terms in 1990 which is unique among all of the 35 examined election programs. The 1994 election only mentions trade twice and exports twice, and it is not until the 1998 election campaign that globalization enters into The Left/PDS election programs. The two elections around the turn of the century most frequently mention globalization, a total of 11 times. Issues like trade and exports are briefly touched upon. The combined election

program of PDS and WASG in 2005 marks a sharp reversal from the previous trend. Globalization is only mentioned once and trade is referred to twice, making this the program with the second fewest references of the five key terms. Globalization is pretty much a dead topic for The Left in their last two election programs, as there is only one reference on the issue. References on trade and export explode in the last two programs, with a combined 19 trade and 24 export references. These last two elections are also the only elections in which the party refers to imports and free trade in a meaningful manner. In essence, one can identify three phases with regards to these election programs: in the early phase, globalization and trade are largely irrelevant topics for the PDS. During the second phase from 1998 to 2002 globalization begins to become an important topic, which is in line with all the other parties, where globalization begins to gain traction around the turn of the century. Other trade issues are not mentioned much in this second phase, where the emphasis for the PDS is on shaping globalization (PDS, 2002, p. 22). The 2005 election separates the second from the third phase. In this election, the joint PDS/WSAG program focuses on tearing apart the domestic policies of the Schröder government, and there is hardly any mention of the five terms. The last two election programs of The Left party constitute the third phase, in which globalization is unimportant as a topic. It is as if the party is done with that subject and has moved on to focus on trade related issues. References to the other four key terms increase sharply. Overall, two thirds of all mentions of the five terms happens in the last two programs. As the following paragraph shows, the 2009 and 2013 programs focus on criticizing anything trade related.

The message of Figure 9.2, which shows the normative meaning that goes along

with any of the five globalization key terms, is quite obvious. The Left party is highly critical of globalization and international trade. About a quarter of all references are neutral in nature. The only positive reference to trade was the trading of emissions certificates in the 2005 election (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 20). Both the 2009 and 2013 programs mention opportunities with regards to trade twice. In 2009 the focus is on creating trade structures that can make trade more fair (Left, 2009, p. 32), and emissions trading, which is potentially an opportunity to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Left, 2009, p. 9). Interestingly, this is already a step back from the 2005 program where emissions trading schemes are regarded as something positive. Additionally, the last two election programs both mention that emissions trading has failed as a means to curb greenhouse gas emissions (Left, 2009, p. 33, 2013, p. 65). The remaining 70% of references are all negative, with most of that contribution coming from the last two elections. The Left clearly has scaled up its critique of the neoliberal structures that dominate international trade (Left, 20013, p. 54).

While Figure 9.2 does suggest that The Left party has a very negative disposition towards any of the five key terms, it does not allow for any specific inferences as to how the party feels about each individual term. The following paragraphs will assess how The Left regards each one of the key terms individually. Beginning with globalization, which is mentioned a total of 13 times (see Figure 9.3), one can see that references are close to equally distributed between neutral references and those that emphasize the risks and dangers of trade, with the latter having one more mention. There is no mention at all of potentially positive outcomes from globalization.

Figure 9.4 shows how all trade references in the seven Left party election

programs are divided. This is the only term where the combined negative references make up less than 50%. There are a total of 28 references, with one of them, as previously mentioned, referring to the positive effects of emissions trading. Fourteen percent of all statements on trade highlight the opportunities that arise from trade and 39% are neutral in nature. Overall, the picture of trade is more negative than it is positive, with 7% of references referring to the unjust character of international trade and 36% outlining the risks and dangers of trade. A common tenor of the negative references is the critique of international trade organizations like the WTO and its promotion of capitalism (PDS 1998, p. 49, 2002, p. 3, Left 2009, p. 34) and arms trading (PDS 1994, p. 3, 2002, p. 24). It is interesting to note that trade appears to be the issue that The Left is most at ease with, since it is the only globalization related term that the party uses in a positive context, albeit being heavily outnumbered by negative references on the issue of trade. Figure 9.5 shows that all but one of the party's 32 export references deal with trade in a negative manner. Most of them refer to the party's objections to regular or nuclear waste exports (PDS, 1994, p. 18, 1998, p. 19, The Left, 2013, p. 65), or arms sales to other countries. For example, the 2013 election program refers to arms exports in a negative context 10 times. The only other reference on exports is neutral. The Left's position on trade is illustrated in Figure 9.6, which demonstrates that a quarter of the eight total references on imports are neutral. The remainder of mentions are negative in nature. These important critical points are almost exclusively mentioned in the last two election programs and focus on the party's rejection of importing agricultural products in order to produce fuel (The Left, 2009, p. 9, p. 33, 2013, p. 54, p. 67).

Figure 9.7, the final figure in this chapter, illustrates The Left's position on free

trade, which only became an issue in 2009 and 2013. One of eight total references is about the unjust nature of free trade, while there are two instances where trade is referred to in a neutral manner. The remaining references make up 62% and states that free trade has failed (The Left, 2009, p. 32), or that it only leads to price dumping and lower standards (The Left, 2009, p. 32, 2013, p. 59). Additionally, free trade is only good for large international companies and it fosters neoliberal structures (The Left, 2013, p. 54), which are all reasons that it should be resisted.

9.3 Comparing Election Programs to Globalization and Political Parties

A somewhat common thread throughout this study has been to point out incongruities in the assessment of party positions on globalization and trade, because of the role that trade plays for Germany and how it is over proportionally involved in trade compared to other developed economies of its size, or that parties should equally discuss the benefits of exports and imports. The same could be said for The Left party, but it is important to keep in mind that The Left is a party which is highly critical of the entire political, social, and economic system in Germany. It is also the only major political party in Germany that has never been involved in governing at the federal level.

This makes it a lot easier for the party to formulate holistic criticism, because it is never responsible for the system. Similarly, since the party has never been seriously considered at the federal level for a governing coalition, it has also has had the ability to been extremely unrestrained in the policy proposals that it communicates to voters, because the party knows that voters will not measure its performance on its ability to

implement campaign promises. This means that the campaign program of The Left will always be more extreme than its counterparts' programs.

The question of whether or not factor mobility is addressed by The Left, as outlined by Brawly (1997), cannot be answered in the affirmative. Congruent with the other four parties, factor mobility is too complex an issue for political parties to address in an election campaign. As a matter of fact, The Left is the party that differentiates the least between industries or sectors within the economy. The only manner in which The Left breaks up the economy is through its regional focus on the former East Germany. Similarly, the issue of volatility, as defined by Woodruff (2005) as fluctuating between economic busts and booms, is not addressed by the party. The Left does not build arguments around pivotal events like the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The party consistently presents a systemic critique of capitalism (PDS, 1994, p. 4) and the neoliberal policies of Germany' government (PDS, 1998, p. 5). The rhetoric does get a bit more pronounced in the 2009 election program, pointing out how companies have used the crisis and the threat of unemployment to squeeze workers (The Left, 2009, pp. 13-14). As previously stated, The Left has not been involved in any federal coalition governments nor have they been seriously considered for such a coalition by any of the other parties at the federal level. This allows the party to be consistently disparaging when it comes to German politics, society, and the economy, but there is no significant change in the party's rhetoric that would correspond to the economy's performance.

The issue of how parties address labor subgroups as put forth by Midford (1993) is straightforward in the case of The Left, because the party does not distinguish between labor subgroups. Instead, the party's language revolves around workers and employees

whose collective prosperity is in conflict with the capitalist profit maximization efforts of big companies. Garst (1998) argues that unions are an important element to overcome the negative consequences of globalization and that they are important for building support. While The Left certainly does not talk about unions as a tool to mitigate the negative effects of globalization and increase a sense of security despite increasing openness, the party does so indirectly. Ever since the 1994 election. the party asserts its commitment to labor unions and the vital role that they must play within society, by fighting for the rights of workers and employees (PDS, 1994, pp. 18-19). With regards to unions, it is important for The Left to strengthen their ability to speak for workers and to establish a degree of codetermination within companies (The Left, 2009, p. 6). The party also calls for protecting collective bargaining and the right to strike (PDS, 1998, p. 6). The Left also views labor unions as an ally in the fight to protect people from unemployment and institute shorter work weeks (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 8, p. 10).This message is consistently communicated to voters and the electorate should get a sense that unions are an important factor for guaranteeing the rights of all employees and for better wages. However, unions are also important players for strengthening the social safety net, not just for increasing wages of the currently employed. Unions are one important actor in a wider movement that collectively looks critically at globalization and fights against the neoliberal order (PDS, 2002, p. 1). Unions also play a role in addressing ecological problems within society, and they should use their influence to improve environmental standards (PDS, 1994, p. 18). In short, strong unions are essential both for a good work environment and living standards (The Left, 2013, p. 16).

Caproso (1997) pointed out that support for globalization can be increased by

giving people real choices on the issue. The question of whether or not The Left offers voters significant policies when it comes to globalization is rather simple: It does not. As previously stated, The Left does not refer to globalization until 1998 and then it is only relevant for one more election, after 2002 the party uses the term only twice. Initially there is some talk about globalization in a neutral manner. The party asserts that globalization is not to blame for high unemployment rates, but rather neoliberal policies (PDS, 1998, p. 5). Similarly, globalization creates pressures to tackle certain problems, but it doesn't create them (PDS, 1998, p. 49), except for the neoliberal financial form of globalization, which is counterproductive to human development (PDS, 1998, p. 48). The 2002 program explicitly outlines the need to dispense with the capitalist form of globalization. Instead, this destructive form of globalization must be replaced by a globalization that is characterized by international cooperation and designed to be social, ecological, and democratic (PDS, 2002, p. 22). While the 2005 program still contains a chapter heading that asserts the need and desire to create a fair form of globalization, substantively, the chapter is rather devoid of anything that addresses globalization, except for the critique that neoliberal globalization must be replaced with a peaceful global order (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 32). In essence, there are only two election programs that actually address the issue of globalization in any greater depth than a single side comment. The party's lack of substantive policies that directly address the issue of globalization does lead to a decrease of support for the issue, according Caproso (1997), which appears to be exactly what the party prefers with its emphasis on regionalism over globalization (PDS, 1998, p. 50).

The questions of how regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement (Ranjan

& Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000) are addressed by The Left is interesting, because the party does not pretend that Germany can just engage in a form of policy/standards upload, where in essence, other countries end up adopting German standards, like the CDU, for example (see Section 5.3 for details). This can be explained by the fact that the party is quite critical of existing standards and regulations and calls for them to be changed, anyway. Specific examples of policy fields that the party is interested in harmonizing are tax policies and dues across Europe in order to prevent tax evasion and tax dumping (PDS, 1998, p. 21), coordinating social and ecological standards across Europe against social or environmental dumping (PDS, 1998, p. 49, 2002, p. 25; The Left, 2013, p. 10), and aligning immigration and asylum policies in Europe (PDS, 2002, p. 20; Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 24; The Left, 2009, p. 29). Contract enforcement is not an issue that The Left addresses.

Broadly related to the issue of harmonization and contract enforcement is the matter of offering voters distinct choices with respect to international agreements (Hays 2009; Martin 2000). The Left presents a clear view on the negative effects that the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank have, due to their capitalist agendas (PDS, 1998, p. 49). It is not really clear what these organizations' functions should be, according the party's election programs. The programs only state that these organizations must be comprehensively democratized (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 32) and be placed within the framework of the UN, while also being complemented by regional development organizations (The Left, 2009, pp. 33-34). The party's view on NATO is extremely critical with the first instance in which they call for the abolishment of NATO coming in 1994. NATO is a Cold War relic and only propagates a violent form of dealing with

problems; a much better approach is to work through the UN (PDS, 1994, p. 20, 1998, p. 4, p. 8, p. 52). This message is consistently repeated and emphasizes the pacifist agenda of The Left and its commitment to stop German participation in military missions (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 31; The Left, 2013, p. 35). This leads to the importance that the party places upon the UN as the primary organization in international relations. In order to better perform in that role, the UN must become more democratic and its resolutions must be treated as binding (PDS, 2002, pp. 22-23; The Left, 2009, p. 34). This also includes the more prominent role that the UN will have to play with regards to environmental issues (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 20). One thing that is not apparent is how the UN will actively promote a pacifist agenda and establish itself as the final institution in international matters, with binding character, without military enforcement options. The Left's support for the EU is somewhat timid. The party does claim that the EU is an important organization, despite its social, democratic, and ecological deficits. The EU must work on addressing those problems and do more to create jobs and to promote peace (PDS, 1998, p. 6). This necessitates that the EU receive increased competencies from the national governments to actively use regulatory measures to intervene in markets and the power to create binding social and environmental standards (PDS, 1998, pp. 53-54). In more recent elections, The Left has focused on critically looking at the EU's inability to better promote ecological and social change within its borders and to stop privatization, economic liberalism, deregulation, and dumping policies for taxes as well as social standards (The Left, 2002, p. 35). Particularly within Europe, the EU must focus less on economic liberalization, but on increasing social standards by strengthening unions, harmonizing social regulation, and averting tax dumping (The Left, 2013, p. 49).

With regards to globalization and global markets, The Left has two different approaches which are not fully compatible. The party consistently talks about granting developing countries full access to the Western markets (PDS, 1994, p. 19) by abolishing export subsidies, so that developing countries can fairly compete on the markets of rich industrial countries (PDS, 2002, p. 22); this is particularly important for agricultural products (The Left, 2009, p. 32). The party also calls for a fundamental reorientation of the relationship between Germany and countries of the southern hemisphere to the point that development support is no longer designed to promote the interests of donor countries. The aim must instead be build local markets (The Left, 2009, pp. 32-33). This goal of creating local markets is not just important for developing countries, because neoliberal policies are all too prevalent around the world and the harsh competition of global markets has only aggravated social challenges, within Germany as well (PDS, 1998, pp. 5-6). A key element for combating these developments, according to The Left, is to build up regional economies. The goal is to cultivate and emphasize regional development (PDS 1994, p. 8) and to promote globalization through regionalization (PDS, 1998, p. 50). It is not clear how these two, globalization and regionalization, go together because the party only focuses on strengthening regions and regional interactions. The goal is to build regional economies and regional production chains that become increasingly autarkic (PDS, 2002, p. 3). This is especially true for regional agricultural sectors that focus on producing and consuming products within regions (PDS, 2002, p. 6). These efforts are supposed to be further strengthened by building up regional research clusters that focus especially on ecologically friendly technologies and that create additional independence for the region (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 16), which

must include infrastructure policies that are designed to promote better regional networks (The Left, 2009, p. 8). Globalization, by contrast, leads to the marginalization of entire regions (PDS, 2002, p. 25). The Left has consistently supported not globalization but regionalization and tried to foster a distinct regional economic culture (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 17). With international trade the party is opposed to what it refers to as a one-sided focus on exports, rather than what is necessary, a collective effort towards regional economies (The Left, 2009, p. 12). This must also be reflected in the development policies that Germany promotes, which must focus on building strong economic relationships between developing countries so as to build regional markets, in opposition to global trade. This way more value added production processes can take place within developing countries, which will increase fair payment for products (The Left, 2009, p. 32).

According to the literature, if political elites are interested in a positive domestic response to globalization, they need to identify and address the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). Addressing this point makes more sense for the other four major German political parties, since they all are supportive of globalization, at least on some level. This cannot be said of The Left. Besides the fleeting statements on shaping globalization in a social, ecological, and democratic manner (PDS, 2002, p. 22), the party has a predominantly negative disposition towards economic globalization and trade. Since the party has no interest in promoting globalization, it would be ludicrous to expect that The Left addresses the globalization dilemma. However, the party does propose policies that will indirectly build greater willingness to adopt more economic openness. The consistent efforts by the party to support and

strengthen those people in society who are most vulnerable to a more competitive environment will create a greater sense of safety and assure employees that even if they lose their jobs, this will not result in a financial and social downturn. Examples of this increased safety net are the generally increased welfare payments for which the party calls, the added power that it wants to grant to unions (PDS, 1994, p. 18, 1998, p. 6; The Left, 2009, p. 6), the creation of a government funded jobs market (PDS, 2002, p. 4; Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 8; The Left, 2013, p. 17), and a binding minimum wage of at least 10 Euros per hour (PDS, 2002, p. 5; Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 9; The Left, 2009, p. 4, 2013, p. 13). In essence, while the party does not directly reference the globalization dilemma, the policies it promotes will assuage the fears that people might have with regards to globalization and possibly more competition. It is not clear that is indirect support is enough to offset the overtly negative message that the party is otherwise sending to the electorate on the issue of globalization.

The last theoretical building block that must be addressed is the work by Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004), who claim that a useful tool for European states to overcoming resistance to globalization is to emphasize a shared European identity. The Left states that the EU is an important organization for the PDS (PDS, 1998, p. 6) and the EU's enlargement is viewed very favorably by the party, not just for it economic opportunities, but also for the chance to engage in social and cultural exchanges (PDS, 2002, p. 9). Nonetheless, the party does not foster a European identity. The Left does not promote any form of German identity and it is extremely critical of nationalistic rhetoric and calls for a Europe without nationalism (PDS, 2002, p. 25, Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 31). Otherwise, The Lefts propagate a very open and

inclusive Germany, which is evident in the regular call for openness towards immigrants and especially asylum seekers. The party also attempts to promulgate an understanding of culture not as something nationalistic, but as something inclusive where everyone can contribute, including minorities and foreigners (The Left, 2009, p. 24). In fact, the state must build up institutions that foster diversity including minority languages and cultures, as well as structures that allow minorities to fully participate at all levels (The Left, 2013, p. 44). In a nutshell, while The Left does not promote a supranational identity that transcends nationalist thinking, at least it does not erect a national identity that would potentially be threatened by globalization. In an atypical sense for German parties, The Left is very skeptical when it come to the free movement of capital, goods, and services, but it promotes the free movement of people, which means that the party cannot be classified as isolationist.

9.4 Conclusion of The Left Analysis

The Left dependably calls for a social state that is supportive of everyone, especially of minorities, and one that fosters social cohesion and inclusivity with a plethora of policy suggestions that are designed to increase the social safety net. These include increased unemployment protection, more benefits for the unemployed, minimum wages, supplemental benefits for low income families, as well as an effort to push for higher social and ecological standards across countries. These policies have the ability to instill confidence in individuals and mitigate fears of personal hardship due to global competition. Combined with the party's unfailing calls for a very inclusive and open, multicultural Germany that is not linked to national ideals, Germans should not feel

threatened by globalization and international trade. However, the systematic critique of international trade and the marginalization of globalization will most likely leave voters with a sense that regional economies and solutions are best. Trade, and especially Germany's export surplus, are very negative in the eyes of The Left (The Left, 2013, p. 49), so that the party's supporters will most likely not favor trade liberalization in any form, but actually prefer trade restrictions.

A liberal economic order is anathema to The Left, because free trade only leads to neoliberal structures and a form of capitalism that profits powerful companies and not individuals (The Left, 2013, p. 54). Capitalism has failed and is unable to address basic human needs or to guarantee sustainable living standards (The Left, 2009, p. 1). Similarly, free trade has only led to price dumping (The Left, 2009, p. 32). That is why socialism and government intervention is essential. The party repeatedly emphasizes its desire for peaceful cooperation and for Germany to become a fair partner for global justice and prosperity (PDS, 2002, p. 21), but instead of creating more equality, unbridled capitalist globalization only increases inequality, instability, and violence (PDS, 2002, p. 22). Neoliberal globalization also undermines democracy and development, because it undermines the ability of states to act in a self-determined manner (PDS, 1998, p. 48). The Left clearly outlines the type of globalization that it does not want, but it lacks a vision for what globalization should look like. The party's answer, that globalization should be regional, is not an outline of what globalization should look like, but what the party wants to see instead of globalization. Beyond 2002, the issue is pretty much dead when it comes to the party's election programs, almost like one traveled back in time to the early 1990s, when globalization had not yet entered into Germany's competitive

election vernacular. Even in the few instances that the party addresses global trade or globalization, it is not coherent. For example, The Left claims that developing countries must receive better access to global markets, which necessitates that rich countries stop export subsidies (PDS, 2002, p. 22). While this appears to be a sensible position, it is contradictory to an earlier point in the same 2002 program, in which the party asserts that Germany's agricultural sector must receive special attention. The ecological achievements and social sustainability of farmers must be recognized, including through financial compensation (PDS, 2002, p. 6). Any form of domestic subsidies for farmers amounts to an export subsidy, because German farmers can offer their products at a lower price point and maintain profitability on domestic and international markets. Without government support, these price points would be unsustainable.

The German electorate deserves better and more coherent policy proposals as to how to deal with Germany's huge export and import share of GDP. It is unclear how an economy that excels at importing a vast amount of goods and that is then able use those imports to produce finished products that are exported at unrivaled levels for an economy of its size across the world can just transform into a regionally based economy without creating upheaval and job loss. Then again, it is the luxury of an opposition party to make all sorts of claims and assertions regardless of whether or not they are populist, because the opposition party is not judged on how many of its policy proposals are implemented or the consequences of such propositions. Nevertheless, this kind of communication is likely to negatively influence the view of voters on issues like globalization and free trade, thus increasing the voices of those who call for more economic isolation.



Figure 9.1 The Left Party Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms



Figure 9.2 The Left Party Globalization References Sorted by Their Normative Implication



Figure 9.3 Globalization References The Left Party



Figure 9.4 Trade References The Left Party



Figure 9.5 Export References The Left Party



Figure 9.6 Import References The Left Party



Figure 9.7 Free Trade References The Left Party

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

Before summarizing the findings of this study and outlining how they connect to future research, it is beneficial to briefly summarize the premise at the outset of this study. This work argues that globalization is the figurative wave that lifts all boats, i.e., small as well as large economies. Globalization is an essential tool to ensure a broad wave of growth (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Moran, 1978), which is not to say that globalization amounts to a panacea; there is plenty of critique that can be lodged at its current state of operation (Dos Santos, 1970; Milanovic, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003). However, within the field of political science, the discussion does not revolve around a moratorium or even reversal of globalization; instead the discourse focuses on identifying and fixing its shortfalls (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2003; Wang, 2000). The ability to make globalization more universally beneficial necessitates a better understanding of the process. This study acts as one of the many puzzle pieces that help better explain this complex phenomenon, in particular by shedding light on the role that political parties play with regards to globalization, because the relationship between political parties and globalization has not been broadly studied and it is not as well understood as it could be. This is precisely the reason that drives this research, to gain added understanding of the relationship between political parties and globalization.

The very first steps that this study takes toward this end are to reject a) the notion that increased globalization is inevitable due to technological progress and b) that globalization circumscribes the state's sovereignty. Globalization does not confront the state with existential threats; instead, it alters the environment within which states operate and adds complexity. The state retains its power, even under increased globalization. In fact, the nation state is a major threat to globalization as, ultimately, states retain the potential to stop and even reverse globalization. The historic evidence of global economic upheaval in the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates that this is not just a theoretical possibility. The Great Depression was aggravated by global protectionist measures. It was only towards the end of the Second World War that governments started to increasingly replace protectionism with economic openness. The driving force behind this development in the Western World was the leadership of the United States, which was not predictable given the lack of prior domestic political will to break with isolationism. One key that had fundamentally changed within the United States was the domestic political will to promote an open economic global order.

This study argues that globalization is dependent upon political will and that it is important to examine this political will more closely. From the 1980s until the recent financial crisis, global trade as a share of global GDP rose steadily, but since 2008 it has largely remained level (until today, 2017), which has caused some to say that "[g]lobalization has clearly paused" ("Special Report: The World Economy," 2013, p. 3). The notion that globalization is bound to progress due to ever-increasing technological advancements and the ease with which global communication is possible is dangerous, because it breeds complacency (Ghemawat, 2017). If no one actively supports and

campaigns for globalization, then we cannot expect it to spread in the future. In fact, demonizing globalization is a popular approach for politicians to gain popular support. The French far-right leader Marine Le Pen, who has ambitions to become president of the EU's second most populous country and is expected to make it into the second round of the French presidential election (at least) in 2017, started her campaign by warning "thousands of her flag-waving supporters of 'two totalitarianisms', globalization and Islamism, that want to 'subjugate France'" (Nossiter, 2017, n.p.). When the new American president Donald Trump offered his first full speech on foreign policy while on the campaign trail in 2016, he asserted that "[w]e will no longer surrender this country, or its people, to the false song of globalism" (Tharoor, 2016, n.p.). The candidate of the Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton, did not use such extreme language, but also distanced herself from globalization while campaigning. For example, she expressed her opposition about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, even though she had championed it as Secretary of State. "Democrats and Republicans agreed on almost nothing at their conventions […], except this: free trade, just a decade ago the bedrock of the economic agendas of both parties, is now a political pariah" (Steinhauer, 2016, n.p.). This recent verbal attack on globalization also coincides with a trend that has been developing since 2010, where "greater openness has been replaced by an enthusiasm for building barriers – mostly to the world's detriment" ("The world economy: The gated globe," 2013, p. 13). Since nationalism is alive and well, and given its potential to end globalization like no other development (Bisley, 2007, p. 186), it is vital to examine and understand the political will which key political actors express.

It is not uncommon for globalization scholars to disregard the impact of political

party platforms and preferences when it comes to analyzing a state's disposition or its actions with regards to globalization. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, there are researchers who would reject this notion and argue that the way that parties compete with one another can have a substantial impact on a state's foreign policy (Camyar, 2012; Shoch, 1998), especially when it comes to passing protectionist measures (Callahan et al., 1994; Cupitt & Elliot, 1994; Pastor, 1980). This study identified party election programs as a useful tool to identify the different positions that parties take on the issue of globalization, because such programs constitute publicly available expressions of a party's key policy positions that have been formulated by party elites and sanctioned by the wider party body (Crowson, 2007; Klingemann et al., 1994; Pappi & Seher, 2009). The perception that election programs are merely electoral tools for securing votes is erroneous. There is a strong link between party election programs and policy outcomes (Kavanagh, 1981; Klingemann et al., 1994; Mansergh & Thomson, 2007). This connection is also referred to as the program-to-policy linkage (Thompson et al., 2012), and extends beyond the governing party. In a country like Germany, where coalition governments have historically been the norm, election programs have a special function. They are not just about gaining votes but signal to other parties the issues on which they are compatible and willing to enter into negotiations on in order to form or join a governing coalition. As Jensen and Seeberg (2015) point out, opposition parties have the ability to develop issue ownership or reputational advantage, which can enable opposition parties to successfully pressure the government into accepting or at least adjusting policies in a manner that it otherwise would not have done. Additionally, opposition parties do influence the domestic discourse that sends signals to the governments of other

states and thus influences intergovernmental negotiations (Ramsay; 2004; Schultz, 1998).

Before proceeding to a summary of the findings of this study, it is helpful to briefly remind readers of why this project focuses on Germany. Recent events offer a sound basis. By the end of 2016, Germany was attracting attention. There was a theme circulating in the print media, at the time of the closing of the Obama era, while Britain was busy figuring out how to leave the EU with as little hurt as possible, and as France's political elite was struggling to fend off the populist surge of Marine Le Pen, that Germany's leadership took on a special role. The New York Times wrote that "Germany's chancellor, Angela Merkel, has emerged as the last powerful defender of Europe and the trans-Atlantic alliance after the election of Donald J. Trump" (Smale & Erlanger, 2016). This sentiment was echoed by others as well, describing Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel as "the leader of the free world" (Garton, 2016; Noack, 2016). While this may or may not be an exaggeration, it does reveal a certain perception that German leadership matters and is more relevant than that of the average state.

Although recent events further justify a study such as this one, at the point in time when the study was conceived, it was not possible to foresee the surge in antiglobalization and antiestablishment populism. This work rests on a more theoretically grounded logic, a structural approach that justifies the focus on Germany. Size matters in international relations and when it comes to an open economic order, there are three key economies: China, the USA, and the EU, which are all disproportionate in size to all other economies. Any one of these three would make for an interesting and important research project, but it would be hard to combine all three into a single piece. Even looking at the EU as a whole would not have been possible given the in-depth approach

that this study takes towards how parties present the issue of globalization and trade, in elections. The justification for looking exclusively at Germany is based on Kindelberger's (1973) structural logic that the anarchic self-help system of international relations and the global economy can only be overcome when there is a stabilizer, a powerful state that has a significant incentive to create and enforce a stable free trade system. As Mattli (1999) and Crawford (2015) point out, Germany certainly takes on this role for the EU, because it provides leadership, payments to ease distributional tensions, economic clout, and institutional role models. In other words, closely looking at Germany instead of the EU as a whole is justified, because the EU's overall position on trade liberalization and globalization will, to a large part, be determined by Germany's position on the issue.

10.1 Summary of Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Findings

This study is built on the assumption that globalization causes domestic policy change, which in turn can shape globalization, because it can alter domestic political will. This political will acts as an intervening variable between globalization and policy. In this context, political will refers to the willingness to either promote or object to increased openness and trade liberalization. This claim is theoretically grounded in Rogowski's (1989) idea to combine the economic Stolper-Samuelson theorem with a political element, which allows for the key assumptions that those who profit from a change in trade liberalization will rally together with others who are similarly affected, in an effort to generate more openness and even freer trade. Conversely, those who are adversely affected will try to stop any form of further trade liberalization and attempt to establish

obstacles to trade. Additionally, economic openness will also increase the political influence of those who see their income increase due to a change in trade policies. While Rogowski talks about alliance formation in a more abstract manner, this research argues that it is reasonable to infer that this also means a change in the overall debate as to what policies are favored and which ones discarded. As the political landscape shifts and new alliances are formed, one will be able to observe how such shifts in power are reflected in the manner with which parties vie for power and try to represent their clientele. In order to apply Rogowski's sparing approach to the specific context of Germany, and in an effort to cultivate a better understanding of how political will is formed, this study identifies five key elements. These are elements that Rogowski's critics claim are missing from his model for a better and more complete understanding of how globalization affects domestic politics (see Table 2.1).

This study shows that three of the five additional elements identified by Rogowski's critics do not in fact help understand this connection better, at least not in a competitive party context. The following paragraphs address each of these failed variables, beginning with the concept of partial factor mobility. Based upon the logic of partial factor mobility (Brawley, 1997), trade liberalization does not affect sectors uniformly, which means that one must differentiate between labor in the import versus the export sector, as trade affects people differently depending on whether they are employed in the export or the import sector. In terms of electoral competition, this means that parties should have opportunities to craft targeted messages for voters depending on the sector they work in: a message of openness for those who work in an exporting sector and a promise to increase import restriction for those who face a lot of competition from

imports. While Brawly is successful in demonstrating that including partial factor mobility is helpful to explain historic cases, it is not applicable to party competition. None of the five parties examined in this study even remotely addresses partial factor mobility. It appears that this is the case because it is too complex an issue to address in an election campaign. German parties are not able to address the issue in a manner that it is understandable for the broad electorate. German parties do have a certain core clientele, but they all try to attract a broad spectrum of voters. It would require a niche party to advocate specifically for policies that are designed to only advance the interests of capital within the import sector. The risk that such a niche party faces in Germany is that they may not clear the 5% threshold that any party must obtain in order to be seated in parliament.

The same pattern emerges around the issue of volatility. Woodruff (2005) pointed out that volatility affects trade preferences, meaning that significant changes in the economic environment alter trade preferences. Parties should be able to increase votes by catering to such changed preferences, specifically, using economic volatility in the wake of booms and busts to gather support for more protectionism polices. Here too, volatility is not relevant for party competition in Germany. As previously outlined in the individual party analysis chapters, a party that is involved in a governing coalition has a strategic incentive not to address volatility, since no party that governs wants to be associated with any form of instability. This logic applies to all major German parties, except for The Left. Instead of focusing on specific economic downturns The Left is more concerned with emphasizing the East-West disparity within Germany. In essence, all parties briefly mention the 2007 financial crisis in their 2009 election programs, but not one party made

the argument that trade restrictions were needed because of the crisis and volatility. In other words, Germany's major parties do not use the issue in their electoral competition with one another, although one can detect a slight increase of negative references to trade and globalization in the SPD and Green programs. The Left makes two thirds of all its critical trade and globalization remarks in the 2009 and 2013 elections. It is not clear if this is an instance of causation or simply correlation. At best, one might be able to claim that there is an indirect link between volatility and trade preferences when it comes to party competition.

The third theoretical element that is not addressed in a meaningful way in Germany's election process is the multifactor model, as Midford (1993) refers to it. According to this model, labor subgroups are an important element to consider in order to better understand how the international economic order affects domestic party competition. Such subgroups can be divided into skilled and unskilled workers, service versus manufacturing employees, or public and private workers. The five examined parties do not differentiate in their programs between labor subgroups. It appears that all parties prefer to appeal to the entire electorate instead of identifying policies that are of particular interest to a specific subgroup. The only two parties that briefly try to appeal to a subgroup are the CDU with a special emphasis on the agricultural sector and the SPD, which regularly vows to support coal mining. The CDU's special attention to agriculture in its election programs is much more part of an effort to emphasize the party's efforts to protect Germany's countryside and farming as part of its cultural heritage and identity than it is an attempt to discuss economic policies let alone to formulate a response to globalization. A similar argument can be made for the SPD, which tries to curry favor

with one of its oldest constituencies, instead of communicating relevant trade policies as they relate to the mining industry.

Unlike the three previously identified elements that do not relate well to party competition in Germany, the remaining two do so very well. Garst (1998) brought up the vital role that labor unions can play in globalized economies by fostering cooperation between capital and labor. This cooperation is essential for trade liberalization to succeed and unions can also play a vital role in figuring out ways to share the gains from trade liberalization more equitably. This is why this research poses the question, "What kind of positions do the five examined parties take on the issue of labor unions?" The FDP is the one party that does not express support for labor unions. Instead, the party wants to curb the influence of unions (FDP, 1990, p. 39) and replace them with local works councils, which are supposed to be more flexible and effective (FDP, 2005, p. 14), but of course, also have much less bargaining power. All other parties take a positive position on the issue of unions. The CDU is the most timid in this regard, clearly recognizing them as an important part of Germany's society and economy, but not really interested in advancing their position either. The Greens do express tacit support of unions and their role as an important element within German society (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1998, p. 69), but such references are sporadic, at best. The two parties that consistently and strongly support unions are the two parties on the left of the political spectrum. The Left's position on unions can be summed up as strongly supporting them, because unions are essential both for a good work environment and living standards (The Left, 2013, p. 16). The party with the strongest endorsement is the SPD, which is not surprising due to its close historic ties to labor unions. The SPD regards strong labor unions as essential both for a

good work environment and living standards (The Left, 2013, p. 16). The party consistently emphasizes its desire to build a cooperative global world order that can shape the future by mutually solving problems. For the SPD, shaping this new order includes the support and influence of unions (SPD, 2013, p. 106).

There is clearly some differentiation between party positions on labor unions with one party disregarding them, while two parties provide some support for them and another two strongly endorse their role in society and the work they do. Garst (1998) claims that labor unions have an important role to play in a globalized world, because they foster cooperation between capital and labor. The party election program analysis conducted in this study shows that the role of unions is secure within German society and their role as mediator is not in question, except by one of the smaller parties. This can be disregarded, in light of the otherwise supportive position that all the other parties take. Unions will remain an integral part of German society and its economy. Therefore they will continue to be an important factor in making adjustments to the economy and the relationship between workers or employees and the companies or large corporations that they work for in the global economy. However, German parties must better formulate a vision for unions in a globalized world. Does the role of unions change under conditions of increased trade liberalization? How can unions help distribute the gains from globalization more equitably? These are questions that German parties must address, because on the one hand labor unions are an integral and historic part of Germany's society and economy, and on the other hand, Germany's economy highly profits from globalization and trade liberalization. It is time for parties to outline how these two components fit together and how they can be mutually reinforcing to increase both

prosperity and equality.

The fifth and final element that is identified in the literature as important for making Rogowski's model more complete is Caproso's (1997) claim that even though there might be cleavages within voter preferences, these cleavages do not necessarily lead to action. This is because voters are not experts and are not necessarily able to identify policies that are congruent with their individual preferences. According to Caproso's logic, political parties ought to formulate clear choices based on preferences, so that voters can choose by casting a vote. This means that it is important to look at whether parties present meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or if they merely use the issue for scapegoating.

The FDP policies that relate to globalization focus on deregulation and decentralization, in an effort to remove barriers to trade. Overall, the party regards globalization as a chance for growth, promoting peace, and increasing prosperity (FDP, 1998, p. 91). The Greens, by contrast, paint a very critical picture of globalization emphasizing how unjust it is and that it primarily serves the interest of multinational corporations (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79), and most importantly that the consequences of globalization are often environmentally harmful (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1998, p. 152). The party asserts that globalization currently contributes significantly to the increase in hunger, environmental destruction, racism, violence, the subjugation of women, and exploitation of children. This is also why the Greens promote resistance to globalization and support movements that oppose it (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79, 2013, pp. 63-64). The SPD is also somewhat critical of globalization and claims that globalization must be shaped in order to ensure commensurate benefits

from it. The SPD presents itself as a party that can do this, emphasizing free markets, but at the same time making sure that the gains are evenly distributed (SPD, 2005, p. 41). A clear lack of meaningful policy proposals can be observed in the CDU's campaign programs. The party does not use the issue for scapegoating, but aside from a few statements that developing countries need better access to markets, purposeful policy proposals are lacking. The Left does not unilaterally condemn the issue either; in fact the party does state that globalization in and of itself is not necessarily to blame for social challenges that society is facing, but rather neoliberal policies (PDS, 1998, p. 5). Similarly, the globalization of the financial system is bad because of its neoliberal form (PDS, 1998, p. 48). Overall, The Left has no substantive policies that directly address the issue of globalization.

In essence, of the major German parties there is only one party, the FDP, which clearly and consistently argues in favor of globalization. There are two parties that are predominantly critical of globalization with The Greens highlighting the injustice of the current global order and The Left, which expresses some direct opposition to the issue, but mostly demonstrates its discontent with globalization by ignoring it in its campaign programs. The two remaining parties that are somewhat in the middle, showing some support for global and open markets, but in the case of the CDU just not consistently and in that of the SPD, a slightly stronger focus on the negative social consequences. Overall, one must conclude that German parties do not deal with globalization in an adequate manner, because if the issue is truly as important and all-encompassing a topic, as the CDU claims (CDU, 2009, p. 90), then parties would pay more attention to the issue and formulate precise policies to deal with issues such as social mobility and worker

protection in a global economy. Even parties that are more critical of globalization promote the idea that it can be transformed into a sustainable, fair, and peaceful process (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 16, 2013, p. 24). In fact, all parties, except for The Left which is simply ignoring the issue, claim that globalization can be shaped and formed into a beneficial process. It is time parties present voters with the details of how they are going to accomplish this, clearly linking domestic policy fields to globalization and international trade, including a more honest approach about the benefits and central role of both exports and imports for the German economy.

To sum up, three of the additional elements that the literature identifies with regards to improving the link between politics and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem do not lend themselves well to electoral party competition. It appears that this is not a Germany specific issue for partial factor mobility and labor subgroups, but rather that election campaigns are not suitable for addressing such differences. With regard to a lack of references on volatility this might be based upon the structure of Germany’s multiparty system, which means that in countries with similar systems one can expect to make a similar observation. It is conceivable that within a party system where coalitions are not the norm and where there is a high degree of partisanship, addressing volatility and busts might be common practice during election campaigns. By contrast, looking at the role that parties envision for labor unions makes sense and while one can observe an overall strong commitment on unions, German political parties are lacking when it comes to defining a role and vision for unions in a globalized world. With regard to the formulation of clear policy choices, German parties do present policies, but they fall short in both quantity and quality for a heavily trade dependent country that has been

traditionally in favor of increased openness. The complexity and importance of the matter demand a more comprehensive approach with specific policy proposals as to how globalization ought to be shaped.

This research also argues that globalization is not just affected by obvious trade related factors such as tariff rates or trade agreements, but also by many more indirect factors (see Table 3.1). The following paragraphs summarize how German parties relate to these indirect factors, in order to ascertain if German parties directly and/or indirectly support the concept of globalization. The first indirect factor identified by this study is the globalization dilemma, which addresses the problem that globalization relies on less government intervention and to some extent a smaller state. At the same time, popular support for globalization necessitates a certain level of government interference through regulation and taxation in order to compensate those people who are worse off as a direct result of globalization. Addressing this dilemma and devising policies that alleviate fears of social instability and a loss of prosperity are key in this respect. As the research conducted by this study shows, unfortunately the globalization dilemma is a topic that is not addressed directly by any of the five parties in their election campaigns. There are plenty of indirect references, however, because all parties have an opinion on the size and role of the state. The CDU for example, focuses largely on the message that a smaller state is better for society and that individuals need to take on more responsibility for themselves. This does not amount to shedding the welfare state, but it does create an emphasis on more self-reliance. In addition, the party's recurring message that while increasing competitiveness can create a sense of empowerment and opportunity for those who believe that they have the skills and talents to succeed in such an environment, it can

also create anxiety for those who already feel that they are on the fringe of society, barely able to afford life in the 21st century. Increased competition is the last thing that people look forward to in that situation, which means that they will oppose any effort to increase global trade and competition. This is even more true for voters who read the FDP's election programs, because the liberals have a more pronounced message of self-reliance and competitiveness. A need to compensate the losers is not addressed by the FDP at all. There is no need for government organized wealth distribution and regulation, because increased free trade simply means more prosperity for everyone.

The Greens have a different perspective. They also do not address the globalization dilemma directly, which is to be expected as it is not clear that the Greens are actually interested in gathering support for globalization. The party is interested in protecting people from economic hardship: It supports a strong welfare system, and an active state. The constant emphasis on introducing new environmental standards and the ambitious goal to reduce energy consumption is most likely not able to assuage the fears of unskilled and financially struggling workers whom the state is primarily interested in assisting in times of increased international competition of the global economy. Thus, while the party generally supports the welfare state, it is not clear that the party's overall policy platform would not leave some voters questioning if a ruling government with the Green party as one of the coalition partners would truly be able to build up a social safety net that can protect the individual from the potential pressures of a liberal trading order. The SPD also fails to address this issue directly. Even though the party does not link globalization with a need to strengthen the welfare state, its generally worker/employee friendly rhetoric does communicate a desire to support and strengthen the position of

people who might struggle in a more competitive environment. The party repeatedly talks about the need to strengthen the social safety net. The only problem for the SPD is that its message will be compared to the reality of Agenda 2010, which removed protections and stared requiring more self-reliance by citizens. Overall, the Social Democrats do outline policies that are mostly designed to alleviate the fears that voters can have in conjunction with globalization and increased competition brought about through trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the party could more directly address the link between globalization and policies that are designed to increase social security, especially for low skilled workers. The policies that The Left propagates with respect to the welfare system and the role of the state should assuage fears that people might have in regards to globalization and the possibility of more competition. This cannot offset the negative message about the capitalist form of globalization (PDS, 2002, p. 22) that the party communicates to voters and anyone who accepts the party's message should emphasize a regional approach to the economy over a global one. The single most important policy all three politically left parties share, that is most likely to lower resistance to foreign competition, is a binding minimum wage. This would suggest to voters that regardless of whether or not Germany is more or less involved in a globalized world, there is a minimum standard for income below which no individual should fall. In essence, the three parties that range from tacit support for to quite critical of globalization mostly promote policies that will increase economic safety and thereby lower resistance to globalization, because voters feel increasingly protected. The two parties that are most in favor of globalization, competition, and trade liberalization do little to nothing to address the security dilemma directly or indirectly. It would be much better for these parties to instead increase support

for globalization by identifying specific steps to help everyone compete more effectively and strengthen those individuals who are at a disadvantage.

Rodrick (2000) and Ranjan and Lee (2007) bring up the claim that emphasizing regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement can build acceptance for open economies and globalization, because people feel that they are competing with others in a fair manner. Contract enforcement is an issue that is almost completely ignored by German parties. Only the FDP brings up the issue, for example, when it comes to protecting of intellectual property rights (FDP, 1998, p. 71), or upholding and enforcing European competition laws (FDP, 1994, p. 32). The 1994 call for establishing a European law academy, which would ensure a unified understanding and implementation of laws across Europe, is the most far reaching policy in this regard (FDP, 1994, p. 60). By contrast, all parties call for some form of regulatory harmonization, especially when it comes to the tax code. This is seen as a crucial element for ensuring fair competition, particularly within the European common market, and vital for curbing tax evasion. Other common calls include shared consumer protection standards, common environmental standards, as well universal labor laws. The only party that is somewhat sparse with references on regulatory harmonization beyond the issue of taxation is the FDP, due to its preferred emphasis on deregulation. The Greens and The Left are the only two parties that call for a shorter work week across Europe to harmonize economies. Overall, German parties do communicate to voters that there are various efforts to harmonize to ensure fair competition between countries. One thing that is missing in this regard is that parties are mostly concerned with the policy upload, especially the CDU which is very strong on this shared standard, but with an exclusive emphasis on how German standards

will have to become the yardstick for everything. The FDP is the exception, here claiming that it is not about implementing German standards, but rather implementing the best regulations (FDP, 2005, p. 20). It would be a more honest approach to communicate to voters the standards Germany might have to change in an effort to create fairer competition.

Martin (2000) and Hays (2009) claim that governments can more easily implement international agreements, such as the EU with its common market, when voters feel engaged and feel they have options. This is why this study asks if parties communicate their goals when it comes to international agreements and do they offer voters clear alternatives? All German parties support international institutions as a vital tool for peace and prosperity in international relations and all of them unequivocally back the UN and the EU. A common thread in this regard is the goal to reform these two organizations in order to make them democratic (this especially true for the UN along with a call for increased power for the General Assembly and better representation of developing countries). Primary global economic institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO are also supported by all parties, except for The Left, which views them in a very negative light due to their overtly capitalist agendas (PDS, 1998, p. 49). The other parties do not share this negative view, but do see room for improvement, especially when it comes to giving developing countries a bigger say within these three organizations. There are also specific policy proposals like the Greens' goal to ensure that the programs that the IMF promotes focus more on crisis prevention and are self-reflective in order to assess the ecological and social consequences of the programs it promotes (Alliance '90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 81-82). Similarly, the SPD wants those

three institutions to not just focus on liberalizing markets, but also to promote shared standards, because social and ecological minimum standards are essential for preventing the exploitation of humans or the environment (SPD, 1998, p. 75, 2002, p. 16). When it comes to NATO, only The Left is critical of the institution and calls for its abolishment. Otherwise there is a strong consensus that NATO is Germany's essential security organization. Even the Greens, who were initially opposed, changed their mind as a result of NATO's engagement in the former Yugoslavian states. Differences only persist in the level of activity the organization should take, but not is legitimacy. Overall, German parties paint a positive picture of international institutions and their role for building prosperity and peace, which is a good thing. In terms of choice, voters do not have many alternatives, which is not to say that more parties should be more critical of specific organizations, like The Left, but to be more explicit in the way they want specific institutions to change or develop. Parties could also talk about specific policies they would push an organization to pursue after the election, if they are part of the government. Providing choices does not have to mean taking a stand for or against an organization, but rather can be about different priorities and goals within an organization. More specific choices would keep voters more engaged and lower public resistance to international agreements, as pointed out by Martin (2000) and Hays (2009).

Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004) have argued that one way to decrease resistance to economic integration in Europe is to purposefully build a European identity. As a whole, German parties do not promote a European identity, although the SPD does makes some hand gesturing in this direction. The party is not actively trying to build a European identity, but it strongly supports the European

integration process and a European identity. In general, except for the CDU, German parties do promote and support an open and inclusive culture that is open to anyone who is not opposed to Germany's democratic and pluralistic values (SPD, 2013, pp. 58-65). Culture and identity are not viewed as tools to propagate nationalism, but are rather treated as something inclusive where everyone can contribute, including minorities and foreigners. Any form of nationalism is despised in this context, because it destroys the idea of Europe and leads to conflict. In essence national identity is nothing that four of Germany's major political parties talk about and their generally positive outlook on Europe combines into a message that accepts outside influences and is open to other cultures. While this does not amount to actively communicating a European identity in their election programs, voters should not view globalization as a negative development on the basis that it threatens German identity. Unfortunately, the party in Germany that has governed the most does communicate a German form of identity that is distinct and must be preserved. The party's message is regularly about protecting a German homeland, a place of belonging and identification, a special culture with a Christian heritage. This type of identity is threatened by globalization. Thus, people who subscribe to the CDU's message will more likely object to globalization on the grounds that it threatens their unique identity. It would be better for the party that is also very concerned with promoting growth and prosperity to change its message on identity to something more comprehensive and inclusive, and not just for the sake of globalization.

To summarize, one should ask what can be said about the domestic political will in Germany with regards to globalization? Three of the five additional elements do not lend themselves well to party positions on globalization in German elections. On the

issue of labor unions there is a generally strong support for their role in Germany society. Thus one should expect unions to be an important element for building cooperation between capital and labor, as well as to ease distributional tensions. One thing that is lacking from all parties' programs is a clear vision of the roles that unions should fill in a modern and increasingly interconnected globalized world, thus missing an opportunity to formulate a plan for engaging unions in the process to shape globalization. Similarly, on the issue of providing choice in order to increase support and voter engagement, one has to conclude that German parties leave voters largely uninformed as to what their specific goals are with regards to globalization, which also constitutes a missed opportunity to define how Germany should respond to globalization and in which way it should try to shape and influence it. After all, with the exception of The Left, parties repeatedly claim that they want to shape globalization. However, they all fail to outline what it should look like and how to get there, except for the FDP which largely responds with a message promoting deregulation to support globalization. Again, a missed opportunity for spelling out a vision for voters and engaging voters on a key issue.

Concerning the four indirect factors that indicate how likely it is that German parties are in fact building support for globalization and trade liberalization, one can conclude that election programs in Germany are building tacit support for globalization when it comes to the issue of regulatory harmonization. Fears of unfair competition could be squelched if parties would be more specific on their harmonization goals, but also on their contract enforcement measures. When it comes to offering voters clear choices on the issue of international agreements and institutions, parties are creating minor support for globalization by affirming their backing of the EU and UN, but such affirmative

statements could be much more specific and thus create more support. This is especially true for key economic institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, which are hardly addressed at all. Stronger support and more specific reform goals with regards to these organizations would be helpful for reinforcing support for globalization and would constitute an indication that parties really do have a comprehensive plan for shaping globalization. Unfortunately, none of the parties directly addresses the globalization dilemma and while the three parties on the left of the political spectrum do provide some indirect assurances to voters that those who might be adversely affected by globalization will receive support from the government, there is a need for much stronger support from the CDU and FDP, who argue in favor of more openness. There have to be ways for these two parties to acknowledge the need to compensate globalization's losers in a specific and targeted way, without promoting big government. One policy path is to emphasize more and better opportunities for the training of people in low skilled jobs who are most likely to lose their jobs due to international competition. When it comes to actively constructing a European identity in order to alleviate fears of national identity loss through globalization, no party really seizes this opportunity. Most promote an open form of identity that is not tied to a particular German identity, except for the CDU which persistently emphasizes a German identity that can be threatened by globalization. Unfortunately, of the two parties that most favor globalization and trade liberalization, the one that has more supporters and political power consistently communicates to voters a concept of identity that lowers support for globalization. Thus, it is not apparent that German parties are creating more support for globalization through the messages that they communicate to voters in their election programs. This, combined with the overall

sparse and ambiguous references to globalization, does not show a form of political will that is likely to promote policies which will increase globalization and trade liberalization.

10.2 The Lessons of This Study and Questions That Still Need Answering

First off, the research conducted here is different from the majority of other studies in the field of political science with regards to globalization, because they tend to favor large-*N* statistical studies over single case studies. One interesting result of this work is that it fails to corroborate the conclusions of some large-*N* statistical studies. For example, based upon their statistical research of European election programs Milner and Judkins (2004) conclude that increased exposure to international markets over time makes all parties seek increasingly liberal trade policies. Exposure measured in terms of the value of exported goods traded in 2013 was almost three times higher than it was in 1991 and for value of imports roughly doubled (2.5 times) over the same time period.[1] The foreign trade quota (imports plus export divided by GDP) for Germany also dramatically increased over the same time period, with imports and exports accounting for less than 40% of Germany's GDP in the early to mid-1990s, but increasing to 70% in 2013. Clearly, exposure to foreign markets increased within the time period covered in this study, but there is no indication, overall, that German parties seek to increasingly liberalize trade policies. The statement is true for the FDP and in a more limited way also for the CDU, but not for the other three parties, which certainly do not promote

[1] Exports in 1991 were 340 billion Euro and by 2013 the figure had grown to 1,093 billion, for imports the numbers had increased from 329 billion Euro in 1991 to 898 billion in 2013 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p.7).

increasingly liberal trade policies during the 2005, 2009, and 2013 elections. Trade liberalization and globalization hardly feature in election programs prior to 1998, but trade liberalization appears more often in election programs around the turn of the century. For the Greens and The Left the issue is increasingly couched in a negative context and once the financial crisis hit, the SPD became more critical as well. The reason for the difference between this research and the work conducted by Milner and Judkins is the fact that there is a difference in the examined time frames. This study covers a later period, which includes the 2007-2008 financial crisis, but it also covers a period when exposure to international markets is relatively high in Germany. Further research should look at the effects that shocks, like the recent financial crisis, can have on the type of trade policies that parties promote in response to such a shock. Do such shocks lead to isolated instances of calls for less globalization and trade liberalization or is there a persistent change in the way that parties campaign with regards to these issues? Another explanation could be that once an economy reaches a certain degree of openness, backlash begins to grow. This would reflect a line of thinking that trade is in principle good, but there is a limit as to how much competition/imports or foreign meddling the domestic economy can handle. This would also be an interesting research question to address: Is there a point when increased exposure to markets causes parties to seek increasingly illiberal trade policies? It is also possible that Germany is an exception to Milner and Judkins' hypothesis regarding exposure and party positions? After all, their findings apply to parties in general and not to a specific state. This is common for large-N statistical research, but it might make sense to also pay special attention to key states, whose approach to globalization is more relevant than that of others.

Another claim of large-*N* statistical research is that in countries that are net exporters of goods, political parties will largely support open markets (Haupt, 2010). Germany had a current account surplus of nearly 300 billion U.S. dollars in 2016, making it the country with the largest current account surplus in the world that year ("Germany's current account surplus is a problem," 2017), so one would expect German parties to be predominantly in support of open markets. The evidence from the 35 examined election programs does not confirm this hypothesis however. The FDP is Germany's only party that is strongly and willingly in favor of open markets. The CDU does make some supportive statements about open trade, but overall these references appear insignificant for a country that is this heavily engaged in trade. The other three parties range from not really for or against open markets, in the case of the SPD, to quite against it when it comes to The Left, with The Greens somewhat critical, mostly due to the negative impact that trade can have on the environment. Overall, it is not that German parties are against open trade, but they do not communicate a purposeful message that is in favor of trade, either. Most importantly, in this regard, is the zero-sum thinking that all parties exhibit when it comes to trade, because all of them omit the positive role that imports play for the economy. The consistent message from all parties is that imports are seen as negative and exports are a good thing. In the long run, this can lead to protectionism in times of economic stress. Based upon this logic, a state can simply improve its wealth by reducing imports and increasing exports, since the economic downturn can easily be blamed on a negative current account balance. One ought to expect the political parties of one of the world's strongest export nations to proclaim an unequivocal message regarding the benefits of both exports and imports without resorting to zero-sum thinking rhetoric.

Further research should look at why German parties generally do not actively support open markets in their election programs. One explanation might be that a positive current account balance eventually becomes counterbalanced by a desire for less openness if the economy reaches very high levels of exposure to trade. This is again the idea that increasing openness can eventually be viewed as too much of a good thing. Further research should examine if there is a general level of openness when parties or the electorate tend to favor less trade liberalization and if so, are there parties that are able to successfully maintain a message of openness? It would also be interesting to see if the vast imbalance in the way that imports and exports are presented by the five examined parties is a unique German phenomenon, or a much more common occurrence? Are there examples of parties that are able to present a more holistic picture when it comes to trade by including the benefits of imports and how German parties can learn from them?

The conclusion of this research, that Germany's major political parties are not demonstrating the type of political will that is likely to promote policies for increased globalization and trade liberalization, must not necessarily hold for other countries. The specifics of this study are not suited to allow for broad generalizations, but the fact that the political elite in a country that is as actively engaged in trading goods and services at a level that is far beyond the reach of most other countries and that has been one of the, if not the, primary driver for integrating Europe and building a shared economy with increasingly fewer borders to trade, is so unenthusiastic about globalization and is only able to muster the ability to pay lip service to the idea of shaping and building globalization, but fails at delivering truly meaningful policy proposals, make it difficult to be hopeful that other states will feature parties that will behave differently from

Germany's parties who correctly claim that the issue of globalization needs to guide all policy formation (CDU, 2009, p. 90), but fail to implement this goal. Nevertheless, there might be structural differences in the economy or the political system of other states which will lead parties to behave differently within these states, exemplifying the political will to promote globalization. Therefore, other states should certainly be examined as well, but as previously mentioned, the USA and China should receive special attention. They are the two pivotal states with regards to the level of global trade openness that the world will seek. A different way of examining political will is necessary though, since the U.S.'s presidential system does not rely on the same type of party cohesion and election programs as European parties do and China's system of one-party rule will also not allow for analysis based upon election programs. The vastly different structure of the Chinese political system and the sheer size of its economy promises to be a very interesting study that might even reveal a form of political will that is happy to speak out on trade liberalization and advocate on behalf of globalization.

In the meantime, German politicians and those in other countries, that might have taken a similar approach to openness and trade should rethink their position, because an open and honest debate about how to shape globalization is indispensable. After all globalization "must be managed so that its fundamentally benign effects are ensured and reinforced" (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 35).

APPENDIX

Table A.1

Globalization Indicators of Germany's Economy

Year	Export Ratio (Exports*100) /GDP	Import Ratio (Imports*100) /GDP	Foreign Trade Balance = Export Ratio – Import Ratio	Foreign Trade to GDP Ratio = Export Ratio + Import Ratio
2015	46,8%	39,2%	7,6%	86,0%
2014	45,7%	39,1%	6,5%	84,8%
2013	45,5%	39,5%	6,0%	85,0%
2012	46,0%	39,9%	6,1%	86,0%
2011	44,8%	39,9%	5,0%	84,7%
2010	42,3%	37,1%	5,2%	79,3%
2009	37,8%	32,9%	5,0%	70,7%
2008	43,5%	37,5%	6,0%	80,9%
2007	43,0%	36,4%	6,6%	79,4%
2006	41,2%	35,9%	5,3%	77,1%
2005	37,7%	32,7%	5,1%	70,4%
2004	35,4%	30,4%	5,0%	65,9%
2003	32,6%	28,9%	3,7%	61,5%
2002	32,6%	28,2%	4,4%	60,8%
2001	31,9%	30,1%	1,8%	62,0%
2000	30,8%	30,6%	0,3%	61,4%
1999	27,0%	26,3%	0,7%	53,4%
1998	26,5%	25,1%	1,3%	51,6%
1997	25,4%	24,2%	1,2%	49,6%
1996	22,9%	22,1%	0,8%	45,0%
1995	22,0%	21,5%	0,5%	43,5%
1994	21,1%	20,9%	0,2%	42,1%
1993	20,4%	20,3%	0,1%	40,6%
1992	22,3%	22,8%	-0,5%	45,1%
1991	23,7%	24,2%	-0,5%	48,0%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017

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